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Abstract 
In complex tasks, experts perform effectively due to their extensive domain-
specific experience and intuitive expertise. Intuitive expertise facilitates rapid 
information processing and performance of actions in situations that can be 
overwhelming for less experienced people. Inspired by the potential of intuitive 
expertise, this research investigates the question: ‘How does intuitive expertise 
facilitate technology-mediated visual tasks in uncertain contexts’. Airport security 
screening was chosen as an exemplary case through which to explore this question due 
to its inherent task complexities and reliance on technology. Previous airport security 
screening research has investigated only some aspects of task performance and, 
consequently, our current understanding of expertise is limited.  
A field study was conducted at an Australian International Airport. Eye-tracking 
glasses were used to observe the visual and physical interactions of security screeners 
during normal task conditions. Following these observations, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with security screeners. To determine the role of intuitive 
expertise, data analysis focused on investigating the relationships between security 
screener experience, and the knowledge and processing styles underlying interactions.  
Field study results show that, as the result of experience, security screeners 
develop an integrated knowledge base that is characterised by the acquisition of 
problem-solving knowledge. Thus, expert security screeners demonstrated efficient 
and adaptive problem-solving that was used to overcome complex and difficult task 
situations. In comparison, non-expert security screeners relied strongly on rule-based 
knowledge, and performed standardised interactions. In unfamiliar and complex 
situations, non-experts demonstrated knowledge limitations that resulted in hesitation 
and poor articulation of problem situations.  
The implications of these findings have led to recommendations that address 
issues related to visual focus, skill development, and future airport security screening 
processes. These recommendations are also applicable to other complex activity 
domains, where they can assist the design of systems and interfaces that support 
knowledge development and skilled performance. 
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This research has pioneered the study of intuitive expertise in the airport security 
screening context, and has advanced the theory of intuitive expertise in uncertain 
contexts. It has contributed a novel research method that is suitable for the study of 
intuitive expertise in complex and uncertain domains.  
Research findings have also led to the development of conceptual models of 
expert and non-expert security screener interactions. Models represent the interactions 
performed by security screeners, and illustrate the structure of knowledge underlying 
these interactions. The models provide a significant outcome in the airport security 
screening context, where they can be applied to design and training, and to the 
development of adaptive systems that support interactions and encourage skill 
acquisition. Because the models are based on general concepts of knowledge, their 
application is transferrable to other uncertain activity contexts. This is particularly 
significant in safety-critical domains, where improving interaction and decision 
making accuracy is highly desirable. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
In most tasks, some level of complexity is experienced as a result of natural 
variability in the task environment (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Lillrank, 2002). The 
extent of this complexity is determined by the number and characteristics of variables 
that are experienced. At the most extreme, highly complex and uncertain environments 
are characterised by ambiguity, difficult-to-extract information, variable task 
conditions and limited feedback (Klein, 1997, 2008; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 
2001; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Zsambok & Klein, 1997). These types of conditions 
are experienced in domains such as medical diagnosis, military operations, emergency 
services, and air traffic control (Klein, 1998).  
In turn, the factors associated with complex and uncertain tasks can reduce the 
effectiveness of decision making and task performance (Krueger & Dickson, 1994; 
Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). It can be difficult for people to prioritise information, 
perform actions and rationalise decision making (Krueger & Dickson, 1994; Lipshitz 
& Strauss, 1997). This difficulty is exacerbated in unfamiliar situations where there 
are no standard procedures for dealing with problems (Becker, 2001; Hall, 2002; 
Lillrank, 2002; Savulescu, 1994).  
Many of the characteristics associated with complex and uncertain contexts are 
present in the airport security screening context. Security screeners are required to 
search images of passengers’ luggage, with the purpose of identifying broad categories 
of prohibited objects. Prohibited object categories include those that are clearly 
dangerous, such as firearms, explosives, and sharps. Categories also include seemingly 
innocuous items such as sporting goods, liquids, and certain electronics that could have 
potentially dangerous uses (Australian Government, 2009b; Seidenstat, 2004; 
Transport Security Administration, 2012).  
There are an indeterminate number of objects that fall within these categories. 
The appearance of objects can vary substantially in terms of size, shape and material, 
and it is possible that security screeners could be searching for something that they 
have never seen before (Bravo & Farid, 2004). Adding further to this complexity, is 
the fact that objects must be simultaneously identified in complex images characterised 
by superimposition, clutter, and objects presented at difficult viewing angles 
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(McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni, & Boot, 2004; Michel & Schwaninger, 2009; 
Von Bastion, Schwaninger, & Michel, 2008; Yi, Schwaninger, & Gall, 2008). Security 
screeners must possess visual skills that are tolerant of these variances (Kourtzi & 
DiCarlo, 2006).  
Sophisticated imaging technology plays an important role in mitigating the 
complex task conditions experienced in the airport security context. Imaging 
technology assists security screeners to identify threatening objects concealed within 
personal belongings and on the body. In the global airport security context, the 
continual development and deployment of increasingly sophisticated technology is the 
common strategy for improving the effectiveness of airport security (Graves et al., 
2011). The targets outlined by the Australian Government’s review of airport security 
screening (2009b) are in line with this trend. This review identified that there has been 
little innovation in airport security screening processes in Australian airports since the 
1970s. To address this deficit and help protect against new types of threats, the review 
recommended that enhanced screening technologies be integrated into existing 
processes (Australian Government, 2009b).  
Notwithstanding technological advancements, however, the people operating the 
equipment remain one of the most important factors in its effective use. In most cases, 
the screening and imaging technology used for airport security requires some level of 
interpretation and intervention by a security screener. Indeed, when it comes to 
decision making, the security screener is responsible for the final and most important 
decisions (Graves, et al., 2011; Schwaninger, 2003, 2004). 
In research aiming to understand decision making in complex and uncertain 
environments, it has been found that experts are able to overcome many of the 
difficulties experienced. This ability is attributed to their highly specific knowledge 
and experience that is developed in the domain of expertise (de Groot, 1965,  in Chi, 
2006; Popovic, 2000). This extensive knowledge and experience allows experts to 
extract and perceive task-critical information that is unavailable to less experienced 
decision makers (Lesgold, 1988, in Chi, 2006; Goldstone, 1994, 1998; Klein & 
Hoffman, 1992). A notable component of an expert’s ability in uncertain environments 
is intuitive expertise—the parallel and unconscious processing of information, enabled 
by domain-specific experience, pattern matching and automaticity (Salas, Rosen, & 
DiazGranados, 2009). Intuitive decision making is considered to be one of the only 
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viable options in uncertain and complex tasks (Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewé, 2004), 
as slower, analytical reasoning can be easily overwhelmed by large amounts of 
complex information (Mosier & Fischer, 2010; Salas, et al., 2009; Sinclair & 
Ashkanasy, 2005).  
In the airport security context, the role of intuitive expertise is unclear. To date, 
the focus of most security screening research has been on measuring threat detection 
performance in simulated screening tasks (e.g. Ghylin et al., 2008; Klock, 2005; Liu, 
Gale, & Song, 2007; McCarley, et al., 2004; Michel, Koller, Ruh, & Schwaninger, 
2006; Schwaninger, 2003; Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2005). In these types of 
studies, it is typically found that expert security screeners perform tasks more 
efficiently and with greater accuracy than less experienced security screeners (e.g. 
Koller, Drury, & Schwaninger, 2009; Liu & Gale, 2011; Schwaninger, 2004; 
Schwaninger, et al., 2005; Schwaninger & Wales, 2009). Despite these general 
increases in performance efficiency, studies have found that when faced with difficult 
image conditions such as clutter and superimposition, the performance of experienced 
and inexperienced security screeners does not differ significantly (Schwaninger et al., 
2008; Schwaninger, et al., 2005).  
The trend of using simulated tasks to measure performance has a number of 
disadvantages that limit understanding of expertise. Simulated tasks do not represent 
the full range of activities performed by security screeners under normal task 
conditions. Most importantly, they remove much of the complexity and diversity of 
interactions that are available during problem-solving situations (e.g. Klock, 2005; 
Michel, et al., 2006). There is a clear need for more thorough studies that investigate 
the various aspects of expertise in the security screening context. 
The study of intuitive expertise in the airport security screening context is highly 
compelling. Many of the abilities associated with intuitive expertise have been shown 
to develop in similarly complex visual tasks. In domains such as medical imaging, 
highly experienced people exhibit specialised visual skills when performing tasks with 
trained stimuli (Gauthier, 2010; Myles-Worsley, Johnston, & Simons, 1988). Experts 
are able to generate inferences and probabilities based on extensive knowledge and 
experience (Goldstein, 2010; Myles-Worsley, et al., 1988; Pylyshyn, 2003; Wolfe, Võ, 
Evans, & Greene, 2011). This experience and knowledge serves to guide attention to 
likely locations and areas of interest, while ignoring irrelevant distractor items (Bravo 
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& Farid, 2012; Huestegge & Radach, 2012; Myles-Worsley, et al., 1988; Pylyshyn, 
2003; Wilder, Mozer, & Wickens, 2011; Wolfe, 2003). Understanding this type of 
effective interaction is highly relevant in the security screening context and in other 
complex tasks. In safety-critical domains such as security screening, facilitating 
accurate and efficient interactions is of particular importance, as poor decision making 
in these domains can have potentially disastrous outcomes.  
This research investigates the role of intuitive expertise in the complex task of 
airport security screening. Of particular importance for this research, is an 
understanding of the knowledge and processing styles underlying security screeners’ 
visual and physical interactions. As only some aspects of task performance and 
expertise have been investigated in the airport security screening context to date, this 
research provides an original and significant contribution to this domain. The findings 
are also relevant to other domains characterised by complexity and uncertainty. New 
knowledge developed in this research has the potential to more widely facilitate skill 
development and improve the interactions performed in complex tasks.  
An overview of this research is presented in the following sections of this 
chapter. First, the research question is explained and the research aims and objectives 
are presented. This is followed by an overview of the research significance, its 
contributions to knowledge, and its resulting outcomes. This chapter concludes with 
an outline of the thesis structure and its individual chapters. 
1.1 Research Question 
The important role of expertise and intuition in uncertain contexts is clearly 
illustrated in the literature. In the airport security screening context, however, expertise 
is only partially understood. An investigation of the range of activities performed by 
security screeners, and their skilful application of intuitive processing and decision 
making has not yet been considered. Responding to this research gap, this research 
investigated the following question: 
 How does intuitive expertise facilitate technology-mediated visual tasks in 
uncertain contexts?  
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The complex and uncertain nature of situations encountered in the airport 
security x-ray screening task provided the exemplary environment in which to explore 
the role of intuitive expertise. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research was to gain an understanding of security screening 
activity and the cognitive processes underlying task performance, to determine the role 
of intuitive expertise in uncertain contexts. 
Using airport security screening as the context, the research objectives were to: 
 Investigate the influence that different knowledge types and processing styles have 
on the performance of x-ray screening activities in the field 
 Understand the development of intuitive expertise by comparing the types of 
knowledge and processing styles used by expert and non-expert security screeners 
 Develop conceptual models that represent the knowledge and task performance 
features used by experts and non-experts during security screening activities  
1.3 Research Significance 
This research makes a number of significant contributions through its generation 
of new knowledge and its tangible outcomes. New insights gained contribute to 
advancing knowledge in the airport security screening domain, and also advance the 
theory of intuitive expertise. A significant contribution is the development of 
conceptual models that illustrate the interactions and knowledge used by experts and 
non-experts. Further significance is demonstrated by the transferability of these 
contributions to other complex and uncertain domains. The following sub-sections 
provide an overview of the key contributions to knowledge and outcomes of this 
research. 
1.3.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
As elaborated below, four significant contributions of this research advance 
knowledge in the airport security screening context, advance the theory of intuitive 
expertise, and assist future research in uncertain domains.  
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i. Methodology for Investigating Intuitive Expertise in Uncertain Contexts 
This research has contributed a novel methodology for the elicitation of 
knowledge and processing styles utilised in uncertain contexts. The use of portable 
eye-tracking glasses and concurrent verbal protocol allowed field data to be collected 
with little disruption to the cognitive processes of security screeners. Interviews 
performed after observations provide clarification and a deeper understanding of the 
knowledge underlying security screeners’ visual and physical interactions. This 
methodological contribution is significant as it can be transferred to other complex and 
uncertain domains.  
ii. Advanced Understanding of Airport Security Screening 
This research strengthens the understanding of interactions performed in the 
airport security screening task. In particular, it contributes new insight into the range 
of knowledge and processing styles that influence the interactions of security 
screeners. On comparing the knowledge and processing styles utilised by experts and 
non-experts, the greatest differences were found in the performance of activities for 
the purpose of problem solving. Experts demonstrated access to specialised knowledge 
that assisted with problem-solving interactions and decision making in complex 
situations. This finding is significant, as problem-solving interactions have not been a 
focus of previous security screening research. Indeed, this research suggests that 
greater focus should be placed on the knowledge required for effective problem-
solving in the security screening context. 
iii. Implications and Recommendations for Design 
This research has implications for the security screening context, and for other 
tasks performed in complex environments. Three main implications are identified: 
visual focus, skill development, and future systems and processes in the security 
screening context. Recommendations and design principles are discussed to address 
these implications. The recommendations provide pragmatic considerations for the 
design of systems and interfaces that support knowledge development and skilled 
performance. Furthermore, they are transferrable to other uncertain domains. This is 
particularly significant in safety-critical domains similar to security screening, where 
even small errors can have wide-ranging and serious consequences. 
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iv. The Role of Intuitive Expertise in Uncertain Contexts 
This research has pioneered the study of intuitive expertise in the airport security 
screening context and has developed new knowledge that is transferrable to other 
uncertain domains. Thus, it has contributed to advancing the theory of intuitive 
expertise in uncertain contexts. Analysis of the knowledge and processing styles 
underlying security screeners’ interactions has linked knowledge development theory 
to the concept of intuitive expertise. Findings show that intuitive expertise is closely 
related to the development of an integrated knowledge base that facilitates efficient 
and adaptable problem solving. It is believed that the new knowledge resulting from 
this research is transferrable, and can be used to further understand intuitive expertise 
in a broad range of domains. 
1.3.2 Research Outcome 
The primary outcome of this research is the development of conceptual models 
that illustrate the visual and physical interactions performed by expert and non-expert 
security screeners. Conceptual models represent the knowledge underlying 
interactions, the relationships among types of knowledge, and the key features of task 
performance demonstrated by experts and non-experts. The models are configurable 
to represent specific activity sequences, and illustrate the relationships among 
knowledge types which facilitates consecutive activity transitions. The configurability 
of models is significant, as many models that describe the processes behind visual and 
physical interactions operate at a high level of abstraction. By representing specific 
activity sequences, the developed models operate at a lower level of abstraction. This 
means that they can be used to identify traits that are specific to certain interaction 
sequences, and thus provide opportunities for design. 
For the security screening context, the models provide a complete representation 
of the activities performed by security screeners, and the knowledge underlying the 
performance of these activities. This is significant, as previous airport security 
screening research focused on visual interactions and the development of visual 
knowledge; physical interactions and other types of knowledge were generally not 
considered. It is believed that the models are transferrable to other complex domains 
due to the generalisability of the activities, knowledge, and task performance features 
comprising the models. The models have a variety of applications; these include 
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training, the design of interfaces, and the development of artificial intelligence 
systems.  
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is comprised of eleven chapters (Figure 1). Literature from a range 
of research fields is presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. In Chapter 2, security screening 
and the role of the security screener is discussed. With security screening identified as 
an uncertain context, the concept of uncertainty and its effects on decision making are 
presented. Chapter 3 then focuses on intuitive expertise and its role in uncertain 
contexts and visual tasks. Concepts associated with expertise development, including 
the nature and development of knowledge, are also discussed. Chapter 4 addresses the 
approach to studying intuitive expertise, focusing on methods for eliciting expert 
knowledge and processes.  
 
Figure 1. Thesis structure 
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Chapter 5 presents the research methodology, outlining the research plan and 
procedure for data collection and analysis. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 present the findings 
from data analysis, and discuss the results for each analysis performed. Chapter 6 
investigates and compares the knowledge types and processing styles utilised by expert 
and non-expert security screeners. Chapter 7 builds on the results presented in Chapter 
6 through the investigation of the significant differences between expert and non-
expert security screeners that emerged. Chapter 8 analyses the knowledge 
demonstrated by expert and non-expert security screeners, and explores how this 
knowledge influences the activity representations formed by security screeners.  
Chapter 9 is a general discussion which brings together results from Chapters 6, 
7, and 8. Its focus is a discussion of the nature and development of knowledge, and the 
role of intuitive expertise in complex visual tasks. Implications for the performance of 
complex visual tasks are then discussed, and several design recommendations are 
made. Chapter 10 presents conceptual models for expert and non-expert security 
screener interactions. These are based on the convergence of findings and related 
concepts explored in the literature. Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by outlining the 
research implications, its contributions to knowledge, and future research directions. 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter has given an overview of the research background. The airport 
security screening task was identified as a complex and dynamic activity. In other 
complex tasks, the development of expertise was shown to result in highly effective 
task performance. In particular, intuitive expertise was identified as a key determinant 
of an expert’s ability in these environments. To date, a detailed investigation of 
intuitive expertise has not been undertaken in the airport security screening context. 
The research aims, objectives and research question were formulated and presented to 
address this identified gap in current knowledge. The chapter then outlined the 
research outcomes and research contributions to knowledge. This chapter concluded 
with an overview of the thesis structure. 
In Chapter 2, the security screening context and the role of the security screener 
is discussed. Considering the degree of uncertainty faced in this context, Chapter 2 
also provides a thorough definition of ‘uncertainty’ and discusses its effects on task 
performance and the development of expertise. 
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Chapter 2:  Airport Security Screening 
This chapter sets the context of this research by discussing airport security 
screening and the implications that uncertain activity domains have for task 
performance. The stance of this research is that the task of airport security screening 
is characterised by considerable complexity and uncertainty. To date, research into the 
airport security screening context has only focused on some aspects of this task 
performance. Furthermore, much of the previous research has been based on simulated 
screening tasks to investigate specific aspects of security screener task performance, 
most commonly, visual knowledge, and threat identification. Given the simulated 
conditions of previous research, task complexity and many of the decision- making 
options have not been considered.  
The first part of this chapter discusses the role of the security screener and the 
uncertainties that are faced during the performance of their x-ray screening tasks. An 
overview of current research and the current understanding of expertise in the x-ray 
screening task are then discussed. The final section of this chapter discusses 
uncertainty and its consequences for decision making and the development of 
expertise. 
2.1 The Role of the Security Screener and Task Uncertainty 
Passenger screening at airport security checkpoints is a well-defined process, 
with clearly distinguished steps controlled by security personnel (Graves, et al., 2011). 
This screening process is generally understood by passengers. They obediently 
participate in the process so as not to draw unwanted attention or cause delays (Salter, 
2007). Graves, et al. (2011) identify two mandatory screening functions that 
passengers are subject to: x-ray screening of carry-on luggage, and walk-through metal 
detector screening of individuals. Passengers might also be subject to additional 
screening measures in the event of an alarm being raised or a suspected threat object 
being found. These additional measures include hand-wand or pat-down searches of 
individuals, physical search of their property, and trace detection of explosives 
(Graves, et al., 2011). Security personnel attend each stage of the screening process, 
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prompting action from the passenger when and if required (Popovic, Kraal, & Kirk, 
2009).  
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the role and effectiveness of airport 
security has come under increased scrutiny (Champion, 2012). As a result of this 
scrutiny, interest in the x-ray screening task has increased. A common perspective in 
the airport security screening literature is that security screeners are indispensable to 
the activity of providing security in the airport, as they are trusted with the most critical 
decision in this context. However, for this reason, they are also considered to be the 
weakest link. Even the most sophisticated technology is of limited value if the security 
screeners’ training and ability to interpret the technology is inadequate (Ghylin, et al., 
2008; Graves, et al., 2011; Michel & Schwaninger, 2009). Thus, the greatest concerns 
addressed in the current research are the effectiveness of human threat-detection 
capabilities, and improvement in the detection of threat objects. 
X-ray security screeners are faced with the complex task of identifying threat 
objects in x-ray images of passenger baggage. The ability to successfully identify a 
target object is reliant on the presence of a stored representation of a familiar object in 
the security screener’s working memory. (McCarley, et al., 2004; Schwaninger, 2003, 
2004). The range of threat objects that must be identified is vast, and several broad and 
indeterminate categories of threat objects are specified. Threat items range from those 
with clear intention, such as guns and explosives, to those seized under precaution, 
such as scissors or nail files (Seidenstat, 2004).  
The Australian National Aviation Policy White Paper (Australian Government, 
2009a) identified that its then-current list of prohibited items was an inconsistent 
framework, containing items that were allowed in many other countries. It was 
determined that these inconsistencies provided minimal security benefit, resulting in 
passenger confusion and delays due to constant rescreening of passengers. The 
National Aviation White Paper proposed revisions to the prohibited items list with the 
aim to bring it closer in line with international policy. This was expected to reduce the 
burden and confusion of passengers without sacrificing the security outcome. Under 
the proposed revisions, four broad threat-object categories were determined. These 
categories are ‘blunt instruments’ consisting of  “objects capable of being used to cause 
serious injury when used to hit” (p. 227); ‘guns, firearms and other devices’, defined 
as “devices capable or appearing capable of being used to cause serious injury by 
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discharging a projectile”; ‘things capable of being used to restrain a person’ (p. 227); 
and, ‘objects with sharp points or sharp edges’, defined as “objects with a sharp point 
or sharp edge capable of being used to cause serious injury” (p. 228).  
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Transport Security Administration 
(TSA) defines a similarly broad set of prohibited object categories. While not intended 
to be all-inclusive, the list provides examples of common items that can and cannot be 
carried in checked and carry-on luggage. The categories include: sharp objects; 
sporting goods; guns and firearms; tools; martial arts and self-defence items; explosive 
and flammable materials; disabling chemicals and other dangerous items; and other 
items, including potentially dangerous liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) (Transport 
Security Administration, 2012). The categorisations outlined by the Australian 
Government and the TSA demonstrate the extremely broad scope within which 
prohibited items are defined. Furthermore, objects in the respective threat categories 
vary significantly in size, shape, colour, and appearance. Due to this broad 
classifications of threat items, security screeners could be searching for objects they 
have never seen before, let alone encountered during their time on the job (Bravo & 
Farid, 2004).  
In addition to the problems posed by broad object categorisations, the conditions 
faced by security screeners during security screening tasks are also problematic for 
their performance: objects are often presented at angles that make identification 
difficult, and heavily cluttered bags result in superimposition of objects and opaque 
areas on the display. These variables make it difficult to differentiate between objects 
in the bag, resulting in detection error and a reduction in screeners’ search efficiency 
(McCarley, et al., 2004; Michel & Schwaninger, 2009; Schwaninger, 2003, 2004, 
2005; Von Bastion, et al., 2008; Yi, et al., 2008).  
Encountering threat objects is also very rare. This is also problematic, as it does 
not provide security screeners with frequent instances of threat detection (Van Wert, 
Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2009; Wolfe, 2010; Wolfe, Horowitz, & Kenner, 2005). It has 
been found that the low prevalence of items in x-ray screening search tasks results in 
a significantly higher miss rate than when items are more prevalent (Wolfe, et al. 2007 
as cited in Van Wert, et al., 2009; Wolfe, et al., 2005). Wolfe and colleagues suggest 
that this is due to security screeners requiring less information to declare a bag threat-
free when their expectancy of encountering a threat is low. Wolfe and Chun (1996) 
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suggest that observers in a visual task calculate the probability that each item is a 
target; when searching for targets, they have an activation threshold that is determined 
by prior search activities. An individual’s activation threshold decreases with the 
length of a search task and the positive experiences gained in successful search tasks. 
Alternatively, thresholds are increased as a result of a negative experience, such as a 
series of unsuccessful search tasks. Negative experiences are found to result in 
precautionary search strategies that often result in false positives (Wolfe & Chun, 
1996).  
Because of the limited instances of threat identification, security screeners 
receive very limited and imperfect feedback. Thus, they do not often have the option 
of reflecting on, or improving their search. In simulated experiments performed by 
Fleck and Mitroff (2007), and to some extent in Wert, et al. (2009),  it was found that 
false alarms associated with the low prevalence of threat items could be circumvented 
by providing the opportunity to reflect on, and correct a search. Similarly, when 
feedback was presented before and after searches, the effects of low prevalence were 
reduced (Van Wert, et al., 2009).  
One of the major implications of poor and limited feedback is that it results in 
poor opportunities for deliberate practice for the improvement of specific skills. 
Security screeners are limited to repetitive engagement in the task; this results in the 
refinement of basic skills only, rather than the development of more complex 
perceptual abilities (Ericsson, 1993, 2006; Ericsson & Towne, 2010). This is shown in 
the research conducted by McCarley, et al. (2004), where it was found that 
identification of threat objects became faster as a result of practice; however, the 
effectiveness of identifying threat objects did not improve significantly.  
In order to overcome the implications of the low prevalence of threat objects, 
most modern x-ray screening equipment incorporates a Threat Image Projection (TIP) 
system. TIP systems work by pairing images of fictional threat objects with the images 
of the passengers’ luggage being searched. These objects are paired during normal task 
operations. As well as keeping security screeners alert, TIP systems are also used for 
providing in-situ training and evaluation. Using such programs, security screeners can 
gain experience and practice in detecting threat objects that they might otherwise never 
be exposed to during normal operations. 
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2.2 Airport Security Screening Research Approach 
Previous research in the airport security screening context has focussed on 
investigating security screeners’ ability to detect threat objects in x-ray images of 
passenger bags. The most common approach used to test this aspect of security 
screener performance is the use of simulated screening tasks. During these tasks, 
participants are shown x-ray images of passengers’ luggage and are required to 
determine if a threat is present or not. The setup of these simulated screening tasks 
varies among studies, and is largely dependent on the equipment used to display 
stimuli and collect data.  
Most research into the performance of security screeners has been performed by 
Schwaninger and colleagues as part of The Centre for Adaptive Security Screening 
Research and Applications (CASRA). CASRA (2014) investigated the effects that 
various personal and image-based factors have on the performance of security 
screeners. As a result of this work, a number of computer-based training products were 
designed to help improve the visual knowledge and detection performance of security 
screeners. These computer-based training software packages are based on the TIP 
systems in which fictional threat images are merged with images of passengers’ bags. 
Specific software developed by CASRA includes:  
i. Prohibited Item Test (PIT). The PIT is used to measure visual knowledge of 
threat objects. It is comprised of images of threat objects superimposed onto 
images of passengers’ bags (CASRA, 2014). 
ii. X-Ray Object Recognition Test (ORT). The ORT is used to test screeners’ 
abilities to cope with difficult image conditions. It is comprised of images of 
varying complexity, with fictional threat objects superimposed onto images 
(CASRA, 2014; Hardmeier & Schwaninger, 2008). 
iii. X-Ray Tutor (XRT). XRT is training software that is adaptive to the individual 
experience level of the security screener. Using threat images superimposed 
onto images of passenger baggage, XRT enables security screeners to gain 
experience with threat objects from various categories under varying image 
difficulties (CASRA, 2014; Halbherr, Schwaninger, Budgell, & Wales, 2013). 
Although designed as training tools, these software packages are often used as 
the screening tasks in the research conducted by CASRA (e.g. Michel, et al., 2006; 
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Schwaninger, 2005; Schwaninger, et al., 2005; Schwaninger & Wales, 2009; Von 
Bastion, et al., 2008). In addition to using the software developed by CASRA, studies 
have also used qualitative data from the TIP systems to investigate the performance of 
security screeners. Obtained from collaborating airports, TIP data is used to generate 
statistical analysis of different variables across large numbers and a diverse range of 
users (e.g. Halbherr, et al., 2013). Due to the different nature of computer-based 
training and TIP data collection, there is a significant range in the number of 
participants taking part in the CASRA group’s research. For instance, much of the 
research performed using computer-based training software is based on fewer than 100 
participants (e.g. Michel, et al., 2006; Schwaninger, 2004). By contrast, in research 
using data from TIP systems utilised in actual airports, participant numbers have been 
as high as 5717 (Halbherr, et al., 2013).  
Apart from CASRA, a number of other researchers have investigated security 
screener task performance. The concepts investigated by these other groups are more 
diverse than those investigated by CASRA. For example, studies have investigated 
threat-detection performance in relation to variables such as metacognition (McCarley 
& Gosney, 2005), visual skill (McCarley, et al., 2004), effectiveness of screening 
enhancements (Klock, 2005), expertise (Liu & Gale, 2011; Liu, et al., 2007; McCallum 
et al., 2005), training complexity (Fiore, Scielzo, Jentsch, & Howard, 2006), and the 
influence of bag features (Liu, Gale, Purdy, & Song, 2006). These variables are tested 
in simulated screening tasks comprised of sets of x-ray image stimuli presented on 
standard computer displays.  
The most common metrics used to determine performance in security screening 
research is the calculation of hit rate that takes hits, misses, and false positives into 
consideration. Statistical analysis of this data is performed against independent 
variables (e.g., age, experience, training) in order to make inferences about the way in 
which a certain variable affects detection performance. In addition to hit rate, a 
common metric used to measure performance is reaction time. Reaction time measures 
the time taken between stimulus exposure and the point of decision (e.g. Klock, 2005; 
Koller, et al., 2009; McCarley, et al., 2004; Schwaninger, 2004; Schwaninger & Wales, 
2009). Eye movement data from eye-tracking systems has also been used in a number 
of studies. Eye movement data has been used to analyse fixation duration prior to 
decision making (Liu & Gale, 2011; McCarley, et al., 2004), the effects of bag features 
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on detection performance (Liu, et al., 2006), speed of first fixation on threat objects 
(Liu, et al., 2007), and fixations on target objects (McCarley, et al., 2004). 
Additionally, test batteries and verbal reporting have been used in conjunction with, 
and following simulated screening tasks. Test batteries are used to identify factors 
contributing to security screener expertise. They involve a combination of simulated 
x-ray screening tasks, abstract visual skills tests, and pen and pencil tests (McCallum, 
et al., 2005). In a number of studies, participants have been required to rate the 
difficulty of the image (Michel, et al., 2006) or their confidence in their decisions 
(Hardmeier, Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2005; Liu, et al., 2006) after each answer (hit or 
miss) for each trial. 
2.3 X-Ray Security Screening Expertise and Task Performance 
Current research in the airport security screening context provides only partial 
understanding of security screener expertise. As previously mentioned, a key reason 
for this is the trend in airport security screening research to simulate screening tasks to 
assess security screener performance (e.g. Ghylin, et al., 2008; Klock, 2005; Liu, et 
al., 2007; McCarley, et al., 2004; Michel, et al., 2006; Schwaninger, 2003, 2004; 
Schwaninger, et al., 2005). Nevertheless, there is a number of benefits of utilising 
simulated screening tasks to investigate the performance of security screeners. For 
instance, it is difficult to investigate threat detection in natural settings due to the rarity 
of real threat objects. The ratio of images with threats to those without, can be 
increased substantially in simulated tasks in order to quickly collect a large amount of 
data. In general, threat images are present in 20%-50% of images in most simulated 
screening tasks (e.g. Ghylin, et al., 2008; Liu & Gale, 2011; Liu, et al., 2007; 
McCarley, et al., 2004; Michel, et al., 2006; Schwaninger, et al., 2008; Schwaninger 
& Wales, 2009). Although this prevalence affords an effective study of detection 
performance, it also changes the nature of the task. Most importantly, simulated tasks 
remove much of the complexity faced by security screeners in real contexts, and do 
not facilitate the performance of the many interactions present under normal 
conditions. This makes it difficult to fully evaluate security screener expertise. 
Another common trend in security screener research is to perform experiments 
using naïve participants who do not have experience with screening tasks (e.g. Fiore, 
et al., 2006; Ghylin, et al., 2008; Liu, et al., 2006; McCarley, et al., 2004; Menneer, 
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Barrett, Phillips, Donnelly, & Cave, 2007). Using naïve participants, studies have 
shown that increased detection performance can be gained by training. For instance, 
McCarley et al. (McCarley, et al., 2004) and Liu et al. (Liu, et al., 2006) both showed 
that image scanning efficiency improved as a result of increased familiarity with the 
screening task. However, as these studies are only testing naïve participants, they do 
not offer much understanding of expertise in the security screening context. Other 
studies compare naïve participant performance with expert performance. For example, 
Liu and Gale’s (2011) research analysed the visual fixation maps of both security 
screeners and naïve participants during screening tasks. Results show that security 
screeners had a more efficient and effective screening process than naïve people. The 
visual processes of security screeners during image search were characterised by 
selective attention. Fixations were concentrated on task-relevant areas of the image, 
while other areas were not explored. In comparison, naïve participants were found to 
have a less efficient process, attending to a greater area of the image during their 
search. Although these studies provide interesting insight into the visual process 
engaged in during screening tasks, they do not provide a precise understanding of 
expertise. It is not unexpected that security screeners outperformed naïve participants 
in these tasks.  
Research that compared security screeners of different experience levels has the 
greatest relevance for understanding expertise and the role of experience. Such 
research has typically investigated the performance of x-ray screeners, focussing on 
differences in visual knowledge and threat-detection performance. These studies have 
generally found that experience and practice with threat objects enables more effective 
threat detection. Experienced security screeners generally outperform novice security 
screeners in terms of speed and accuracy of detection (e.g. Koller, et al., 2009; 
Schwaninger, 2004; Schwaninger, et al., 2005; Schwaninger & Wales, 2009). In 
Schwaninger and colleagues’ (Schwaninger, 2004; Schwaninger & Wales, 2009) 
research, security screeners who engaged in deliberate practice over time were found 
to increase their threat-detection hit rate and reaction times. In their 2009 study, 
Schwaninger and Wales tested 244 screeners on a simulated screening task at two 
different stages, with a median time of 427 days between tests. During this period, all 
security screeners took part in computer-based training and on-the-job TIP training. 
Participants were required to determine if the bag was threat-free of not. Results show 
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that while the performance of some participants’ deteriorated, there was a general trend 
for performance and reaction time to improve. 
Although there is reliable evidence of performance improvements as a result of 
experience and training, general performance improvements are found to be highly 
dependent on image characteristics. For example, in Schwaninger, Hardmeier and 
Hofer’s (2005) study, the effects of difficult viewpoint, superimposition, and bag 
complexity on detection performance were tested on expert and novice security 
screeners. It was found that experts demonstrated significantly better knowledge of 
threat objects; however, their ability to identify them under difficult conditions was 
not significantly better. In other words, difficult viewpoint, image complexity, and 
superimposition all had significant effects on both expert and novice screening 
performance. Schwaninger et al.’s (2008) later study confirmed these results, finding 
that difficult viewpoint, opacity, and superimposition had the most significant effects 
on detection performance; however, clutter and bag size did not have a significant 
effect. Their study also found that training had little effect on detection performance 
under conditions characterised by superimposition and high opacity; it was only found 
to improve the detection of objects with difficult viewpoints (Michel & Schwaninger, 
2009; Schwaninger, 2003, 2004, 2005; Schwaninger, et al., 2005).  
In order to identify predictors of security screener performance in difficult image 
conditions, some studies have tested security screener performance in abstract visual 
tasks. For example, Hardmeier and Schwaninger (2008) investigated a variety of 
predictors by using a battery of tests. These consisted of tests for figure ground 
segregation, visual search, mental rotation, spatial imagination, logical thinking, and 
the X-Ray Object Recognition Test. Results from these tests were cross-referenced 
against on-the-job threat detection scores in order to identify predictors of task 
performance. Results from this study showed that the ability to cope with difficult 
image-based factors measured in the Test Battery correlated strongly with the 
prediction of screener performance on the job. Similar findings emerged from the 
battery of tests performed by McCallum et al. (2005), who found that perceptual 
abilities, such as attentional vigilance and the ability to identify hidden patterns, were 
strong predictors of high-performing security screeners.  
To support threat detection during difficult image conditions, security screeners 
have access to a number of image enhancement functions (IEFs). IEFs are visual 
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enhancements that change the appearance of x-ray images in order to clarify or 
highlight certain areas of the image (Michel, et al., 2006). IEFs include: luminance and 
inversion filters, designed to reduce the effects of superimposition and bag complexity; 
organic only or organic stripping filters used to target specific types of items such as 
improvised explosive devices and contraband (Ghylin, et al., 2008; Klock, 2005; 
Michel, et al., 2006); and material density filters that ascribe a colour to each particular 
type of material. Some x-ray screening technologies even feature automatic detection 
of explosives based on non-unique but characteristic materials such as organic 
compounds (Graves, et al., 2011).  
 A number of studies have investigated the effectiveness of screening 
enhancements on threat detection performance (e.g. Hardmeier, et al., 2005; Liu & 
Gale, 2011; Michel, et al., 2006). Results from several of these studies show that IEFs 
do not provide any assistance and, in some cases, actually decrease performance 
(Klock, 2005). This decrease in performance has been found to result from the 
augmentation of an object’s appearance by x-ray imaging technology. That is, there is 
a discrepancy between the way objects look on the screen and how they are perceived 
in the screener’s mental representation (Ghylin, et al., 2008; Klock, 2005; Michel, et 
al., 2006).  
It has also been found that security screeners have a limited understanding of the 
individual benefits of the various IEFs available (Maguire, McClumpha, & Tatlock, 
2002). The perceived benefits of IEFs reported by security screeners did not match up 
to the actual benefits gained by IEFs during task performance. For instance, security 
screeners considered the crystal clear function to be the most effective; during the 
actual task, however, it was associated with lower threat detection performance than 
other IEFs.   
While these results do not support the effectiveness of IEFs, it should also be 
considered that research investigating their use was performed in simulated screening 
tasks. The way that they are used under such conditions is vastly different to the way 
they are used under normal task conditions. For instance, in the research by Klock 
(2005) and Michel et al. (2006), participants were not given the option to select 
relevant IEFs based on situational requirements; rather, pre-set IEFs were used for the 
entire experiment. Thus, they do not provide significant insight into the human factors 
that contribute to the effective use of interface functions in real world situations.  
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There is also evidence that knowledge and personal preference have implications 
for the effectiveness of IEFs during screening tasks. A study by Williams, Kent, Weller 
and Matthews (2001 in Maguire, et al., 2002) shows that no single IEF offers a 
complete advantage over any other; individually, however, they each have a 
measurable benefit. For example, the adaptive edge enhance filter was associated with 
a higher threat-detection hit rate in low density bags. Similarly, in bags with a high 
organic content, the organic enhancement filter showed a reduction in false alarm rates. 
From these findings, it was deduced that it is important for screeners to receive training 
with IEFs so that they know which ones to use in relation to specific goals and 
circumstances. 
Of the x-ray screening technologies that have been analysed in the research 
literature, multi-view systems are documented as one of the few types to provide a 
clear improvement of threat object detection (Von Bastion, et al., 2008). Multi-view 
systems provide the security screener with two images of the bag, taken at two different 
angles. This allows a difficult image to be accompanied by an alternative viewing 
angle from which an object might be easier to recognise. However, if an object is 
difficult to identify from both angles, or if the object is unfamiliar, the benefits of a 
multi-view system are negligible (Michel & Schwaninger, 2009).  
Other emerging technologies that address image difficulties faced by security 
screeners include CT x-ray systems and motion imaging. CT x-ray systems offer great 
potential as they allow for 360 degree rotation. These systems are quite new, however, 
and are not widely used (Wetter, 2013). Motion imaging allows for images to be 
rotated by 25 degrees in two directions. The benefits of motion imaging have not 
proven to significantly improve detection performance in highly cluttered bags. It is 
still more effective for security personnel to manually remove the cluttered objects to 
produce a less complex image (Mendes, Schwaninger, & Michel, 2013; Mendes, 
Schwaninger, Strebel, & Michel, 2012).  
2.4 Uncertainty and Task Performance 
The uncertainty of a task domain is a concept that features prominently in the 
decision making literature. This literature places uncertainty as a pervasive component 
embedded in the decision making ecosystem—a system that is comprised of many 
aspects, and transcends many domains. Commonalities can be found across the most 
 22 Chapter 2: Airport Security Screening 
extensive streams of the decision making literature, such as those investigating 
naturalistic field environments. The unpredictability of causality, change, and 
consequences within a naturally occurring environment is closely related to, and acts 
as a precursor to, the broader-reaching concept of uncertainty (Milliken, 1987). 
Uncertainty is considered to be ubiquitous, and a major threat in naturalistic settings 
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  
2.4.1 Defining ‘Uncertainty’ 
Several synonymous terms can be identified in the process of defining 
‘uncertainty’. The following review identifies three primary concepts that operate as 
determinants, facilitating and connecting to the broader terms related to uncertainty in 
decision making domains. These concepts are change, control, and consistency.  
Change 
Uncertainty relating to change is based on how change is predicted and dealt 
with (Milliken, 1987). Milliken differentiates between types of change within the 
environment, stating that uncertainty as a result of change is not associated with all 
types of change or dynamism. Rather, it is the unpredictable change that is credited 
with facilitating environments of uncertainty. Unpredictable change is where 
predictions cannot be made for future events, and there is an inability to predict cause 
and effect. Unpredictable change is associated with the overall environment and with 
components within that environment such as the actions of others, or changes in the 
environment context such as various trends and developments in technology (Milliken, 
1987). 
Control 
Control is described as a key predictor of uncertainty, as well as a primary coping 
strategy for reducing uncertainty. Based on Lipshitz and Strauss’s review of the 
literature, uncertainty is caused by an inability to act deterministically due to 
knowledge limitations and environmental dependencies (Thompson, 1967, in Lipshitz 
& Strauss, 1997); an inability to influence future events and actions; and an inability 
to control consequences of actions (Humphreys & Berkeley, 1985, in Lipshitz & 
Strauss, 1997).  
Establishing control over an unpredictable situation has been found to mediate 
the effects of uncertainty, mitigating the stressful and aversive psychological state 
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induced by uncertainty (Bordia, Hobman, Jones, Gallois, & Callan, 2004). Lipshitz 
and Strauss identify the attainment of control and predictability (Smithson, 1989, in 
Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997); the reduction of internal and external variability 
(Thompson, 1967, in Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997); and the engagement of ‘power 
responses’ (Firsirotu, 1989, in Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) as major strategies for coping 
with uncertainty. Adding to this list, Bordia, et al. (2004) identify communication and 
involvement as a major strategy for reducing uncertainty. Through communication and 
involvement, members of an organisation are endowed with a sense of control and 
knowledge of the greater context; this results in a more positive perspective of the 
change environment, and a greater awareness of the need to expect and deal with 
change.  
Consistency  
Consistency is a broad-reaching component of uncertainty, containing elements 
from both of the previously described components of control and change. The term 
‘consistency’ is derived from an amalgam of two synonymous terms referenced in the 
literature: ‘typicality’ and ‘routine’. The extent of a task’s consistency is dependent on 
typicality (Klein, 1998; Klein & Hoffman, 1992), which is itself determined by the 
task’s location between the two extremes of routine or non-routine (Klein, 1993; 
Perrow, 1967). The second element of consistency is identified as the level of 
specificity and vagueness of the task, and the elements of which the task is comprised 
(Bravo & Farid, 2009, 2012; Osherson & Smith, 1997). 
In terms of typicality, Perrow (1967) uses the categorisations of routine and non-
routine to describe the structure of actions that an individual must perform on an object 
in order to make some change in that object. Routine contexts are considered as those 
which are familiar, containing few exceptions and analysable problems (Perrow, 
1967). Routine tasks are also reliably predictable, and do not violate expectation 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Non-routine contexts involve tasks that have not been 
encountered before (Kahneman & Klein, 2009); they are characterised by 
unfamiliarity, containing frequent exceptional cases and non-analysable problems 
(Perrow, 1967). Non-routine events are experienced in most domains (Kahneman & 
Klein, 2009). 
The extent to which a task can be defined as ‘routine’ is determined by how well 
it corresponds to the observer’s preconception of typicality. During task performance, 
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a person will make judgements of typicality by matching currently experienced 
situations to the experience held in memory (Klein & Hoffman, 1992). If a situation 
corresponds to an experience held in memory, then a typical solution can be applied. 
In non-typical situations, decision making is much more difficult, and requires a broad 
experience base to make fine discriminations and identify relationships among 
unfamiliar elements (Klein, 1998). Experts can use their extensive knowledge and 
experience to identify antecedents and consequences of action within the decision 
making context to quickly and reliably predict and deploy suitable action. Decision 
makers with less extensive experience lack this ability (Klein & Hoffman, 1992).  
Osherson and Smith (1997) describe typicality as the extent to which objects can 
be provided as good examples of larger concepts. A class of objects might have a 
master prototype which can be used to judge the proximity of a particular object. A 
concept’s membership of a prototype is determined by the definition of that prototype, 
and by the vagueness or specificity of the concept’s definition. An example of this is 
the vagueness present in the definition of a prototypical chair as ‘something that can 
be sat on’. Apart from the prototypical chair, there are numerous other objects that 
have this affordance (Osherson & Smith, 1997). A situation or object’s proximity to, 
and membership of a particular prototype can have significant implications on for the 
way it is perceived by an observer.  
An example of the uncertainty that can result from the effects of specificity is 
illustrated in the field of visual search. When looking for an object, both low and high 
specificity of an object prototype can limit the effectiveness of searching for that object 
(Bravo & Farid, 2012). An example of a high specificity search task is the search for 
a particular object. In contrast, low specificity refers to goal-exempt exploration 
(Wilder, et al., 2011).  
In the visual search tasks performed by security screeners, the specificity of 
objects fits somewhere in between these two extremes. Most frequently, security 
screeners are searching for category items. For category items, denoting specificity of 
the task is problematic. Objects of a specific category can vary greatly in appearance 
(Bravo & Farid, 2012). When using a specific search template based on stereotypical 
features of an object, the template might differ visually from the target category object, 
despite being of the same category. This factor is attributed to most everyday search 
tasks and is referred to as ‘target uncertainty’. Target uncertainty limits the 
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effectiveness of the prototype or search template held by the observer, if that search 
template is too rigid for a task that requires flexibility (Bravo & Farid).  
The extent to which consistency affects the environment and the decision maker 
is heavily reliant on the ability of the observer to judge typicality. This ability is 
strongly related to how well a particular concept, environment, or task can be defined. 
The effects of consistency on performance can be seen quite clearly in cases where 
domains that can be defined with some detail and certainty are those that support expert 
performance and enable prototypes for typicality to be constructed. Where the domain 
is less consistent, that is, characterised by dynamic and changeable conditions where 
there is little room for error, performance is more limited (Shanteau, 1992). 
2.4.2 Experiencing Uncertainty 
In most decision making domains, some level of uncertainty is unavoidable 
(Hall, 2002; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). The exact type and 
causality of uncertainty is specific to the domain in which it is experienced (Savulescu, 
1994). Savulescu (in Hall, 2002; 1994) identifies two orders of uncertainty that are 
useful for describing the causality of uncertainty: first order uncertainty, and second 
order uncertainty.  
First Order Uncertainty 
First order uncertainty relates to the knowledge held by, and information 
accessible to a person (Beresford, 1991 in Hall, 2002). Concerned with the interaction 
and consideration of information and knowledge, this type of uncertainty is easily 
quantified due to its relationship with objective fact (Hall, 2002). First order 
uncertainty manifests in factors such as incomplete information, inadequate 
understanding (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997), and inappropriate knowledge (Beresford, 
1991 in Hall, 2002; Savulescu, 1994). It has also been found to result from natural 
variability, lack of knowledge, and lack of confidence in information (Lipton and 
Gillet, 1992 in Hall, 2002).  
First order uncertainty is experienced as an inability to predict the outcomes of 
a known change (Beresford 1991, in Hall, 2002; Milliken, 1987; Savulescu, 1994), as 
well as the inability to predict the outcome of an action (Milliken, 1987). Salthouse 
(1991) hypothesises that decision-making domains are commonly faced with 
processing limitations due to the uncertainty of information sources. Salthouse (1991) 
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suggests that a major contributor to this uncertainty is not only the inability to identify 
relevant knowledge and information, but also an insufficient knowledge of the 
interrelationship of variables and how information should be integrated. The 
implications of first order uncertainty are relevant to the prediction of cause and effect. 
First order uncertainty is considered as the simplest forms of uncertainty, and is 
addressed by simply gaining more information—a strategy documented in the decision 
making literature as a method to alleviate uncertainty (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). 
Second Order Uncertainty 
Where first order uncertainty addresses factors of quantifiable information and 
knowledge, second order uncertainty poses a more complex layer of causality. Second 
order uncertainty is also known as ‘meta-uncertainty’ (Savulescu, 1994 in Hall, 2002; 
Savulescu, 1994), and relates to uncertainty about how uncertain one is (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1986 in Becker, 2001; Hall, 2002). According to Beresford (1991 in Hall, 
2002), second order uncertainty is caused by personal and conceptual factors. In terms 
of personal sources, uncertainty can result in emotional biases and impaired decision 
making (Hall, 2002). Emotional bias experienced in affective situations can cause 
undifferentiated feelings or intuitions based on no tangible evidence (Mosier & 
Fischer, 2010). Conceptual uncertainty, on the other hand, is largely considered to 
result from ambiguity (Becker, 2001; Hall, 2002), incommensurability (Hall, 2002; 
Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997), equivocality (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Sayegh, et al., 
2004), and uncertainty about probable outcomes (Curly et al., 1986 in Becker, 2001; 
Savulescu, 1994). The undifferentiated alternatives that result from conceptual 
uncertainty are the result of being confronted with many options that are equally 
attractive or equally unattractive (Hall, 2002; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). An inability 
to differentiate between alternatives can result either in hasty decision making or in a 
debilitating form of deliberation (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  
Second order uncertainty is the most complex form of uncertainty as it is 
composed of unquantifiable elements. Unlike first order uncertainty, simply gathering 
more information does not alleviate or identify the source of second order uncertainty 
(Hall, 2002; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Situations characterised by higher order 
uncertainty have numerous implications for decision makers who lack the necessary 
experience to overcome both conceptual and technical problems. 
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2.4.3 Consequences for Decision Making  
Experiencing uncertainty at the same time as facing an uncertain environment 
can have an adverse effect on decision making, and limit the development of domain 
experience. According to Shanteau (1992), certain task characteristics are more 
conducive to expertise, while others can have a debilitating effect on its development. 
In Shanteau’s categorisation, the poor performance of experts is linked to domains 
where information and stimuli are unpredictable, inconsistent, and changing. 
Expectations in these environments are high and decision making is impacted by 
ambiguity and subjectivity, and poor feedback and problem decomposition (Shanteau, 
1992). Similarly, where the environment lacks validity, is unpredictable, or provides 
insufficient opportunities to learn the rules of the environment, poor intuitive 
performance is identified (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). 
While Shanteau’s review describes task characteristics that contribute to poor 
performance, it does not provide specific detail and reasons to explain why poor 
performance results from uncertainty. The impact of uncertain environments is 
determined by the way in which they affect behaviour and action, and their provision 
for the development of strategies and skills to address their uncertainty. The following 
sub-sections explore these concepts. 
Behaviour  
A sustained and undifferentiated level of uncertainty has a major effect on 
behaviour. Dealing with uncertainty on a daily basis can result in denial (Hall, 2002) 
and ignorance, as decision makers become increasingly accustomed to experiences of 
uncertainty  (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Chi (2006) describes a similar effect on 
behaviour in the context of expert decision making, where experts can become overly 
confident, gloss over situations, and show bias. The tendency for experts to show bias 
is referred to as ‘functional fixedness’, and is commonly reported in the medical 
profession (Chi, 2006). Functional fixedness results from probabilities based on a 
mental set created by the decision maker, and this mental set serves to drive decision 
making. Decision makers who display functional fixedness demonstrate a lack of 
creativity and become primed to act in a particular way, while overlooking alternative 
perspectives that might offer a superior judgement (Chi, 2006). 
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Action 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) propose that uncertainty deters fluidity of action and 
encourages hesitation and doubt. One result of this doubt is blocked or delayed action. 
Delay can be experienced as a result of situation-inclusive doubt, subjectivity, and 
hesitation (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). As an alternative to hesitation and doubt, Hall 
(2002) suggests that uncertainty can propel action in decision making domains by 
lowering decision-making thresholds. The lowering of decision-making thresholds is 
sometimes used as a strategy to resolve uncertainty, such as in the case of being overly 
cautious. A high false positive rate is a common result of lowering decision-making 
thresholds for the purpose of resolving uncertainty. 
Development of Expertise 
The effects of uncertain contexts on expertise development stem primarily from 
the lack of opportunity for practice and reliable feedback in these contexts. Deliberate 
practice and feedback are widely cited as concepts that encourage the development of 
expertise (Ericsson, 1993, 2006; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson & Towne, 
2010; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Salas, et al., 2009; Shanteau, 1992). In domains 
where feedback is easily obtainable and effective, expertise develops more effectively 
(Salas, et al., 2009). When provided with immediate and informative feedback, the 
decision maker has the opportunity to correct action with the most optimal solution 
(Ericsson & Towne, 2010). When this practice is deliberate and meaningful, the 
decision maker engages in in-context learning (Lajoie, 2003); this results in the 
development and modification of mechanisms for the improvement of performance 
(Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996).  
Sources of feedback can be broken into the categories of self-regulation, real 
time, and evaluation. 
i. Self-regulation is a deliberative and reflective process (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
2005) that aids the development of higher order problem representation and 
situation assessment strategies such as mental simulation (Salas, et al., 2009). 
ii. The ability to react and adjust to contextual cues in real time provides feedback 
on the consequences of decisions and actions (Salas, et al., 2009). Feedback 
from sources in real time enables the decision maker to adjust to the changing 
requirements of the task. For example, when driving a car, the driver receives 
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real time feedback such as the sense of speed and noise from the engine 
(Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996).  
iii. Evaluative sources, such as those from expert colleagues (Lajoie, 2003; Salas, 
et al., 2009) and computerised feedback systems, can identify and target 
specific aspects of performance to be addressed and improved (Lajoie, 2003).  
Domains that lack opportunity for effective feedback and practice show weak 
relationships between experience and performance (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Salas, 
et al., 2009), and consequently limit the development and effectiveness of expertise 
(Shanteau, 1992). Decision makers with poor motivation (Sternberg, 1998 in Salas, et 
al., 2009), and who do not actively seek practice situations (Alexander, 2003) and 
feedback from those of greater expertise (Salas, et al., 2009), ensure that expertise is 
reserved for a select few. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the literature relating to airport security 
screening and the task of x-ray threat detection. It addressed the role of security 
screeners in x-ray screening tasks, the current understandings of expertise in this 
context, and the current research approaches used to further this understanding.  
The task of airport security x-ray screening is characterised by a substantial level 
of uncertainty. X-ray screening officers are required to search images of passenger 
bags with the aim of detecting threats. These individuals must search for an 
indeterminate number of possible threat objects belonging to broad threat categories. 
The images in which they are required to search for threats are often comprised of 
complexities such as clutter, high opacity, superimposition, and objects presented at 
unfamiliar viewpoints.  
A review of the current research in this field has shown that past research into 
expertise and the role of experience has focused on measuring visual knowledge. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of this research is performed utilising simulated 
screening tasks. Thus, the context of activity and the nature of participant interactions 
are often not an accurate reflection of the real world security screening context. 
Consequently, our current understanding of expertise in the security screening context 
is incomplete.   
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This chapter concluded with a review of the literature relating to the concept of 
uncertainty, and its consequences for task performance. It reveals that in real world 
situations, uncertainty is a pervasive concept due to the inherent unpredictability of 
these environments. It is characterised by unknown change, limited control, and 
inconsistency. The implications that unpredictability and uncertainty have on decision-
making domains are significant. It is identified to have adverse effects that alter 
behaviour and the fluidity of action, as well as restrict the development of expertise 
and skill within the domain. 
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Chapter 3:  Intuitive Expertise 
In complex situations and situations overshadowed with uncertainty, there are 
significant implications for decision making. In these complex conditions, expert 
decision making, and particularly decision making based on skilled intuition and tacit 
knowledge, is highly effective. This chapter explores the various mechanisms that are 
responsible for the exceptional performance of experts. It provides an overview of 
expertise and intuition and then describes the specific qualities of intuitive expertise. 
Following this, the concept of knowledge is explored; this exploration includes an 
overview of key knowledge types and the role of representations. The final section of 
the chapter discusses intuitive expertise in relation to visual perception.  
3.1 Expertise 
Salthouse (1991) describes the limitations of non-experts in decision making 
domains as the inability to identify relevant information, make connections between 
variables, and combine and integrate information. Overcoming these deficiencies is 
difficult, as information retrieval caters for only some of these limitations, and leaves 
the more complex aspects unaddressed (Hall, 2002). Salthouse (1991, p. 292) suggests 
that the limitations caused by complex environmental factors “might be circumvented 
by individuals achieving expertise”.  
In early studies, it was widely believed that expertise was associated with the 
accumulation of 10 or more years of experience. More recent studies, however, have 
found that although time is a factor, the type of experience and the way in which it is 
engaged in is far more important for the development of expertise, and that not all 
learning environments provide the same opportunity for development (Ericsson & 
Towne, 2010; Klein & Hoffman, 1992). For example, one study found that 10 years 
of experience working in a rural fire brigade did not provide the same diverse and 
challenging experiences as one year in an inner city fire brigade (Klein & Hoffman, 
1992). From this example, it can be seen that expertise is not simply a process of 
acquiring information (Salthouse, 1991); it is also about other aspects, such as the 
extensive accumulation of experience in a variety of situations, reflection, and in-
context learning (Klein & Hoffman, 1992). These practices aid in the development and 
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refinement of specific mechanisms and skills: “The development of expertise involves 
a progression from a superficial and literal understanding of problems to an articulated, 
conceptual, and principled understanding” (Hoffman, 1996, p. 84). This development 
allows the expert to overcome and adapt to variability and complexity—a process for 
which the novice is not equipped.  
In situations characterised by limited, ambiguous and difficult-to-obtain 
information, experts can see things that novices cannot (Lesgold et al. 1988 in Chi, 
2006; Klein & Hoffman, 1992). Experts are opportunistic and use whatever 
information is at hand to generate optimal solutions (Chi, 2006). When time permits, 
they engage in a reflective process that serves to monitor and regulate their decision 
making (Chi, 2006; Salas, et al., 2009). This practice is deliberate and involves a 
rational mode of thinking that is detached from emotion and personal bias (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 2005). According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2005), experts objectively view 
their activities during decision making, allowing for a change of perspective if 
required. When time permits, they can reflect on actions and identify various 
perspectives (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). This deliberative and reflective practice 
enables them to avoid functional fixedness (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005), and facilitates 
their perceptual learning (Goldstone, 1998).  
Perceptual learning is in-context learning that occurs through experience, 
practice and reflection (1994, 1998). It enables “an increase in the ability to extract 
information from the environment” (Gibson in Goldstone, 1994, p. 178) and a greater 
understanding of a varied set of contexts and events (Choi & Hannafin, 1995). In terms 
of expertise development, perceptual learning is highly effective in domains 
characterised by unpredictability and uncertainty, where practice opportunities and 
feedback is limited. As well as being acquired through reflecting on actions, perceptual 
learning can also be the result of mental simulation and imagination. Mental 
simulations are decoupled from an immediate interaction with the environment, and 
rely on prior experience (Wilson, 2002). They are used to represent information and 
aspects of the real world in order to draw inferences and generate predictions for the 
purposes of reasoning and problem-solving (Barsalou, 2009; Wilson, 2002).  
A study by Goldstone (in Barsalou, 2009) found that participants were able to 
learn associations among different stimuli and colour through the generation of 
prototypes based on mental simulations conducted outside of the context of learning. 
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Prior experience and memory of situations enable decision makers to generate 
whatever representations are necessary for tasks to be constructed and simulated 
before their actual performance. This strategy involves exploitation of the known 
predictability in the task situation, and the testing of interactions and events in the 
imagination. Decision makers can test causality and common interactions in situations 
that can be consistently mapped (Schneider & Shiffin in Wilson, 2002). The cognitive 
system that generates these mental simulations is identified as the same system that is 
engaged when perceiving the environment and introspecting on internal states and 
feelings. For this reason, “mental simulations can be matched to actual experience as 
it occurs, thereby assessing whether events have unfolded as predicted” (Barsalou, 
2009, p. 1284).  
The process and relevance of in-context learning and perceptual learning can be 
further explained by the field of research addressing ‘situated cognition’, and 
‘embodied cognition’. The theory of situated cognition posits that formal learning 
environments that deal with explicit knowledge are simplified, isolated, and 
decontextualised from the contexts from which meaning is derived (Choi & Hannafin, 
1995). Choi and Hannafin (1995) suggest that these formal styles of learning 
operationalise knowledge and skill in a very different way to that used by experts in 
real world settings. Compared to formal learning settings, Choi and Hannafin describe 
situated cognition as the exploitation of learning opportunities in real world contexts. 
In the real world, knowledge is a bi-product of the relationship and engagement 
between an individual and the contexts in which they engage. The knowledge that is 
acquired from the context of activity is direct and highly relevant to the requirements 
of the decision maker. Through this experience, the processes that gather information 
are tailored to the specific needs of the context and the person who requires the 
information (Goldstone, 1998).  
Klein & Hoffman (1992) hypothesise that over time, experiences that are 
encoded into memory become less vivid as individual experiences, and form a highly 
integrated knowledge base. The advanced knowledge structures accessible to experts 
enable them to make fine discriminations among subtle features, and judgements that 
detect typicality and variability (Bransford in Choi & Hannafin, 1995; Klein & 
Hoffman, 1992).  
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With experience and practice, new distinctive features are discovered, permitting the active, 
strategic search for critical information. One gains an ability to rapidly detect and discriminate, 
but not isolated features or cues. Rather, one learns to attend to invariant patterns that were not 
previously noticed. Over the course of development, perceptual skills change, permitting the 
rapid search, discrimination, recognition and comprehension of complex informational 
patterns. (Norman et al., 1989 in Hoffman, 1996) 
This ability has been demonstrated across a variety of domains with different 
activity types. Critical decision-making domains, such as firefighting, have provided 
evidence that experts are able to rapidly recognise causal factors and goals, rather than 
needing to evaluate separate solutions based on explicit information. Similarly, in the 
field of radiography, experts demonstrate the ability to efficiently allocate their 
attention, selectively searching for abnormalities, and focusing on distinguishing 
features of the images (Hoffman, 1996). 
While there are predominantly positive accounts of expertise, experts in general 
have also been criticised for falling short on a number of aspects (Chi, 2006). They are 
considered by some to be ineffective in domains that are characterised by uncertainty 
(Shanteau, 1992).  In uncertain domains, they are accused of being overly confident 
(Chi, 2006; Kahneman & Klein, 2009), having a tendency to gloss-over surface 
features of problems, and being inflexible (Chi, 2006). Experts are also found to 
harbour bias and fixation as a result of superior knowledge and priming (Chi, 2006; 
Kahneman & Klein, 2009), and to consistently make poor judgements and predictions 
about the abilities and performance of others (Chi, 2006).  
A major source of the negative perspective on experts is the Heuristics and 
Biases community. In this field of research, expert performance is compared to the 
performance of rule-based models, and it is believed that the predictions of experts are 
often inferior to those of a linear model or intelligence system (Kahneman & Klein, 
2009). One reason for this belief is that the heuristics and biases approach is often 
concerned with experiments in well controlled laboratory settings, rather than the real 
world settings of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) research. In these controlled 
laboratory settings, models and systems accurately store and retrieve optimal linear 
combinations, whereas expert are limited to those that they can store in their memories. 
The Heuristics and Biases approach identifies the inaccurate intuitive processes that 
arise from simplifying heuristics, as a major element that contributes to mistakes made 
by experts.  In NDM research, on the other hand, expert performance is investigated 
in naturally occurring and complex situations (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Klein, 1998) 
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characterised by uncertainty and dynamic conditions (Orasanu & Connolly in Klein, 
1998; Lipshitz in Stewart-Patterson, 2008). Decision making in these environments is 
high stakes, and often involves team coordination under time pressure. Goals and 
procedures are ill-defined and ambiguous within poorly structured problems (Orasanu 
& Connolly in Klein, 1998; Lipshitz in Stewart-Patterson, 2008). The Naturalistic 
Decision Making approach focuses on intuitive processes and expertise that develop 
as a result of extensive and specific experience and are applied to the domain of their 
expertise. In these environments, experts are often found to be right, and exhibit far 
superior decision making abilities than novices (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  
3.2 Intuition 
Intuition is a decision-making process that is widely referenced in expertise and 
decision-making literature. In particular, intuition is discussed in relation to complex 
and unpredictable conditions. Suited to these complex situations, intuition itself is a 
highly complex information-gathering and decision-making process. The complexity 
of intuition is evident from Bastick’s (2003) review of the literature, where he 
identifies its 20 properties, and its associated concept of insight. As a general 
consensus, intuition contrasts with logic (Bastick, 2003), and is qualitatively different 
to analytical reasoning (Salas, et al., 2009). Building on this common ground, it is 
widely accepted that the human brain has two distinct information processing systems 
(Salas, et al., 2009): one unconscious, attached to, and integrated with emotion; the 
other, conscious, detached from, and driven by logic (Bastick, 2003; Salas, et al., 
2009). “Intuition is rooted in the unconscious information processing system” (Salas, 
et al., 2009, p. 945), and is characteristically antonymous with its analytic counterpart 
(Bastick, 2003; Salas, et al., 2009).  
These contrasting processing styles have been extensively investigated in 
various dual processing theories. Evans’ (2008) review of dual processing theories 
identifies 14 different designations for the contrasting theories, many of which use 
processing characteristics that are identified as individual characteristics of intuition 
in Bastick’s extensive review (see Bastick, 2003). Despite this diversity of 
designations, the contrasting processing styles of dual system theories are 
prototypically referred to as either ‘system 1’, or ‘system 2’, with each system 
comprised of its respective generic characteristics (Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Klein, 
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2009; Salas, et al., 2009; Sinclair, 2010; Stanovich & West, 2000). In this generic dual 
system designation, intuitive processes fall into system 1, while analytic processes 
comprise system 2.  
Because of its inherent complexity, it is difficult to provide a clear and concise 
definition of ‘intuition’. Nevertheless, a review of the literature indicates that it can be 
divided into two components: the output—that is, the superficial experience one feels 
when intuiting; and, the input—that is, the underlying mechanisms that enable 
intuitions.  
3.2.1 Output 
Intuition is described as a process of direct knowing (Bastick, 1982; Sinclair, 
2010) that is experienced as preconscious (Bastick, 2003) or unconscious (Salas, et al., 
2009; Stanovich & West, 2000) ‘feelings’ (Bastick, 2003). Intuitions are an automatic 
process (Salas, et al., 2009; Stanovich & West, 2000): they occur pre-verbally 
(Bastick, 2003); are not consciously controlled (Baylor, 1997); and there is no 
cognitive awareness of their origins (Bastick, 2003; Salas, et al., 2009). Consequently, 
they are deemed to be relatively undemanding of computational capacity (Stanovich 
& West, 2000). 
When associated with affective sensations such as empathy (Bastick, 2003; 
Salas, et al., 2009), fear and anxiety (Mosier & Fischer, 2010), intuitions are 
experienced as undifferentiated subjective convictions (Bastick, 2003; Mosier & 
Fischer, 2010) that serve to guide actions (Mosier & Fischer, 2010). These feelings 
have been colloquially described as ‘feelings of rightness’ (Mosier & Fischer, 2010; 
Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011) or ‘gut feelings’ (Boucouvalas, 1997 
in Blackler, 2008; Mosier & Fischer, 2010). When associated with tangible elements, 
on the other hand, intuitive decisions and judgements are synonymous with concepts 
of speed. For example, intuitions are commonly described as immediate (Bastick, 
2003; Baylor, 1997), fast (Stanovich & West, 2000), rapid (Bastick, 2003), and quick 
(Salas, et al., 2009). 
3.2.2 Input 
Intuitive processes implement tacit knowledge (Blackler, Popovic, & Mahar, 
2010; Salas, et al., 2009; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005) that has been gained through 
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associative learning (Salas, et al., 2009), sensory exposure (Bastick, 2003; Stanovich 
& West, 2000), and prior experience (Bastick, 2003; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). Unlike explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge is acquired 
implicitly, and without conscious awareness (Reber, 1992 in Blackler, et al., 2010).  
This experiential knowledge is stored in memory and retrieved during interaction 
with relevant cues that are experienced in a situation (Blackler, et al., 2010; Salas, et 
al., 2009). Retrieval of this knowledge is facilitated by the experiences stored in 
memory and sensory input (Sinclair, 2010), and is more likely to occur in situations 
that are familiar (Noddings & Shore, 1984). Retrieval occurs unintentionally and 
unconsciously (Osman, 2004) as associations (Stanovich & West, 2000), pattern 
recognition (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005), and the synthesis of memories that are 
matched to the situation and its contents (Klein, 2008). Through pattern matching, 
relevant cues can be highlighted, expectancies and plausible goals are generated, and 
typical reactions are identified. This process results in rapid decision making (Klein, 
2008). As well as resulting from implicit learning, it is widely suggested that 
knowledge that is acquired consciously is also engaged as intuitive processes. In other 
words, after extensive practice, previously effortful, controlled, and conscious actions 
become automatic (Stanovich and West, 1998 in Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Osman, 
2004). 
Closely integrated with experience is the notion that intuitions are emotionally 
involved due to the relationship between experience and affect (Bastick, 2003; Gore 
& Sadler-Smith, 2011; Mosier & Fischer, 2010). Just as current situations are matched 
to past experiences, emotions can be matched to situations (Bastick, 2003). Bastick 
(1982, p. 77) states that “past experiences condition emotional states, producing 
emotional sets. These emotional sets are the attitudes with which we approach present 
situations. The perception of present stimuli is moderated by our present emotional 
set”. Once an emotional set is associated with elements of experience, feelings that are 
experienced act as memory hooks, creating associations between perceived events and 
stored experiences (Bastick, 2003). 
The associations made between affectively charged experiences and present 
situations occur holistically (Bastick, 2003; Dane and Pratt, 2007 in Gore & Sadler-
Smith, 2011; Sinclair, 2010; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005), and result in a complete 
perception of the situation (Bruner, 1960 in Bastick, 2003). Holistic processing is 
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structured as parallel and non-linear; analytic processing, on the other hand, is serial 
and linear (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). Internally, this non-sequential process is 
described as the ability to synthesise “unconnected memory fragments into a new 
information structures” (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). Externally, intuitive processing 
occurs continuously. All elements and their relationships in a field of knowledge are 
engaged, forming relationships between these stimuli and the greater context in which 
they are situated (Bastick, 2003). Holistic processing is commonly demonstrated in 
visual processing, where scenes can be processed globally when they conform to 
naturalistic structure. In natural scenes that are familiar, holistic processing results in 
guided search, where “general scene properties extracted from the entire image are 
used to make saliency predictions across the whole field of view” (Wilder, et al., 2011).   
3.2.3 Interaction of System 1 and System 2 Processes 
Dual system theories consider the intuitive system 1 and non-intuitive system 2 
processing styles as distinct systems (Evans, 2008). While the dichotomy of these two 
systems is a consistent view in the dual processing theory literature, the relationships 
and interaction between the systems are disputed (Evans, 2008). For example, 
Stanovich and West (2000) state that system 1 and system 2 processes are 
dichotomous. Alternatively, Newstead (2000) places the alternating systems on a 
continuum.  
In terms of a dichotomous relationship, the dominant views in the literature are 
that the systems either operate in parallel, or are mutually exclusive. Parallel theories 
propose that system 1 and system 2 processes act in concert (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
Under this theoretical account, the two systems can be drawn on at the same time 
(Stanovich and West in Sinclair, 2010), interacting in a seamless relationship (Epstein, 
Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Haier in Sinclair, 2010). Parallel interaction theories suggest that 
each system utilises separate neural pathways (Sinclair, 2010). 
Mutually exclusive theories, on the other hand, propose that one cognitive style 
is used at the expense of the other, thus suggesting that they are sequential (Allinson 
& Hayes in Evans, 2008; Sinclair, 2010). This mutually exclusive theory presents two 
contrasting hierarchical structures to account for the relationship between system 1 and 
system 2 processes. First, it is proposed that system 1 processes are subservient to 
system 2 processes, where intuitions serve as inputs to the primary deliberative 
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processes (Salas, et al., 2009). Second, an alternative proposition is that system 1 
processes are used to make initial judgements, and that the role of system 2 is post hoc; 
that is, the latter is used to rationalise a specific judgement, and acts secondarily to 
system 1 processes (Haidt, Patrick-Seder, & Kesebir, 2008 in Salas, et al., 2009). This 
configuration of the two processes can be used to explain the concept of metacognition 
(Section 3.3.2), where system 2 processes act to monitor and control the intuitive 
system 1 processes (Thompson, et al., 2011).  
Opposed to these dichotomous portrayals, are single-system accounts that are 
based on the principal argument that dual system theories do not account for the full 
range of possible reasoning processes and configurations (Osman, 2004). Single 
system theories illustrate the relationship between intuitive and analytical processes 
by situating the two contrasting reasoning styles on opposite ends of a continuum 
(Bastick, 2003; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; Osman, 2004; Sinclair, 
2010). Stevenson’s (1997 in Osman, 2004) version of this continuum places implicit 
processes that encode and apply fragmentary knowledge at one end. At the other end, 
are explicit processes that present organised representations of current experiences and 
combine with prior instances to form new representations. Similarly, Hammond’s 
(1987) Cognitive Continuum model proposes that different forms of cognitive 
processes can be arranged in relation to one another on a continuum, with intuition and 
analysis at opposite ends (Blackler, 2008; Osman, 2004; Sinclair, 2010).  
In both of these single-system accounts, the role of the task is critical in eliciting 
the respective processing styles (Osman, 2004). In Stevenson’s model, representations 
of knowledge vary “according to their accuracy and relevance to the current problem 
space” (1997 in Osman, 2004, p. 992). Similarly, the location of the cognitive 
processing styles on Hammond’s cognitive continuum are related to, and induced by 
the structure of the task in which they are being applied (Blackler, 2008; Hammond, 
et al., 1987; Osman, 2004; Sinclair, 2010). In this sense, the structure of the task 
induces the most relevant composition of processing styles. 
Sinclair (2010) claims that one of the major differences between dual system 
theory and single system theory models is that the dual system view describes process, 
while the single system model describes outcome. Using the distinction of process and 
outcome, it is in the outcome that the most consistent and measurable view of intuition 
is presented. Although the various processing theories present divergent theories on 
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process, in terms of outcome, they present a greater consistency. It is commonly 
accepted that task characteristics (Bastick, 1982; Hammond, et al., 1987; Osman, 
2004; Sinclair, 2010; Stanovich & West, 2000) and the preferences of the decision 
maker (Salas, et al., 2009) play a significant role in inducing the respective processing 
style. While this chain of causality explains the processes of activation of the various 
systems, it is particularly useful in the locus of this study—the role of intuition in 
unpredictable contexts. 
3.2.4 Interaction between Context and Processing Style 
Intuition is influenced by the predispositions of the decision maker (Salas, et al., 
2009), and is contextually dependent; that is, it relies on the decision environment and 
decision task (Bastick, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000).  Intuitive processing is found 
to be particularly active in complex contexts that are characterised by uncertainty and 
tasks of an ambiguous nature (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Klein, Calderwood, & 
MacGregor, 1989; Mosier & Fischer, 2010; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). It is also 
considered to be strong in situations where there is disagreement over task 
interpretations (Stanovich & West, 2000), and in situations that require the integration 
of vast amounts of information (Mosier & Fischer, 2010). According to Claxton (1998) 
the complex and counterintuitive patterns found in uncertain environments are 
advantageous for intuitive learning. The premise of this theory is that rational problem 
solving only simplifies a situation in order to create a plausible starting point. In 
complex situations, however, a state of confusion is induced, and this state requires 
tolerance. Adapting to this temporary state of confusion, encourages the engagement 
of implicit learning. 
The strengths of an intuitive processing style can also be attributed to similarities 
and fit between contextual properties and properties of the intuitive processing system. 
Hammond et al. (1987 in Shanteau, 1992) make the distinction between analysis-
inducing, and intuition-inducing task characteristics. Hammond et al. argue that 
judgement accuracy is highest when task characteristics associate closely to the 
characteristics of the processing style used. Based on this, intuition-inducing task 
characteristics are identified as “unreliably measured cues, non-decomposable task, 
lack of organizing principles, and simultaneous display of cues” (Hammond et al., 
1987 in Shanteau, 1992, p. 261). In these situations, system 1 processes are driven by 
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the relevance of the current state of affairs (Stanovich & West, 2000). As the result of 
feelings of subjective conviction resulting from agreeable relationships among 
emotion, experience, and contextuality, intuition is more variable, and tolerant to 
rational ambiguity (Bastick, 2003).The parallel nature of intuition enables complex 
sets of cues to be quickly integrated for processing (Salas, et al., 2009).  
In the study of organisational decision making, Perrow’s (1967) framework for 
identifying non-routine and routine environments links intuitive decision making to 
the unpredictability of non-routine environments. Perrow (1967) states that searching 
within non-routine environments is facilitated by problems for which there is no 
routine problem-solving approach. In these non-routine situations, strategies that 
implement unanalysed experience, such as intuition, are most common (Perrow, 
1967). Similarly, intuition is found to be a viable strategy in crisis situations where 
stakes are high and interpretation of essential elements of the decision context is 
difficult (Sayegh, et al., 2004). In such high-pressure tasks, individuals tend to process 
knowledge without conscious effort (Barnard, 1938 in Sinclair, 2010). In conditions 
of high stress, ambiguity, and time pressure, strategies that are reliant on tacit 
knowledge and are potentially aided by adaptive emotional responses, are considered 
among the only viable options (Sayegh, et al., 2004) 
Analysis-inducing task characteristics, on the other hand, are identified as 
“reliably measured cues, task decomposition, presence of organising principles, and 
sequential display of cues” (Hammond et al., 1987 in Shanteau, 1992, p. 261). The 
conscious deliberation of system 2 processes serves to de-contextualise and de-
personalise problems (Stanovich & West, 2000).  During this process, problem 
representations are simplified into rules and underlying principles in order to create a 
plausible starting point (Claxton, 1998). In complex situations, however, this low 
capacity channel can quickly be overwhelmed by ambiguous and poorly structured 
information (Mosier & Fischer, 2010; Salas, et al., 2009; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005).  
3.3 Expert Intuitions 
Intuitions produced through expertise have been referred to as ‘intuitive 
expertise’ (Sinclair, 2010), ‘educated intuition’ (Hogarth in Salas, et al., 2009), ‘skilled 
intuition’ (Kahneman & Klein, 2009), ‘mature intuition’ (Baylor, 2001), and ‘creative 
intuitions’ (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). As can be deduced from these references, when 
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compared to other types of intuition, a distinguishing feature of expert intuition is a 
very specific and domain-centric set of knowledge and accumulated experience (Salas, 
et al., 2009). Expert intuitions are the intuitions that are accessed during the later stages 
of expert development (Salas, et al., 2009), and mark a key milestone in the 
development and acquisition of expertise (Hoffman, 1996).  
Superficially, expert intuitions appear similar to unskilled intuitions. Both 
novice and expert intuitions are “automatic, arise effortlessly, and often come to mind 
without immediate justification” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 519). Similarly, 
intuitions of both origins are generated through matching relevant stimuli with tacit 
knowledge that has been coded abstractly within the brain (Reber, 1992 in Blackler, 
2008, p. 63). Because intuitive decision making can be accessed by both the 
inexperienced novice and the experienced expert, the similarities between skilled and 
unskilled intuition are problematic (Baylor, 2001; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Just as 
it is very difficult to tell them apart, it is also very difficult to determine where they 
come from, and what type of knowledge is utilised to construct them (Kahneman & 
Klein, 2009); thus, the decision maker might not know whether they are accessing 
skilled or unskilled intuitions. Despite their similarities, however, Kahneman and 
Klein (2009) describe a hierarchy in which skilled intuition operates at the expense of 
unskilled intuition; in other words, if the decision maker has access to a skilled 
response or action, then they will use it. Nevertheless, if they do not have such access, 
they might still respond intuitively. 
3.3.1 Development of Expert Intuition 
To more clearly define the capacity of intuitions used by experts, Baylor (2001) 
proposes a model which shows the nature and accessibility of two categories of 
intuition: immature intuitions, and mature intuitions. In descriptive terms, the 
difference between these respective forms of intuition is based on the level of expertise 
and the corresponding domain-specific knowledge that is available to the individual 
(Baylor, 2001).  
Baylor describes the development of intuition as following a u-shaped curve 
overlapping the stages of expert development. In Baylor’s model, intuition is available 
to novices in an immature form that precedes analytical understanding. Lacking 
exposure and rational understanding, novices are more likely to engage in this 
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primitive form of intuition. In the intermediate stage of Baylor’s U-Shaped model, 
journeymen develop scientific thinking skills and gain control over theories and rules 
that govern the domain. During this stage, they exert metacognitive control over 
reasoning, and immature intuitive processes are replaced by methods of analysis and 
reason. As the journeymen gain control over understanding the domain during this 
stage, they lose the experimental freedom of the novice and develop more advanced 
knowledge structures. The final stage of Baylor’s U-Shaped Model involves a move 
from the quantitative reasoning of the journeymen, to the qualitative process of 
intuition. The use of expert intuitions at this stage is reliant on the accumulated 
domain-specific knowledge (Salas, et al., 2009; Sinclair, 2010), and the effective 
organisation of this knowledge for its efficient access and retrieval (Elstein & Bordage, 
1988 in Hall, 2002).  
Salas, et al. (2009) describe the relationship between expertise and intuition as 
one where intuition is ‘rooted’ in expertise, rather than the two constructs being 
synonymous. This relationship is based on the overlap of 3 constructs shared between 
intuition and expertise: extensive domain-specific knowledge, pattern matching, and 
automaticity (Salas, et al., 2009). In the decision-making domain, with specific goals 
in mind, these constructs operate in a connected relationship where extensive domain-
specific knowledge, prior experiences, and patterns stored in memory are matched to 
the current situation (Salas, et al., 2009; Sinclair, 2010).  
As expertise develops with the accumulation of extensive domain-specific 
experience and knowledge, intuitions become more integrated into the activities and 
judgements of the expert: “Experiences are effortlessly paired to decisions and actions; 
judgements made by expert become intuitions” (Hoffman, 1996). These intuitions are 
consistently correct, have the appearance of skill (Kahneman & Klein, 2009), and form 
the rapid generation of single-decision options (Salas, et al., 2009). Expert intuitions 
are limited to the domain of expertise, and operate in the presence of a specific goal. 
Due to the specificity of domain and goal, expert intuitions do not transfer to 
unfamiliar domains (Salas, et al., 2009; Sinclair, 2010). 
3.3.2 Combining Reason and Intuition 
Intuition is often thought of as a process that occurs pre-verbally, without 
conscious awareness (Bastick, 2003; Salas, et al., 2009; Stanovich & West, 2000). 
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Although this is true in many cases, the intuitive processes performed by experts are 
often associated with consciousness and reason. Brockman and Anthony (1988, in 
Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005) suggest that, unlike less developed types of intuition that 
occur pre-verbally, expert intuition is only ‘mostly’ non-verbal. It is posited that expert 
intuitions occur with some level of cognitive awareness, where “the process has 
become so internalized that it does not require any deliberate thinking but, on deeper 
probing, it could be verbalised” (Brockman and Anthony, 1988 in Sinclair & 
Ashkanasy, 2005, p. 358). One possible way to account for this cognitive awareness is 
the inferential nature of expert intuitions that relate highly specific experiences to 
situations and actions (Pretz, 2014 in Sinclair, 2010). Another interpretation is that 
intuition is accompanied by a second analytical process that rationalises the immediate 
options generated by intuitive processes (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; 
Dunlosky, Serra, & Baker, 2007; Simmons & Nelson, 2006).  
This presence of reason within the mechanisms responsible for mature intuition 
presents a major differentiating factor from that of its immature counterpart. To further 
explore this distinction, two major divisions of the sources of reason within expert 
intuitions are identified: (i) the engagement of deliberative rationality and 
metacognition, and (ii) the automation of cognitive responses learned through explicit 
knowledge and reason. 
Deliberative Rationality and Metacognition 
Baylor (Baylor, 1997) suggests that intuition and reason exist in a paradoxical 
relationship, with intuition comprised of a particular type of reasoning. During the 
development of expertise, the analytical abilities developed in the journeyman stage 
are carried over to the expert stage and integrated into intuitive decision making 
(Baylor, 2001). Baylor (2001) suggests that the move to expertise and mature intuition 
involves the ability to relinquish metacognitive control over reasoning and engage in 
a qualitative analysis, before reapplying logical reasoning. Intuition and reason are 
placed in a complementary and inseparable relationship, with the two being impossible 
to isolate. In this relationship, analytic reasoning is driven by knowledge that is 
attached to objects. The role of intuition is to direct analytical reasoning so that objects 
are returned to for consideration, development, and validation (Noddings & Shore, 
1984 in Baylor, 1997).  
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This pre-emption of reason by intuitive processes is similarly described and 
conceptualised as the engagement of deliberative rationality (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
2005) and expert metacognition (Klein & Hoffman, 1992). These two concepts can be 
described under the term ‘metacognition’—the knowledge and awareness of one’s 
own cognitive processes, including their potential and limits. As well as knowledge of 
cognition, metacognition allows for active control over one’s own cognition. This 
control facilitates the regulation and monitoring of cognition (Schraw, 1998), as well 
as assisting control of memory retrieval and learning processes (Dunlosky, et al., 
2007). 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2005) describe the processes of deliberative rationality as 
a type of expert reasoning that experts use that differs from the inferential reasoning 
used by those with lower levels of expertise. It is a ‘detached, reasoned observation’ 
of a decision maker’s intuitive judgement. Dreyfus and Dreyfus describe this type of 
reasoning as intuitive reflection, where intuition is visible to conscious processes. 
Experts are able to reflect on rapid intuitions, and subsequently improve, and 
potentially alter, their judgment. This ability to reflect on, and reinterpret situations 
protects experts from operating within a narrow perspective. Experts are found to 
engage in this activity when they have time to reflect, and when they seek opinions 
from other experts (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005).  
Similarly, Klein and Hoffman (1992) discuss experts’ metacognitive control 
over intuitive reasoning, attributing this capacity to developmental stages as early as 
the journeyman stage. At this stage, it is possible for journeymen to identify when their 
experience base is inadequate for them to employ an analytical reasoning process. 
Kahneman and Klein (2009) identify metacognition as a system 2 output, and suggest 
that it protects intuitions against error. Although intuitive judgements made by experts 
are often right, there is no way to check their legitimacy without engaging in deliberate 
system 2 processes. Metacognition enables experts to validate their answers (Richman, 
et al., 1996 in Blackler, 2008), to perceive when their intuitions are inadequate, and to 
adjust their decision making if necessary (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  
Thompson, Prowse Turner and Pennycook (2011) state that metacognitions are 
actually a secondary system 1 process that accompanies initial intuitions during system 
1 processing, rather than a system 2 process. The metacognitive experience is 
described as a subjective feeling of conviction felt by a decision maker, without 
 46 Chapter 3: Intuitive Expertise 
knowledge of where it came from (Alter, et al., 2007; Simmons & Nelson, 2006; 
Thompson, et al., 2011). Simmons and Nelson (Simmons & Nelson, 2006) refer to this 
as ‘intuitive confidence’, which is explained as an intuitive feeling that determines the 
level of confidence held over intuitive judgements. When faced with a decision, people 
use this feeling of confidence to decide whether to remain with the initial intuitive 
judgement or to switch to an analytical approach (Simmons & Nelson, 2006). 
Thompson, et al.’s (2011) review of the literature determines that the types of feelings 
associated with metacognition are dependent on the familiarity of retrieval cues and 
the amount of supporting information held in memory.  
In addition to conviction, it has been found that the ease with which initial 
responses come to mind plays a central role in determining the level of intuitive 
confidence (Simmons & Nelson, 2006; Thompson, et al., 2011). The ease with which 
initial responses come to mind is referred to as ‘answer fluidity’ (Thompson, et al., 
2011) or, in the case of difficulty, ‘disfluency’ (Alter, et al., 2007). These theories 
hypothesise that easy intuitions are associated with higher intuitive confidence, and 
difficult intuitions are associated with lower intuitive confidence (Simmons & Nelson, 
2006; Thompson, et al., 2011). The fluency with which items can be retrieved from 
memory is a strong indicator that they have been experienced, and accurately 
remembered (Benjamin, et al., 1998 in Thompson, et al., 2011). Consistent with their 
hypothesis, Thompson et al. (2011) found that strong answer fluency was positively 
correlated to a strong feeling of confidence. Similarly, metacognitive experiences of 
‘disfluency’ are found to negatively correlate with feelings of confidence.  
Research investigating the effects of answer fluency found that when stimuli 
were manipulated to incite negative feelings, these feelings acted as a trigger to engage 
more effortful processing. This is explained by the weakening of overall confidence in 
the decision maker’s initial intuitive response (Alter, et al., 2007). In this way, 
metacognition that is a result of fluency acts as a cue for judgement as well as a 
mechanism for strategy selection. Evidence supports this relationship between 
processing style and level of fluency. It is identified that the experience of disfluent 
stimulus results in the activation of the prefrontal cortex, the system responsible for 
deliberate, effortful processing (Boksman, et al., 2005 in Alter, et al., 2007) 
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Explicit Knowledge Forming Automated Intuition 
In addition to implicitly learned knowledge, expert intuition integrates explicit 
knowledge which, through frequent activation, becomes automated (Salas, et al., 
2009). Explicit knowledge is that which the decision maker is aware of, and consists 
of knowledge that is implemented as abstractions or inferences (Osman, 2004). This 
type of knowledge is rule-based and is typically associated with the journeyman stage 
(Baylor, 2001; Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Moonie, 2007). Inferences made utilising 
explicit knowledge can be consciously controlled, and are registered in working 
memory. Decision makers can recall these processes, and are therefore cognisant of 
these processes.  
Through frequent and consistent activation, explicit knowledge becomes highly 
familiarised, and specific to relevant tasks (Osman, 2004). Over the course of this 
process, rule-based knowledge reaches the level where it can be performed 
unconsciously (Salas, et al., 2009). Automatic intuitions result from the pairing of 
implicitly learned knowledge stored in associative memory with automated skills 
(Salas, et al., 2009) acquired from the deliberate and repetitive engagement of explicit 
knowledge and skill (Osman, 2004). As an automated process becomes increasingly 
specific to the task and domain of expertise, the individual loses the ability to control 
it (Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Osman, 2004). Once performance has reached this level, 
the automation of familiar aspects of performance becomes effortless. Space in 
working memory is freed up, and this allows attention to be directed to areas that 
require greater cognition (Ericsson & Towne, 2010). Through freeing up working 
memory, automaticity plays a central role in contributing to the expert’s ability to 
comprehend the larger meaning of a set of events (Salas, et al., 2009), and adapt to 
new situations (Moonie, 2007).  
3.4 Knowledge  
The review of the literature in this chapter touched on two broad categories of 
knowledge associated with expertise and intuition: explicit knowledge, and tacit 
knowledge. Explicit knowledge is declarative, associated with rule-based expression 
that can be easily communicated and understood (Baylor, 2001; Ericsson & Towne, 
2010; Osman, 2004). Explicit knowledge, for example, exists in formal language such 
as training manuals, encyclopaedias or formal instruction (Smith, 2001). In 
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comparison, tacit knowledge is difficult to express. It is not found in textbooks or 
manuals; rather, it is acquired implicitly as a result of learning through experience 
(Bastick, 1982; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005; Smith, 2001; Stanovich & West, 2000). 
From the literature presented thus far, there is an understanding of how knowledge is 
acquired and how it relates to expertise and intuition. Building on this understanding, 
the following two sub-sections further explore the nature of knowledge, its purposes, 
and how it is used for task performance. 
3.4.1 Knowledge Types 
At a general level, knowledge is defined as information about the world. It is 
stored in memory and includes formal knowledge such as facts and procedures, and 
informal knowledge that is used do ascribe meaning and generate beliefs (Smith & 
Kosslyn, 2007). At a more complex level, knowledge can also be defined by its 
specific type and purpose. According to Newell (1982), the state and purpose of 
knowledge is determined by input from rationality and the environment. With input 
from a person’s goals or from a particular situation, knowledge is processed, and 
actions are selected specific to the type of input. Because of the diversity of input that 
can act on knowledge, the types of knowledge that are used in any given task vary 
depending on the context and the activity performed. For example, in most work 
domains, people have to perform a variety of tasks in a variety of contexts. For this 
reason, knowledge for task performance has to be adaptable to change, and facilitate a 
suitable approach. In familiar tasks, knowledge of doing is highly utilised. However, 
as tasks become more complex and unfamiliar, or involve multitasking, knowledge of 
thinking is more utilised (Eraut, 1990). 
In addition to type, knowledge can also be categorised by its quality. The premise 
behind the concept of knowledge quality is that not all knowledge is equal. For 
instance, if two individuals both possess the same type of knowledge, the quality of 
this knowledge will vary according to how it was acquired, and how it has been used. 
During the process of accessing and using knowledge, changes to that knowledge will 
occur, and will assist the development of new knowledge. The nature of these changes 
is also determined by the context in which the knowledge is acquired and practised (de 
Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). The clearest example of this difference in knowledge 
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quality is the difference between knowledge that is learned during training, versus 
knowledge that is developed from experience (Eraut, 1990).  
de Jong and Fuguson-Hessler (1996) identify a number of different qualities of 
knowledge that differentiate its nature. The qualities identified by de Jong and 
Furguson-Hessler (1996) include automaticity, modality, domain specificity, depth, 
and structure. Distinction of knowledge quality can be used to provide a more accurate 
description of its purpose. For instance, deep knowledge is highly processed and is 
suitable for comprehension and evaluation during task performance, while superficial 
knowledge does not afford the same depth of critical judgement and, therefore, is less 
effective for task performance. It is important to note that these different qualities are 
not mutually exclusive, but rather, overlap substantially. For instance, deep knowledge 
is closely related to both highly structured and automatic knowledge. Delineation of 
knowledge quality is important, as it facilitates an understanding of how knowledge is 
accessed and utilised in relation to task performance (Eraut, 1990). 
Due to the breadth of possible knowledge types and purposes, and variable 
knowledge quality, it is difficult to develop an authoritative list of all human 
knowledge. However, it is possible to identify some broad types of knowledge that are 
relevant to task performance in particular types of task domains. From a review of the 
knowledge literature, four key knowledge types that relate to task performance in 
complex and uncertain task domains are identified. This categorisation covers 
knowledge for comprehension, for planning, for problem solving, and for executing 
actions. The limits of each knowledge type are not absolute, as different types of 
knowledge share relationships and overlap in purpose and content. Reflecting this 
overlap, the categorisations discussed in this section describe relationships to other, 
related types of knowledge.  
Perceptual Knowledge 
Perceptual knowledge is knowledge that facilitates comprehension and 
recognition of visual stimuli. It belongs to a broad class of knowledge that is concerned 
with representing concepts and facts (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Kirschner & 
Van Vilsteren, 1997; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Phye & Sanders, 1992). This 
class of knowledge is utilised to perceive, understand, and give meaning to objects, 
words, people, places, concepts, and principles (Patterson, et al., 2007). It is 
particularly importance for comprehension and thinking about actions (Eraut, 1990).  
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Perceptual ability is affected by a person’s underlying cognitive framework 
which includes the content, storage, and retrieval of knowledge about concepts and 
facts (Eraut, 1990). The quality of knowledge in this cognitive framework determines 
how effectively knowledge can be retrieved and matched to patterns that are perceived 
in the environment (Eraut, 1990). The greater the quality of perceptual knowledge, the 
more useful it becomes for task performance (Snow, 1989 in de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996). At a very superficial level, perceptual knowledge is explicit and 
unprocessed. It is stored and retrieved as reproduction of fact and rote learning (de 
Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). At a deeper level, perceptual knowledge gives 
meaning and understanding to complex concepts (Gauthier, 2010; Goldstein, 2010; 
McCormick, 1997). With extensive and highly structured perceptual knowledge, 
complex stimuli are able to be processed more efficiently. Discriminations can be 
made between complex and ambiguous information, and attention is drawn to task-
critical features (Jarodzka, Scheiter, Van Gog, & Dorr, 2009; Lesgold et al., 1988).  
Situational Knowledge 
Situational knowledge allows decision makers to identify and represent 
situations as they typically appear in a particular domain (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 
1996). In this way, situational knowledge is similar to perceptual knowledge, as it is 
important for comprehension. However, situational knowledge is viewed as a move 
away from general knowledge about the world, to knowledge that is specific to a 
particular domain (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). The development of this type 
of knowledge is based on engagement with a situation, and with learning as a result of 
the engagement (Kirschner & Van Vilsteren, 1997). It facilitates adaptation to specific 
situational conditions, because it establishes relationships among concepts in an 
environment that might not otherwise be obvious (Alexander & Judy, 1988; de Jong 
& Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Klein & Hoffman, 1992). For this reason, situational 
knowledge is a requirement for the development of problem-solving schemata: it is 
used to select and evaluate the actions that are appropriate to the state and constraints 
of a situation (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). With extensive situational 
knowledge, individuals can choose their own perspectives to guide performance 
(Moonie, 2007). In decision making and problem solving, this results in the selection 
of diverse strategies to achieve highly specific goals (Jarodzka, Scheiter, Gerjets, & 
Van Gog, 2010). 
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Situational knowledge shares a close relationship with metacognition (described 
earlier in Section 3.3.2), and as a result is important for the formulation and 
performance of problem-solving (Mayer & Wittrock, 2006; Schraw, 1998). In 
particular, the relationship between situational knowledge and metacognition 
facilitates regulatory skills including planning, monitoring, and evaluating (Schraw, 
1998). Situational knowledge assists in the construction of expectations and 
determines what is looked at in a situation (Eraut, 1990). With this knowledge, 
decision makers are able to make predictions about how a situation will play out, then 
select strategies (Schraw, 1998) and allocate resources selectively before engaging in 
the situation (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). Selective attention is particularly 
useful in complex and busy situations, as attention is directed to task-relevant cues and 
irrelevant information is ignored. Similarly, selective allocation of attention and 
resources is instrumental for learning. It allows learners to select and focus on the 
information and skills that are most beneficial to rehearse. Monitoring and evaluating 
these skills involves an on-line awareness of task performance, and assessing outcomes 
against goals and expectations (Schraw, 1998). 
Procedural Knowledge 
Procedural knowledge is the knowledge of actions, procedures, rituals, and 
routines (Lee, Foo, & Goh, 2006). This knowledge facilitates understanding of how to 
perform actions and manipulations that are appropriate within a particular situation or 
domain (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Phye & Sanders, 1992). According to 
Smith (1994), procedural knowledge has a strong relationship to knowledge that is 
used for perception and comprehension of concepts (perceptual knowledge). In this 
relationship, procedural knowledge is used to determine the actions that are performed 
in response to perceptual input. The nature of procedural knowledge used is 
conditional on the type of perceptual input received (Mayer & Wittrock, 2006).    
Procedural knowledge starts off as rule-based knowledge, and becomes 
increasingly automatic with use (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Schraw, 1998; 
Smith, 1994). For instance, Nickols (2000) describes procedural knowledge as being 
both explicit and tacit. In its explicit form, procedural knowledge can be stored and 
retrieved as rules, or as a description of the steps required to perform an action. 
Alternatively, as a tacit form, procedural knowledge is represented by motor and 
cognitive skill, such as that required to ride a bicycle or play the piano. As procedural 
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knowledge is used and practised, it is refined, and achieves proficiency over time. At 
a high level of proficiency, procedural knowledge is stored as functional chunks of 
knowledge (Popovic, 2000). Chunking of knowledge facilitates the storage and 
retrieval of specific strategies that are applicable to specific situations and purposes 
(Schraw, 1998). 
Strategic Knowledge 
Strategic knowledge is predominantly used for learning and problem-solving 
(Phye & Sanders, 1992). For the purpose of learning, strategic knowledge affords the 
self-awareness of actions before, during, and after their performance. Metacognition 
is an important part of this process as it enables the learner to monitor task 
performance, identify effective learning situations, and realise knowledge limitations 
(Ertmer & Newby, 1996). For problem solving, strategic knowledge is closely linked 
to situational knowledge, as it is reliant on the creation of links between concepts. Due 
to this relationship, strategic knowledge is often attributed to the planning and 
execution of efficient sequences of actions (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). The 
use of strategic knowledge is generally not considered an automatic process, but rather, 
one that is consciously engaged in and involves active monitoring (Phye & Sanders, 
1992).  
The ability to identify links among various pieces of information makes strategic 
knowledge applicable and adaptable to a variety of situations (de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996). Phye and Sanders (1992) refer to the adaptability of strategic 
knowledge as the result of spontaneous access to prior knowledge. Spontaneous access 
to knowledge is a hallmark of a proficient problem solver. It allows an individual to 
retrieve knowledge from memory and apply it in adaptable and novel ways that are not 
restricted to a particular situation (Phye & Sanders, 1992). When computation time is 
available, knowledge of relationships can be used to project into the future, predicting 
outcomes, and evaluating how to act accordingly. In more complex situations, when 
time is not available, strategic knowledge can also be used to decide what actions to 
apply without having a full understanding of the situation (Gruber, 1989). In this case, 
planning is reactive and adapts to the changing situation in relation to action. A 
decision maker can abstract and adapt general strategies and apply them to specific 
situations in a domain (Alexander & Judy, 1988). 
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3.4.2 Representations 
The total knowledge accessible to an individual is organised in a data-structure. 
This data structure, known as a representation, provides access to knowledge and 
encodes knowledge for its retrieval and use (Newell, 1982). The concept of 
representation is used in a number of ways and is, therefore, an ambiguous concept 
(Strasser, 2010). In a general sense, a mental representation is understood to be a 
mental object with semantic properties that are related to the object being represented 
(Binder, 2009; Palmer, 1978). The object that is represented can be any number of 
things—a material object, a process, or a state (Strasser, 2010). Strasser describes a 
mental representation as a mental image or imagination. However, a representation is 
not restricted to a visual image but can refer to “any structural item that stands for the 
represented object” (Strasser, 2010, p. 16). In this way, a mental representation is not 
limited solely to a detailed copy of the object that is being represented. The knowledge 
held in a representation is characterised functionally by its type, in terms of what it 
does. Representations work by delivering different parts of the total knowledge held 
in the representation. The types of knowledge that are delivered at any given time are 
dependent on the context, and on the goals of the user (Newell, 1982). 
A distinction can be made between mental representations that are internal and 
those that are external. An internal representation explains the ongoing cognitive 
processing of an individual. Internal representations relate to beliefs, memories, and 
knowledge. They represent how an individual understands the world, and explain how 
they are able to anticipate and respond to it in flexible and unique ways (Strasser, 
2010). External representations are those external to an individual, and represent a 
particular object or concept. They are dependent on an individual for interpretation; 
for instance, a photograph represents a particular person, and a stop sign represents 
particular information (Strasser, 2010).  
Mental Models and Schemata 
Related to representations are the notions of schemata and mental models. These 
concepts all share similarities in that they describe the organisation of knowledge and 
experience (Strasser, 2010). Often used as a synonym for the term ‘mental 
representation’, a mental model (Gottschling, 2009) is used to represent objects that 
are real, imaginary, and hypothetical (Johnson-Laird, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 1998). 
According to Johnson-Liard (1983 in Gottschling, 2009; Johnson-Laird, et al., 1998), 
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a mental model is a special type of mental representation that has a structure that is 
analogous to that of the object being represented. It is formed by knowledge gained 
through experience, training, and instruction (Norman, 1988). In an activity domain, 
mental models might be used to represent various problem spaces, and associated 
actions. The utility of mental models and their effectiveness is impacted by the 
knowledge base to which a person has access (Payne, 2003). 
Schemata are representations of concepts that are stored in memory (Rumelhart 
& Ortony, 1978). They are data structures that are used to organise representations of 
experience and knowledge (Strasser, 2010), and exist for “generalised concepts 
underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of 
actions” (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1978, p. 101). Interrelations among concepts within an 
individual schema facilitate understanding, meaning, and action. Schemata are 
comprised of variables which ensure the flexible use of the experience and knowledge 
stored (Strasser, 2010). With extensive experience, and access to high quality 
knowledge, schemata become tailored to the performance of typical tasks in a domain 
(de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). 
Schemata are particularly important for visual perception, and the subsequent 
controlling of action. Visual schemata are comprised of the physical properties of 
objects and the spatial arrangement of components that assist in the recognition of 
objects and situations (Miikkulainen & Leow, 1995). The selection of a visual schema 
as a result of visual input can lead to the activation of other, related schemata. For 
instance, if the selected visual schema is associated with an action schema, then this 
will facilitate the activation of that action schema. This is a critical part of any given 
activity sequence, in which schemata are organised into sets to facilitate the 
performance of action based on a particular type of input (Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
The selection of a particular schema is based on the activation threshold of the 
schema. Once the threshold is exceeded, the schema is activated. As a great number of 
schemata might be applicable in any given situation, Norman and Shallice propose that 
a system referred to as ‘contention scheduling’ is used to organise competing 
schemata, and restrict the activation of multiple competing schemata. In addition to 
contention scheduling, which is used in familiar situations, Norman and Shallice 
(1986) propose the supervisory attentional system, which operates when no 
appropriate schemata exist. The supervisory attentional system is used in situations 
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that cannot be identified because of their novelty or complexity. It works by activating 
or inhibiting additional schemata in order to create new schemata for the novel 
situation.  
3.5 Intuitive Expertise and Visual Perception 
The ability to successfully identify an object or recognise a situation is reliant on 
the formation of, and access to a stored mental representation of a familiar object or 
situation in working memory (McCarley, et al., 2004; Pylyshyn, 2003; Schwaninger, 
2003, 2004). Under many circumstances, coherent representations that are highly 
tolerant of changes—such as rotation of shape, change in size, and the effects of 
background clutter—must be formed (Kourtzi & DiCarlo, 2006). Kourtzi and DiCarlo 
(2006) suggest that object perception and recognition that is tolerant of changes in 
complex natural environments involves much more than learning features that 
regularly occur with target objects. It is found that the behavioural and task- specific 
performance improvements in the perception and recognition of objects are achieved 
as a result of experience-based learning. Consistent with expertise research, this 
learning is identified as highly dependent on task demands and stimulus conditions 
(Ahissar & Hochstein, 1993; Choi & Hannafin, 1995; Kourtzi & DiCarlo, 2006). 
Goldstein’s (2010) review of the vision literature provides two intersecting 
mechanisms that are likely to account for the brain’s ability to specialise the processing 
of information to specific types of stimuli and environments. First, Goldstein suggests 
that selectivity is pre-wired into the brain and is the result of evolution. Second, 
specialisation is likely to be the result of experience and the adaptations that occur as 
a result of interactions with the environment. A central mechanism of this second 
account of specialisation is ‘experience-dependent-plasticity’, which modifies a 
neuron’s response properties, resulting in improved response to frequently 
encountered stimuli (Goldstein, 2010). 
The extent and effectiveness of specialisation is dependent on the task conditions 
and context in which the experience is gained. In simple laboratory-based visual tasks, 
such as the detection of vertical bars in the right visual field, it has been found that 
performance improves dramatically with practice (Ahissar & Hochstein, 1993; 
Gauthier, 2010). However, learning in this context might not transfer effectively to 
different laboratory tests, such as the detection of horizontal bars in the left visual field 
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(Gauthier, 2010). This type of learning that is specific to a task and situation is known 
as ‘perceptual learning’. While it is effective for repetitive tasks in consistent 
environments, it is less effective in environments that are dynamic and complex, such 
as real world contexts (Gauthier, 2010). In real world contexts, objects must be 
detected in variable situations, among clutter and other complexities (Kourtzi & 
DiCarlo, 2006). For this reason, learning that is specific to one particular situation 
might not be applicable to all.  
In contrast to perceptual learning, ‘perceptual expertise’ refers to the acquisition 
of perceptual skills that transfer across objects in a domain, such as the ability to 
recognize birds or to match x-rays (Gauthier, 2010). Gauthier suggests that with 
perceptual expertise, the abilities of an expert might be able to transfer to different 
contexts within the same domain. For example, an expert birdwatcher might learn to 
identify new species of birds with greater ease than a novice would. Although Gauthier 
makes a distinction between these two types of experience-affected perception, it is 
not known exactly what the relationship is between perceptual learning and perceptual 
expertise. For example, it is possible that perceptual learning is an early stage of 
perceptual expertise (Gauthier, 2010). 
3.5.1 Experience and Prior Knowledge in Visual Tasks 
The role of experience and prior knowledge is critical in shaping what is seen, 
and how elements of the environment are perceived. Pylyshyn (2003) suggests that 
what is expected to be seen, what is actually seen, and how this is interpreted is 
determined by our experience. While the concept that cognition contributes to visual 
perception is accepted, the extent to which it penetrates the various stages of vision is 
debated in the literature. It is generally accepted that vision operates at two levels: a 
pre-attentive stage and an attentive stage (Pylyshyn, 2003; Roda, 2011b; Wolfe, 2003, 
2010). At the pre-attentive stage, vision operates before the identification stage, and is 
responsible for computing basic elements such as spatial layout, colour, surfaces, and 
shapes (Pylyshyn, 2003). Attention control is driven by bottom-up input, and is 
directed toward the most salient stimulus in a scene (Wolfe, 2010). Following the pre-
attentive stage, the attentive stage is responsible for actually identifying and registering 
an object. This stage requires input from cognition to bind salient features of that object 
(Pylyshyn, 2003).  
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Phylyshyn (2003) suggests that at the pre-attentive stage, vision is unpenetrated 
by cognition. However, it is generally recognised that perception is influenced by 
cognition and experience in so far as it guides attention in a goal-relevant manner 
(Pylyshyn, 2003; Roda, 2011b; Wilder, et al., 2011; Wolfe, 2003, 2010). According to 
Wilder, Mozer and Wickens (2011), all forms of attentional control, including 
attentional processes that are driven by exogenous input, are fundamentally 
experience-based. It is proposed that attentional control is influenced by task demands, 
knowledge of characteristics, and global properties of a scene. This influence in the 
form of attentional guidance is referred to as ‘scene-based endogenous control’; it is 
proposed to be dependent on a broad range of past experience, with the specificity of 
the task determining the requirements of experience (Wilder, et al., 2011). 
The influence of knowledge and prior experience in visual processing is referred 
to as ‘top-down processing’ (Goldstein, 2010; Huestegge & Radach, 2012; Wolfe, 
2010). Top-down processing is the operation of cognitive processes in perception, 
where prior knowledge is implemented in a user- and goal-driven manner to guide 
attention (Goldstein, 2010; Wolfe, 2010). During this process, vision is continuous 
with cognition (Pylyshyn, 2003). Exogenous search activities are influenced by, and 
reliant on a continuous stream of top-down, experience-based processing (Pylyshyn, 
2003; Wilder, et al., 2011), in addition to receiving bottom-up input from stimuli 
(Pylyshyn, 2003). Here, bottom-up processes refer to the physical properties of the 
search scene and the stimulus being processed (Huestegge & Radach, 2012).  
Top-down influence from experience is particularly important for goal-based 
search tasks where a search template must be formed. Search templates are the mental 
representation of an object, or category of objects and its associated features. Bravo 
and Farid (2012) state that experience with an object, or category of objects, aids in 
the development and refinement of the search template. As this search template 
becomes more refined through experience, an individual becomes better able to ignore 
distractors and to focus attention on areas of interest (Bravo & Farid, 2012). For 
instance, well known target objects are often associated with search guidance in 
crowded and cluttered scenes. However, when the search target has been broadly 
assigned to a category, guidance has not been shown to occur.  
The major factor that limits the effectiveness of the search template is described 
as ‘target uncertainty’, a characteristic common in many everyday search tasks. The 
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solution to target uncertainty is suggested to be the use of adaptable search templates 
that are tolerant of the uncertainty of the task (Bravo & Farid, 2012). An example of 
an adaptable search template is the use of general features that can be matched to 
several objects within a category. This process allows attention to be guided to 
information and image regularities that are crucial for the recognition of most objects 
within a category (Kourtzi & DiCarlo, 2006). 
Search guidance and the development of efficient search processes are 
instrumental in complex and uncertain tasks. For instance, in Myles-Worsley, Johnston 
& Simons’s (1988) study, it was found that that experienced radiologists perceive 
stimuli differently to novices, despite receiving identical sensory input. Results show 
that extensive experience enables experts to rapidly process typical features of the 
image. As a result, attention is selectively and automatically applied, and guided to 
abnormalities in the x-ray films (Myles-Worsley, et al., 1988). The mechanisms 
responsible for selective and guided search are the same as those used when processing 
and recognising human faces (Gauthier, 2010; Myles-Worsley, et al., 1988). Gauthier 
(2010) explains that face recognition involves holistic processing of the structure and 
configuration of the face, where all features of a face are processed in parallel. These 
mechanisms allow attention to be selectively applied to meaningful components only, 
while other parts are ignored (Gauthier, 2010).  
3.5.2 Familiarity of Target and Distractors 
Familiarity with search targets in visual search is a major determinant of efficient 
visual search in terms of both speed and accuracy. Huestegge and Radach (2012) found 
that searching for unfamiliar items was slower and less effective than searching for 
familiar items. Their study found that more unfamiliar than familiar items were 
overlooked (Huestegge & Radach, 2012). An interesting sub-component of this 
research was the identification of the fact that familiarity with objects provided the 
greatest determinant of effective search; that is, it was a greater determinant than other 
factors such as the shape of targets and their location. For example, targets with high 
saliency features, such as novelty of shape, were found more effectively than targets 
with low saliency features; however, when familiar items were present, there was 
negligible difference, thus indicating that familiarity negated the effects of poor 
saliency.  
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As well as target familiarity, familiarity of distracters provides benefits to visual 
search. Kourzi and DiCarlo (2006) suggest that background stimulus should not 
always be ignored and considered as clutter. This view is based on the reasoning that 
it might include relevant information associated with the target object that can be used 
to identify its likely location. Huestegge and Radach (2012) support this notion, 
finding that implicit learning occurred for task-irrelevant distractor items, thus 
improving the selective filtering of these objects. 
Richards and Reicher (1978) examined the effect of background familiarity in a 
series of three experiments that required participants to search for familiar characters 
among distractor characters. Analysis of the results validated that the search was 
slower as a result of unfamiliar backgrounds. Moreover, it was found that the effects 
gained by background familiarity appear to be independent of target familiarity, as the 
search for unfamiliar target locations was similarly aided by the familiarity of 
background non-target objects (Richards & Reicher, 1978).  
Richards and Reicher’s (1978) results were replicated by Mruczek and 
Sheinberg (2005; 2007), who investigated the role of familiarity of distractor objects 
during visual search in complex conditions. The results of these later studies found 
that, after practice, familiarity with distractor objects resulted in better search 
outcomes than search among unfamiliar distractors, specifically in relation to search 
efficiency. This was determined by fixation and saccade measurements that found that 
fewer fixations were made in the presence of familiar distractor objects, and saccade 
target selection was guided by familiar peripheral information (Mruczek & Sheinberg, 
2007).  These effects of familiarity are credited to their development through 
experience. This credit is supported by results showing that experience with a target 
has a greater impact on performance than familiarity of distractors (Mruczek & 
Sheinberg, 2007). 
3.6 Summary 
Expert decision making is considered to be highly effective in decision making 
domains characterised by high stakes, limited feedback, ambiguity, and complex 
information. Experts, through the acquisition of an extensive domain-specific 
experience and the engagement of implicit learning, are able to make fine 
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discriminations and judgements of typicality, extracting and perceiving task-critical 
information that is unavailable to less experienced decision makers.  
Expert decision making has been shown to generate optimal and single-decision 
judgements in these situations through the engagement of skilled intuition. Intuition 
accessed by experts develops through the processes of expertise as a result of domain-
specific experience, pattern matching, and automation of action. These processes have 
been shown to be an effective strategy in complex and dynamic situations, where the 
serial processes of the analytic system can be quickly overwhelmed. 
The effects of intuitive expertise have similarly been shown to transfer to visual 
skills in real world environments. Perceptual expertise enables the parallel and guided 
processing of complex stimuli, facilitating the recognition of target objects under 
difficult and unpredictable configurations. Perceptual expertise is facilitated by the 
development of domain-specific knowledge that enables attention to be selectively 
directed to areas of interest. The linkage between expertise, intuition, and perception 
presents a highly compelling prospect for the study of these components and their 
underlying factors in the aviation security context.  
Having presented a strong case for the effectiveness of intuitive expertise in 
dynamic and uncertain task domains, this chapter concluded with an overview of the 
underlying types of knowledge that facilitate task performance. The knowledge types 
identified in this section describe the knowledge used for the representation of 
concepts and situations, as well as the knowledge used for the planning, execution, and 
sequencing of actions. This knowledge was discussed in relation to the development 
of schemata and mental models that enable understanding and anticipation of, and 
response to the world that is experienced.  
In the following chapter, the study of intuitive expertise is discussed, with the 
aim of situating a methodological approach suitable for the study of intuitive expertise 
in uncertain contexts. 
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Chapter 4:  Investigating Intuitive Expertise 
The previous chapter explored the knowledge and processes underlying the 
skilled performance of expert decision makers. In this chapter, the purpose of expertise 
inquiry and the methods and approaches for the study of expertise are discussed. 
According to Farrington-Darby and Wilson (2006), the study of expertise falls under 
three broad disciplines: artificial intelligence, decision making theory, and cognitive 
science. The outcomes for these different disciplines vary substantially.  
In the area of artificial intelligence, expert knowledge is explicated for the 
development of productive outcomes, such as computer systems. For this purpose, 
expertise is viewed as a structure of rules and relationships within a body of knowledge 
(Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 2006). Outcomes of expertise research in the artificial 
intelligence domain include expert systems, adaptive interfaces, smart tutoring 
systems (Cooke, 1994; Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 2006), and the preservation of 
expert knowledge in organisations (Charness & Tuffiash, 2008).  
In the field of decision making theory, studies of expertise aim to understand the 
choices that an individual makes and how a choice is made. Some of the outcomes of 
decision making theory work is to provide decision making guidance for individuals, 
develop optimal procedures, and develop artificial intelligence-based expert systems 
(Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 2006). 
Much of the influence and inspiration for this research, however, has come from 
the discipline of cognitive science. From a cognitive science perspective, expertise 
research aims to understand intelligence, including the acquisition of knowledge and 
skill. Much work has been done on establishing models of expertise that describe its 
development at different stages of development, in different contexts. As well as these 
general inquiries and applications, expertise has been explored in small scale specific 
tasks in order to explore its differences among various experience groups. Through 
this understanding, it is expected that new knowledge will result in decision making 
assistance in applications such as the design of systems and training to support human 
performance mechanisms (Anderson, 2000 in Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 2006).  
The diverse purposes, applications, and contexts of expertise research demand 
that a variety of research methods be employed in its conduct. Despite this diversity, 
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however,  a common requirement of expertise research is the effective elicitation and 
representation of expert knowledge and processes (Cooke, 1999; Hoffman, Shadbolt, 
Burton, & Klein, 1995; Klein, et al., 1989; Olson & Biolsi, 1991). In theory, a vast 
number of methods and approaches can be used to achieve this goal (Farrington-Darby 
& Wilson, 2006). The most important consideration is that the approach chosen is 
appropriate for the purposes, application, and context of inquiry (Cooke, 1999; Klein, 
et al., 1989).  
This chapter discusses the importance of defining expertise for the purpose of 
research, and provides an overview of expert knowledge elicitation. The final section 
of the chapter reviews the research methods used for the study of intuitive expertise in 
the airport security screening context. 
4.1 Two Approaches to Studying Expertise 
Deciding on what actually constitutes expertise is an important stage in expertise 
research. The length of time taken, and the experience needed to become an expert in 
a particular domain vary greatly. For instance, Ericsson and Towne’s (2010) early 
studies of expertise show that attainment of expert status is frequently associated with 
accumulating ten years of experience in a domain. They go on to explain that time is 
a poor descriptor of expertise, as the experience one can gain over a period of time 
varies depending on the situation. For example, the accumulated experience a fireman 
might obtain working in a rural environment differs vastly from the accumulated 
experience of a fireman in a large metropolitan environment (Ericsson & Towne, 
2010). Similarly, Hoffman (1996) states that even very highly experienced people can 
be regarded as novices in domains that require extensive amounts of experience. 
According to Chi (2006), determining expertise falls into two different research 
approaches: the absolute approach and the relative approach.  
The absolute approach involves studying exceptional people in their domains to 
gain an understanding of their performance. This approach requires a reliable method 
of measurement in order to first identify an exceptional individual. There are a variety 
of retrospective methods used to do this, such as track records, examination scores, or 
an individual’s rating in sports domains (Chi, 2006). In addition to these measures, 
Charness and Tuffiash (2008) describe the expert performance approach that involves 
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“creating a representative task where superior performance can be reproduced and 
observed”.  
In contrast to the absolute approach, the relative approach directly compares 
experts and novices (Chi, 2006). The definition of ‘expertise’ is more flexible in the 
relative approach, as experts are defined on a continuum, relative to less experienced 
people. People classified as experts in the relative approach do not have to be at the 
pinnacle of their domain. For example, some studies compare undergraduate students 
to postgraduate students (Chi, 2006).  
Each respective approach has its own strengths and weaknesses. The suitability 
of each respective approach is dependent on the aims of the research. For example, the 
absolute approach is used in a number of studies in the field of Naturalistic Decision 
Making research (Klein, 2008). In much of the research conducted by Klein (1998, 
2008), for example, individuals who had established rankings, such as military rank, 
or individuals who were directly involved in a specific exceptional circumstance were 
selected. In studies with these individuals, the focus of research was to understand the 
decision-making processes utilised to make decisions under exceptional circumstance. 
In this case, the relative approach would not be feasible. 
The relative approach is widely used to investigate the development of expertise 
by comparing people with various skill levels. For example, groups of novice 
participants can be compared against their relative expert group in a set task (Chi, 
2006).  Much of the current airport security screening research utilises the relative 
approach in studying expertise (Chapter 2); for example, by comparing the 
performance of naïve participants and professional security screeners (e.g. Liu & Gale, 
2011). Using this approach, information can be gained about learning and knowledge 
acquisition in a domain (Chi, 2006).  
4.2 Representing Expert Knowledge and Process 
One of the greatest challenges in expertise research is to accurately capture and 
represent expert knowledge (Olson & Biolsi, 1991). For this purpose, a variety of 
elicitation methods are used to identify the content and representation of knowledge, 
and to infer the general strategies and processes that experts use in task performance 
(Cooke, 1999; Hoffman, et al., 1995; Klein, et al., 1989; Olson & Biolsi, 1991).  
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Knowledge elicitation is the process of capturing information about the content 
and use of knowledge (Cooke, 1994). It plays an important role in expertise research, 
as it enables information about knowledge and cognitive processes to be drawn from 
experts and non-experts. Knowledge elicitation is a required stage of knowledge 
acquisition that involves explicating elicited knowledge and transforming it into an 
externalised and usable form; for example, into a model of expert knowledge that can 
be input into expert systems, or used to form the basis of a smart tutoring system 
(Cooke, 1994). 
Knowledge elicitation methods have been adapted from a diverse range of 
research disciplines, including psychology, business management, cognitive science, 
anthropology, ethnography, linguistics, and philosophy (Cooke, 1994, 1999). The 
knowledge elicitation methods available to expertise researchers are numerous. Cooke 
(1994) provides a useful categorisation of the available methods. Three categories are 
described: (i) observations and interviews; (ii) process tracing methods; and (iii) 
conceptual techniques.   
i. Observations and interviews are direct methods that involve talking to, or 
watching people. There are various categorisations of each of these methods. 
Interviews,  for example, contain both structured and unstructured interviews, 
and these types can be further categorised according to additional distinctions 
(Cooke, 1994).  
ii. Process tracing methods include both verbal and non-verbal reporting, 
protocol analysis, and decision analysis. These methods are generally deployed 
during the performance of a task and are performed concurrently with that task 
(Olson & Biolsi, 1991). Due to their close relationship with activity, they are 
considered a direct method of knowledge elicitation. They are effective for 
making inferences about the underlying cognitive processes and knowledge 
that underlie task performance (Cooke, 1994).  
iii. Conceptual techniques are indirect knowledge elicitation methods used to 
represent domain concepts, the structure of concepts, and their 
interrelationship. Conceptual techniques include ranking and sorting tasks, in 
which experts are required to sort and rank various concepts in relation to 
variables, such as the importance or relatedness (Cooke, 1994). Because these 
techniques rely on indirect methods, they are generally ineffective for the 
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elicitation of knowledge about the rules and strategies used for task 
performance. 
The application and effectiveness of knowledge elicitation methods is largely 
dependent on their appropriateness for the content of the knowledge that is to be 
elicited, and the context that the knowledge is used in (Cooke, 1994). For instance, 
experts utilise both explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is 
declarative, where experts have awareness of the knowledge and processes behind the 
actions they perform. For this reason, explicit knowledge is easy to collect and 
represent (Klein, et al., 1989). Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is unanalysed 
knowledge acquired through implicit learning, and is used in judgements of typicality 
and intuitions (Blackler, 2008; Klein & Hoffman, 1992; Salas, et al., 2009; Sinclair & 
Ashkanasy, 2005). Expressing tacit knowledge is much more difficult than expressing 
explicit knowledge, as it is learned implicitly through experience. Indeed, “If the 
knowledge elicitation method is insensitive to tacit knowledge, then it is easy to draw 
the mistaken conclusion that explicit knowledge is sufficient for performing a task 
well” (Klein, et al., 1989, p. 463). Similarly, if data collection is not representative of 
the task of inquiry, then the knowledge might not be representative of that used in 
reality. For these reasons, it is important that the elicitation methods are sensitive to 
the knowledge that is used in the task (Klein, et al., 1989). The design of experiments 
in which knowledge elicitation methods are used should, as closely as possible, 
represent the real contexts in which that knowledge is used (Cooke, 1999; Klein, et al., 
1989).  
4.3 Research Methods 
A primary consideration of this research was to capture the complexity and depth 
of interactions performed by security screeners in the field under normal task 
conditions. Due to the critical nature of the tasks performed by security screeners, a 
research methodology that did not interfere with their concentration or their procedures 
was required. A multi-method approach that utilised interviews, observations, and 
process tracing methods was designed.  
Employing a multi-method research approach is effective in ensuring that the 
elicitation methods used are sensitive to the breadth of knowledge utilised by experts. 
Whether it is the bias in interviews, or the artificiality of experiments, each data 
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collection method is characterised by its own shortcomings. Fortunately, however, the 
various methods tend not to share the same shortcomings (Sommer & Sommer, 1997). 
A multi-method approach takes advantage of the overlapping and connected 
knowledge that can be extracted by each procedure.  
Particularly relevant for complex issues, a multi-method approach provides a 
flexibility and validity that is not evident when using singular methods (Sommer & 
Sommer, 1997). For example, retrospective verbal protocols can be used to clarify 
fragmented or unclear events that were identified during observations or concurrent 
verbal protocols. The following sub-sections detail the elicitation methods employed 
in this research. 
4.3.1 Observation 
Observations allow insight into people’s activities. They provide direct, 
firsthand accounts of the activities and experiences they are involved in (Abrams, 
2000; Blackler, Popovic, & Mahar, 2004; Sommer & Sommer, 1997). The information 
gathered from observations might differ from that gathered from memory-based 
research, as observations deal with the behaviour of real people in actual environments 
(Van Gog, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2005). For this reason, observations are 
particularly effective for eliciting task performance strategies and procedures (Cooke, 
1994).  
When performed in naturalistic environments within the domain of interest, 
observations are undertaken in the participant’s familiar environment. Compared to 
simulated observations, therefore, naturalistic observations often result in more natural 
participant behaviour during observations (Abrams, 2000). Behaviour is also more 
variable in natural environments, where actions can be unpredictable and surprising. 
As a result, insights that neither the participant nor the observer are aware of might be 
gained (Sommer & Sommer, 1997).  
4.3.2 Concurrent Verbal Protocol 
Concurrent verbal protocol is a process-tracing method that involves the 
participant verbalising or ‘thinking aloud’ while performing a task or action. 
Participants verbalise anything that comes to mind, such as ideas, facts, plans and 
beliefs (Cooke, 1994; Jorgensen, 1990; Van Gog, et al., 2005; Van Someren, Barnard, 
 Chapter 4: Investigating Intuitive Expertise 67 
& Sandberg, 1994). Concurrent verbal protocol is an effective method for collecting 
behavioural events for the purposes of identifying and making inferences about 
cognitive processes (Van Gog, et al., 2005; Van Someren, et al., 1994). It is 
particularly useful for the study of expertise, as it provides qualitatively rich accounts 
of an expert’s reasoning processes (Ericsson & Simon, 1980 in Shanteau, 1992). 
Security screener verbalisations can be used to make inferences about their use of 
intuitive processes. As verbalisations originate from the conscious mind, they do not 
report the unconscious processes of intuition. The gaps in, and absence of detail in the 
reported cognitive processes can be used to infer the presence of intuition (Baars, 1988; 
Blackler, 2008; Blackler, et al., 2004; Jorgensen, 1990; Kleinmuntz, 1987; Van 
Someren, et al., 1994).  
The act of thinking aloud is considered to have minimal negative impact on the 
cognitive processes of the participant, as talking is an automatic activity (Van 
Someren, et al., 1994). However, there is the risk of subtle changes and distortion in 
their cognitive processes (Cooke, 1994; Eraut, 1990).  For this reason, care must be 
taken that concurrent verbal protocols do not change or interfere with participants’ 
cognitive processes. Therefore, it is recommended that concurrent verbal protocols 
should focus on the task and should be unprompted, as prompts might lead to 
inaccurate retrospective conclusions about the participant’s process (Kleinmuntz as 
cited in Blackler, et al., 2004; Van Someren, et al., 1994)  
4.3.3 Interviews 
Interviews are the most direct way to find out what someone knows. They are 
considered to be an effective way to elicit the sophisticated knowledge used by people 
with higher levels of expertise (Klein, et al., 1989). The structure of interviews is 
varied; it is determined by the type of information required, and the aims of the 
interview (Flick, 2009). Interviews range from unstructured to structured: the former 
are open-ended and operate in a somewhat exploratory role, while the latter are 
systematic and sequential, with pre-planned questions to maintain consistency 
(Sommer & Sommer, 1997: Cooke, 1999 #207). Providing a middle ground between 
these two types, are semi-structured interviews. In semi-structured interviews, all 
respondents are asked the same questions; however, the progression of these questions, 
and the manner in which they are asked, might vary (Sommer & Sommer, 1997). Flick 
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(2009) suggests that semi-structured interviews are desirable, as respondents can be 
more likely to express their opinions in an open environment, than in the formal 
environment of structured interviews. 
Interviews provide the opportunity to investigate half-answered or unclear 
responses (Sommer & Sommer, 1997). This is achieved through the use of probes that 
serve to gain more detailed information, and to maintain the focus of the interview. 
Probes are particularly important for less-structured interview formats, and for 
retrospective interviews following observations. While probes can be useful in 
extracting additional information, care must be taken to ensure that the responses to 
the probe are not biased in any way (Sommer & Sommer, 1997). To reduce bias, 
Sommer and Sommer (1997) suggest that the ideal approach is to supplement research 
methods with other methods that counter their weaknesses. In this way, the researcher 
is not relying on any one source of information.  
4.3.4 Eye Tracking 
Eye-tracking technology tracks the movements of a participant’s eyes and 
records fixation and saccade data. It enables the collection of highly detailed visual 
data that is unobtainable through the use of other methods. It is particularly compelling 
for the investigation of intuitive expertise, as visual behaviour is inextricably linked to 
cognition (Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005).  
The most common types of eye movement data used to assess participants’ 
visual behaviour are fixations and saccades (Bruneau, Sasse, & McCarthy, 2002). At 
the perceptual level, the analysis of saccades and fixations enable inferences to be 
made about cognitive processes. For instance, short fixations (<250ms) are generally 
associated with superficial, automatic processing and search. Longer fixations 
(>500ms), on the other hand, are associated with deeper processing and the effortful 
analysis of information (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011). In the context of this research, 
the analysis of fixations and saccades can be used to infer how intuitive or how analytic 
the actions of a person are. For example, intuition is considered to be a somewhat 
automatic and effortless process, while analytic behaviour is slow and effortful 
(Bastick, 1982; Sinclair, 2011). Based on the common interpretation of fixations 
described previously, intuitive behaviour can be inferred by short fixations, while 
analytical behaviour corresponds to longer fixations.  
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The nature of cognitive processes can be further identified by analysing the 
sequences and arrangements of fixations and saccades that occur during visual activity. 
Fixation and saccade sequences, referred to as ‘scanpaths’ (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999), 
provide the basis for a number of metrics that are used to investigate usability in 
Human Computer Interaction studies (Poole & Ball, 2006). A number of these metrics 
are relevant for the study of expertise and intuition, as they are used to describe 
information-processing efficiency. For example, the presence of backtracking during 
visual search can be used to make inferences about search efficiency and cognitive 
activity. Backtracking is defined as ‘a regressive saccadic motion that deviates greatly 
(>90 degrees) from the preceding saccade’. These regressive saccadic motions 
represents disconnection between what a user expects, and what is observed (Goldberg 
& Kotval, 1999; Poole & Ball, 2006).  
Eye-tracking is appropriate for multi-method investigations, as it requires no 
prompts from the researcher and can be used without interfering with other concurrent 
methods. Additionally, the passive nature of eye-tracking technology make it effective 
for use in naturalistic contexts, as there is minimal likelihood of influencing the 
participants’ cognitive processes (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011). Already, eye-tracking 
has proven to be an effective method for investigating aspects of intuition and expertise 
(see Bellenkes, Wickens, & Kramer, 1997; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009; 
Jarodzka, et al., 2010; Van Gog, et al., 2005). 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the various aims of expertise research, 
and the methodological approaches suitable for eliciting expert knowledge. Two key 
considerations that must be taken into account for the study of intuitive expertise have 
been identified: the need to classify expertise for the research purpose, and to ensure 
an appropriate methodological approach for the specific aims and context of the 
research.  
A review of methods suitable for the elicitation of the knowledge and processes 
underlying expert performance was presented, with a focus on those methods with the 
greatest potential for use in the airport security screening context: observation, 
interview, concurrent verbal protocol, and eye tracking. These methods can be used in 
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a multi-method research approach where they operate in a complementary way to 
mitigate the effects of their individual shortcomings. 
This chapter has provided a methodological background for the design and 
implementation of the methodology presented in Chapter 5, which now discusses the 
research plan, the data collection procedure, and the data analysis methods. 
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Chapter 5:  Methodology 
The previous chapters presented a review of the literature relating to this 
research. This review (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) consolidated the concepts from several 
different fields of study that drive this research. In Chapter 2, an overview of the airport 
x-ray security screening activity was presented. Links were established between the x-
ray screening task and the conditions typical of uncertain contexts. Chapter 3 
introduced the concept of intuitive expertise, highlighting its effectiveness in complex 
and uncertain task environments. Knowledge development and the relationship 
between intuitive expertise and perceptual expertise were also discussed in that 
chapter. Finally, Chapter 4 presented an overview of methodological approaches to 
inform and develop a robust methodology for the investigation of intuitive expertise 
in the airport security screening context.  
This chapter now outlines the research plan and methodology used in this study. 
This plan reiterates the research question, aims, and objectives that drive this research. 
This is followed by an overview of the research structure, including a description of 
each data collection stage, the data collection context, and participant information. The 
data collection and data analysis procedures used in the field study are then described. 
The chapter concludes with an overview of the limitations of the analysis methods, 
and ways in which these limitations were addressed. 
5.1 Research Plan 
This research addresses a gap identified in the airport security screening 
literature. At present, understanding of expertise in the airport security screening 
context is incomplete. Previous research investigating the performance of security 
screeners focused on only some of the activities and knowledge relevant to the x-ray 
screening task. These previous studies generally relied on quantitative assessment of 
visual knowledge and threat detection accuracy to determine performance. 
Furthermore, they used simulated screening tasks, which exclude much of the 
complexity faced by security screeners in the field. Thus, the tasks performed, and the 
decisions made in these simulated tasks are not accurate representations of those 
performed in the field during normal screening operations. 
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The effectiveness of intuitive expertise in decision-making domains has been 
discussed in Chapter 3. The skills associated with intuitive expertise are considered to 
be highly effective in uncertain task conditions, and to be transferable to the 
performance of visual tasks. The role of intuitive expertise in these task environments 
provides a compelling rationale for investigating the role of intuitive expertise in the 
airport security screening context. It is likely that security screeners develop superior 
perceptual and problem-solving skill as a result of experience; this, in turn, facilitates 
effective and efficient task performance. To explore this notion, the following research 
question was investigated: 
 How does intuitive expertise facilitate technology-mediated visual tasks in 
uncertain contexts?  
Investigation of this question involved the analysis of five dependent variables: 
activity type, knowledge type, knowledge quality, level of intuitiveness, and context 
(Table 1). The independent variable was the experience level of participating security 
screeners; this was used to group expert and non-expert screeners for the purpose of 
comparison. Details of the participant groupings are provided later in this chapter 
(Section 5.1.4).  
Table 1. Independent variable and dependent variables 
Independent Variable Dependent Variables 
Participant Experience 
(Non-expert: 1 – 24 months) 




Level of Intuitiveness 
 
The selection of these variables was based on the premise that expert intuition is 
determined by a person’s expertise and available knowledge. Intuition is integrated 
into expertise, and overlaps with the knowledge utilised for task performance. As 
experience is gained, knowledge and intuition become more closely integrated to form 
the appearance of skilled action and decision making (Chapter 3). Analysis of these 
variables enables security screeners’ interactions, and the cognitive factors underlying 
these interactions, to be described. From this information, inferences about the role of 
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intuitive expertise can be drawn. An overview of dependent variables is outlined in the 
Coding Scheme in Section 5.3.1. Detail of how dependent variables were 
operationalised for each stage of data analysis is then presented in the respective 
analysis sections—Sections 6.1, 7.1, and 8.1. 
An important consideration when addressing the research question was the 
context in which data was collected. In order to understand the role of intuitive 
expertise in uncertain contexts, the research set out to collect data from accredited 
Australian security screeners during normal task conditions in the field. This ‘real 
world’ data collection ensured that the natural variety and complexity of situations 
faced in the security screening context was maintained, and facilitated a detailed and 
accurate understanding of the activities performed by security screeners. It also 
ensured that the knowledge and processing styles elicited were representative of those 
typically used by security screeners in their context of activity. 
The overall research plan was comprised of five stages (Figure 2): Stage 1, the 
Literature Review (Chapters 2, 3, and 4); Stage 2, a field study comprising field 
observations and retrospective interviews; Stage 3, Data Analysis; Stage 4, Discussion 
and Outcomes; and Stage 5, Conclusions.  
Before commencing the Stage 2 field study, a pilot study was conducted to 
ensure the methods and procedures were adequate. The adequacy of observations and 
interviews were measured in two primary ways. First, methods were tested to ensure 
that they did not compromise the security operations or negatively impact the cognitive 
processes of security screeners. Second, as there is limited information of prior field 
studies undertaken in the airport security screening context, methods were tested to 
ensure their suitability for addressing the research question. In particular, it was 
important to evaluate the appropriateness of collected data and the effectiveness of the 
analysis methods used.  
Following a successful pilot study, the two-part data collection strategy was 
implemented in Stage 2. The first part of this field study consisted of field observations 
that utilised concurrent verbal protocol and eye tracking. This approach was taken in 
order to investigate the knowledge and processing styles underlying task performance 
during normal task operations. Part two involved semi-structured interviews that were 
used to facilitate an understanding of the structure of knowledge, and representation 
of activities underlying task performance.  
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Figure 2. Research plan 
In Stage 3, data was coded and analysed (for details of data coding, see Section 
5.3). Each individual data analysis method is discussed in its corresponding results 
section (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). In Stage 4, results are consolidated and discussed in 
relation to the relevant literature. Implications of, and recommendations for design in 
the airport security screening context and complex domains are also presented. The 
conceptual models developed from the findings are then discussed. The final stage 
(Stage 5) provides an overview of the research significance, its limitations, and 
potential future research directions. 
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5.1.1 Field Observations 
 Field observations were designed to understand the full range of activities 
performed by security screeners, and to elicit the knowledge and processing styles 
underlying their task performance. Relationships between security screener 
experience, activities performed, knowledge utilised, and level of intuitiveness were 
investigated. Figure 3 shows an overview of the relationships between variables that 
were investigated in each analysis, using observation data. 
 
Figure 3. Relationships between variables investigated in analyses of observation data 
1. The activity types performed during security screening were analysed to understand 
the overall composition of activities and the structure of their performance (Section 
6.2). 2. A correlation analysis using Pearson’s correlation coefficient and multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to analyse the relationship between 
security screener experience and the level of intuitiveness with which each activity 
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type was performed (Section 6.3). 3. Level of intuitiveness and knowledge types 
utilised during each activity type were analysed by fitting a linear mixed model using 
generalised estimating equations. Pair-wise tests using the Tukey-Kramer multiple 
comparisons were performed to compare experts and non-experts (Section 6.4). 4. 
Significant differences between experts and non-experts that emerged in the third 
analysis were further analysed. Lag sequential analyses were performed in order to 
investigate the effect that the level of intuitiveness and knowledge type utilised had on 
the activity sequences performed by expert and non-expert security screeners (Chapter 
7). Detailed methods and results for these analyses are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
A summary of the Field Study component of this research is detailed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary of field observation 
Objectives Identify the activity types performed by security screeners 
and the structure of their performance 
Investigate the intuitiveness of activities performed, and the 
knowledge types used during each activity 
Investigate differences between expert and non-expert 
security screeners 
Data Collection Method Observation using eye-tracking and concurrent verbal 
protocol  
Observation Context International Airport departures security checkpoint 
Observation Duration 20-30 minute observation 
Equipment  Tobii eye-tracking glasses, L3 ACX614 multi-view x-ray 
system  
Participants 24 non-expert security screeners 
16 expert security screeners 
Analysis Tools and 
Methods 
Noldus, The Observer v10.5, MANOVA, linear mixed 
model, using GEE, lag sequential analysis 
5.1.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to support field observations. The 
aim of interviews was to elicit detail about expert and non-expert security screeners’ 
knowledge and representation of screening activities. Of particular importance was 
determining the relationships between quality of knowledge and the activity 
representations formed by expert and non-expert screeners. Figure 4 is an overview of 
the relationships between variables that were investigated in each analysis, using 
interview data. 
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Figure 4. Relationships between variables investigated in analyses of interview data 
1. Relational analyses of knowledge qualities were undertaken in order to 
investigate the structure of knowledge of expert and non-expert security screeners 
(Section 8.2). 2. Relational analyses were undertaken to investigate how knowledge 
quality influences expert and non-expert representations of activity types (Section 8.3). 
Detailed methods and results for these analyses are presented in Chapter 8. The 
retrospective interview component of this research is summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3. Summary of retrospective interviews 
Objectives Investigate the quality and structure of knowledge 
Investigate the relationships between knowledge quality and 
the representation of activity type 
Data Collection Method Semi-structured retrospective interviews 
Interview Context Security office, International Airport 
Interview Duration 10-30 minutes 
Equipment  Digital audio recorder (Android phone, using Easy Voice 
Recorder Pro application) 
Participants 24 non-expert security screeners 
16 expert security screeners 
Analysis Tools and 
Methods 
ATLAS.ti, content analysis, relational analysis 
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5.1.3 Context and Equipment 
Observations were performed in the field under normal task conditions at an 
international airport departures’ security checkpoint. Security screening tasks were 
performed on L3 (model ACX614) multi-view x-ray systems. Visual stimuli presented 
to security screeners consisted of the carry-on luggage of actual passengers transiting 
security. Tobii eye-tracking glasses were used to record video, eye movement, and 
audio data during observations (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Mock-up of Tobii eye-tracking glasses worn during the security x-ray screening task 
Interviews were conducted individually with participants at the security 
screening office located at the International Airport departures security checkpoint. 
This location was chosen to ensure participants’ privacy, and to provide a quiet 
location away from distraction. Where possible, interviews were conducted on the 
same day that the field observations were performed. However, this was not always 
possible due to staffing restrictions and scheduling. In these cases, interviews were 
conducted with the participating security screeners on their next available shift. 
Interviews were digitally recorded using Easy Voice Recorder Pro software for 
Android smartphones. 
5.1.4 Participants and Recruitment 
Forty airport security screeners were recruited for field observations and semi-
structured interviews, and their selection ensured a range of experience levels. As well 
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as representing a cross-section of experience, security screeners were categorised as 
either ‘expert’ or ‘non-expert’, based on their relative expertise (Table 4).  
Table 4. Participant groups 
Participant Group Range of Experience (Months) Number of Participants 
Non-expert 1 – 24 24 
Expert 36 – 108 16 
 
The non-expert group consisted of twenty-four security screeners, with 
experience ranging from 1 to 24 months. The expert group consisted of sixteen security 
screeners, with experience ranging from 36 to 108 months. None of the selected 
security screeners had 25 to 35 months’ experience. No spectacle-wearing participants 
were selected, to ensure there was no interference with the eye-tracking technology. 
Participants were selected in order to represent a diverse age range in both the 
expert and non-expert groups. In the expert security screener group, the age of 
participants ranged from 21 to 54 years old, with a mean age of 35. The age of non-
expert security screeners ranged from 18 to 47 years old, with a mean age of 28. In 
addition to the age criterion, selection aimed to represent a balance of both male and 
female participants. However, due to a number of constraints, it was difficult to recruit 
female participants. First, the participant pool available was comprised predominantly 
of male security screeners. Exacerbating this constraint was the policy that requires at 
least one female security screener to be free at all times. This policy is in place to 
ensure that hand pat downs and hand wand screening of passengers is performed by a 
member of the same gender. Furthermore, in this participant pool there was a tendency 
for female security screeners, particularly those of older age, to require reading glasses 
for the x-ray screening task. As a result, a number of potential female participants were 
unsuitable for participation. A total of seven female, and thirty-three male security 
screening officers participated in this research. Documentation of participant 
experience, age, and gender is available in Appendix A (p. 258). 
Participant recruitment was performed on the day of the field study, at the field 
study location. Recruitment for observations and interviews was performed 
concurrently. The researcher and the security duty manager approached security 
screeners individually. They were informed that participation in the study was 
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voluntary, and that no penalty would be incurred by any security screener who was 
unwilling to participate in the study. Upon expressing interest in participating, the 
security screeners were relieved from their current position and taken to the security 
office for individual briefing. During briefing, they were provided with an information 
pamphlet and consent form (Appendix B, pp. 259-265) that provided details of the 
research. They were also given an overview of the Tobii eye-tracking glasses and 
concurrent verbal protocol method. On completion of briefing, they were asked for 
their final consent, and were required to sign the consent forms.  
5.2 Procedure 
Before commencing the observation, the Tobii eye-tracking glasses were 
calibrated to the participant. For this purpose, participants were required to perform a 
short object-tracking task to calibrate the location and tracking of their pupil. 
Calibration results were scored on a 5 point scale for both tracking rate and tracking 
accuracy. If the participant received a result of 0 on either of these scales, the 
calibration was unsuccessful. Any score of 1 or above on both scales was successful. 
All security screeners who participated in this study were successfully calibrated.  
Once calibration was complete, participants were escorted to one of the active 
screening lanes. Observations began at the next available rotation after arriving at the 
lane. In each x-ray screening lane, there are 4 positions that a security officer is 
required to attend: (i) loading area, (ii) walk-through metal detector, (iii) search and 
collection area, and (iv) x-ray screening. During security operations, they are required 
to rotate through positions at 10 to 20 minute intervals. Once the rotation occurred, 
participants were required to log in to the x-ray machine prior to commencing 
screening activities. While waiting for the log-on and start-up procedures to be 
finalised, Tobii eye-tracking glasses were set to record, and participants were reminded 
to deliver concurrent verbal protocol during the course of the observation. The 
researcher was not permitted to interrupt the security screener or interfere with their 
screening operations during the observation. 
Participants performed the x-ray threat-detection task as they normally would. 
The Tobii eye-tracking glasses collected video data from their perspective, as well as 
recording eye-movement data. Verbalisations were also recorded using the on-board 
microphone on the Tobii eye-tracking glasses. Figure 6 shows a screen capture from 
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video and eye-movement data collected from the glasses during observation. The red 
circles are fixation points from the eye-movement data. Thin red lines between the 
circles show saccades; that is, the movements between fixations.  
 
Figure 6. Screen capture from Tobii eye-tracking glasses showing video and eye-movement data 
At the next rotation (10 minutes), recording was paused and the eye-tracking 
glasses were removed so that the participant could rotate to their next duty. Participants 
were required to complete a rotation cycle before another observation was performed, 
to ensure that they had a sufficient break between the x-ray threat- detection positions. 
Due to radiation concerns, and the cognitive demands placed on security screeners, 
policy mandates that they must have a minimum break of 20 minutes before returning 
to the x-ray screening position. When the participant returned to the x-ray threat 
detection position, Tobii eye-tracking glasses were re-fitted and the observation 
procedure began again. This process was repeated until 30 minutes of observation data 
had been recorded.  
Once the observation had been completed, participants were required to take part 
in a short semi-structured interview, and to complete a Likert questionnaire. Interviews 
were conducted in private, away from other staff and passengers, and were recorded 
for the purpose of transcription and analysis. Participants were not required to discuss 
their questionnaire answers; however, the audio recording device was left running in 
the event that a comment was made on an answer. 
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Interviews consisted of nine questions, with additional prompts. Their purpose 
was to support the data collected from observations, and to clarify aspects of 
participants’ screening and cognitive processes during the task. Questionnaires 
consisted of 13 questions, and focused on four areas: (i) difficulty of overall task, (ii) 
knowledge of threat objects and everyday objects, (iii) difficulty of processing images, 
and (iv) difficulty of identifying object categories. Participants were required to rate 
their answers for each question on a Likert scale of 1-6. Full interview and Likert 
questionnaire templates are included in Appendix C (pp. 266-268). 
5.3 Analysis 
Data collected from field observations and interviews was coded to facilitate 
further analysis. Coding schemes were developed from the expertise and intuitive 
decision making literature, as well as inductively from data analysis during open 
coding. Open coding involves labelling concepts and categories during early stages of 
coding. As analysis progresses, coding themes are solidified in relation to the task and 
the aims of the experiment (Benaquisto, 2008). The use of open coding and detailed 
coding heuristics is important for coding visual behaviour, as eye-tracking metrics can 
be interpreted in several ways. For example, high fixation frequency can denote either 
interest in an object because of its saliency, or the screener’s internal uncertainty 
(Poole & Ball, 2006).  
5.3.1 Common Coding Scheme Elements 
As the data collected from observations and interviews differed in medium and 
structure, separate coding schemes were required for the respective data sets. An 
overview of the coding scheme for observations is presented in Section 6.1. Appendix 
D (pp. 269-277) contains the full observation coding scheme with comprehensive 
heuristics. An overview of the coding scheme for the interviews is presented in Section 
8.1. Appendix E (pp. 278-280) contains the full interview coding scheme, including 
examples for each code. Although separate coding schemes were used for each data 
set, both observations and interviews addressed the same overall research question. 
Because of this, both observation and interview coding schemes share common 
underlying concepts. These common concepts are: (i) The activities performed by 
security screeners; (ii) The knowledge used by security screeners; and (iii) The 
intuitiveness of actions performed by security screeners. 
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i. Activity Types 
Five different categories of activities performed by security screeners were 
identified (Table 5). These are: search, examination, interface interaction, object 
interaction, and screener interaction. These activity categories emerged from video 
and verbal data collected from the Tobii eye-tracking glasses.  
Table 5. Activity type codes 
Activity Type Description 
Search Visual interactions with stimuli displayed on the screen for the 
purpose of finding threat objects 
Examination Visual interactions with stimuli displayed on the screen with 
the purpose of inspecting the nature and quality of objects or 
areas of interest  
Interface Interaction Physical interactions with any function on the user interface, 
including application of zoom and IEFs, as well as interactions 
with the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system  
Object Interaction Visual and physical interaction with a physical object or piece 
of luggage located on the conveyor belt adjacent to the security 
screener  
Screener Interaction Interactions with other security personnel, including requests 
for bags to be manually searched, requests for bags to be re-
screened, and requests for assistance  
 
ii. Knowledge Types 
Five knowledge types formed the basis for the knowledge codes used in the 
coding schemes for observation and interview data. Knowledge type codes are 
perceptual, procedural, situational, strategic, and insufficient knowledge (Table 6). 
Knowledge codes were developed based on the expertise and decision making 
literature, and on the knowledge literature discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Table 6. Knowledge type codes 
Knowledge Type Description 
Perceptual 
Knowledge 
Explicit knowledge of perceived objects, concepts and principles (de 
Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Patterson, et al., 2007); can be both 
explicit, expressed as fact and rote learning (de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996), or more integrated, giving meaning and 
understanding to abstract concepts (Gauthier, 2010; Goldstein, 2010; 
McCormick, 1997)  
Procedural 
Knowledge 
Knowledge of actions and procedures (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 
1996; Eraut, 1990; Popovic, 2003); includes implicit knowledge of 
action performance without understanding all the action components 
required (e.g., when riding a bike); also includes explicit knowledge 




Knowledge of the appearance and behaviour of situations (Popovic, 
2003); required to build effective problem-solving schemata (de Jong 
& Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Klein & Hoffman, 1992);  influences 
what we expect, what we look for, and how we interpret our 
environment (Eraut, 1990) 
Strategic 
Knowledge 
Goal driven knowledge of action sequences and procedures used for 
problem-solving (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996); applied for 
learning, remembering, problem solving, and monitoring progress 
(de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Phye & Sanders, 1992); 
involves spontaneous access to prior domain-specific knowledge 
which can adapted to new problem-solving situations (Alexander & 
Judy, 1988; Phye & Sanders, 1992) 
Insufficient 
Knowledge 
Knowledge that results in incorrect action or misunderstanding of a 
situation 
 
iii. Level of Intuitiveness 
Intuitiveness was classified as one of three states; intuitive, partially intuitive, 
and non-intuitive (Table 7). Codes describing the intuitiveness of actions performed 
were developed from the intuition and decision making literature discussed in Section 
3.2, and from previous studies that have successfully examined intuition during 
interactive tasks (e.g. Blackler, 2008; Blackler, et al., 2010; Cave, Blackler, Popovic, 
& Kraal, 2013).  
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Table 7. Level of intuitiveness codes 
Level of Intuitiveness Description 
Intuitive Pre-conscious and parallel comprehension of stimuli enabled by 
prior knowledge, familiarity, and pattern matching; intuitions 
manifest as single-decision options characterised by fast, 
effortless and accurate decision making and performance of 
actions (Bastick, 1982; Baylor, 2001; Salas, Rosen, & 
DiazGranados, 2009) 
Non-intuitive Analytic and rational processing of information and decision 
making (Bastick, 1982; Baylor, 2001); non-intuitive processes 
rely on weighing up decision options; manifest as effortful and 
calculated analysis and performance of actions  
Partially Intuitive Automation of low level processes interchanged with 
deliberative control over higher order processes (Shanteau, 
1992); switching between intuitive and non-intuitive, surface 
level knowledge and actions are automated, while more abstract 
concepts and actions rely on conscious analysis and deliberation 
(Baylor, 2001) 
 
5.3.2 Observation and Interview Coding 
Raw video and eye-movement data collected from Tobii eye-tracking glasses 
during field observations was coded using Noldus The Observer v.10.5 (Noldus, 
2013). The aim of the field observation coding scheme was to facilitate the analysis of 
the knowledge types and processing styles underlying expert and non-expert security 
screeners’ performance of screening activities. An outline of the coding scheme used 
for field observation data and the application of codes is presented in Section 6.1.  
Audio data from interviews was first transcribed, and then coded using 
ATLAS.ti qualitative analysis software (ATLAS.ti, 2014). The interview coding 
scheme was based on the observation coding scheme. The use of similar concepts for 
each coding scheme allowed for the elaboration of concepts based on the strengths of 
the respective data collection methods. In particular, the interview coding scheme was 
designed to elicit the quality of knowledge and its relationship to activity 
representations. An outline of the interview coding schema and the application of 
codes is presented in Section 8.1.  
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5.3.3 Limitations of Coding Qualitative Data 
One of the issues with coding concepts such as knowledge and intuition is that 
it is subjective. To ensure the consistent application of codes, coding was aided by a 
set of coding heuristics. Coding heuristics provide a set of rules that are used to 
associate a specific code to a type of event or concept in the data. Heuristics were 
derived from the expertise and intuitive decision making literature. In some cases, they 
were also derived from established eye-tracking metrics from the field of human 
computer interaction. Concurrent verbal protocols were used as an additional measure 
to assist in clarifying the actions and cognitive processes used during task 
performance.  
To further address the subjectivity of coding and limit researcher bias, 20% of 
data was cross-coded by two researchers. This comprised of data from four expert and 
four non-expert security screeners in order to provide a good representation of the 
whole sample.  While it is preferable that all participant data sets are cross-coded, the 
decision to code a sample of the data sets was made due to the time-intensive nature 
of coding. According to Hallgren (2012), this is a practical method applied in similarly 
costly and time-intensive studies, and the resulting inter-rater reliability can be 
generalised to the full sample. The inter-rater reliability analysis was performed on the 
cross-coded subset in The Observer (Noldus, 2013), using the Kappa statistic. The 
result of the inter-rater reliability analysis was found to be Kappa = 0.69 (p<0.01). 
According to Landis and Koch (1977), a Kappa value between 0.60 and 0.79 suggests 
substantial agreement between raters. However, Krippendorf (1980, in Hallgren, 2012) 
offers a more conservative interpretation of inter-rater reliability values, suggesting 
that conclusions should be tentatively made for values between 0.67 and 0.80. 
Krippendorf (1980, in Hallgren, 2012) further suggests that the interpretation and 
evaluation of an acceptable inter-rater reliability estimate is influenced by the research 
aims and the methods employed. Given the exploratory nature of this research, and the 
complexity of the coding scheme, the obtained inter-relater reliability value of Kappa 
= 0.69 is considered to represent acceptable agreement between raters. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the research plan and a detailed outline 
of the data collection procedure used in this research. This research employed a multi-
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method approach, focussing on accurately eliciting the knowledge and processes 
engaged by security screeners during task performance. Data collection was performed 
in two stages. The first stage involved the observation of security screeners as they 
performed screening tasks in the field under normal task conditions. The collection of 
data during this stage was performed using portable eye-tracking glasses, and 
participants were required to deliver concurrent verbal protocol. The second stage 
involved a semi-structured interview following the field observation. The aim of the 
interview stage was to clarify and further elicit details of security screening process 
and knowledge.  
As this research was performed in the field, it facilitated the collection of data 
that accurately represents the range of activities and interactions performed by security 
screeners. This is an important consideration for this research as it looks to provide a 
rigorous understanding of the knowledge and processes engaged by security screeners.  
For both observation and interview data, analysis involved the coding of 
concepts in the data in order to facilitate further analysis. This chapter provided an 
overview of the general coding scheme that was applied to video and textual data from 
the respective data collection stages. Specific details of the coding scheme and data 
analysis for the respective data collection stages are provided in the following chapters 
(Chapters 6, 7, and 8). These chapters also present the results from each respective 
analysis stage. Accordingly, Chapter 6 now presents the results and analysis of the 
field observation data. 
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Chapter 6:  Knowledge, Intuition, and Task Performance 
This chapter aims to address part of the research question: How does intuitive 
expertise facilitate technology-mediated visual tasks in uncertain contexts? To this 
end, it presents results from the analysis of video and eye movement data collected 
from Tobii eye-tracking glasses during field observations. These results focus on 
understanding the activities performed by security screeners, and the knowledge and 
processing styles underlying their performance of screening activities. This focus 
addresses the first and second objectives of this research; that is, to identify and 
compare the knowledge and processing styles used by expert and non-expert x-ray 
security screeners during the performance of their screening activities.  
The chapter begins with a detailed overview of the coding scheme used to 
analyse observation data. Following this, results from each of the three data analysis 
methods are presented. First, the activities performed by security screeners and the 
composition of these activities during screening tasks were analysed (Section 6.2). 
Second, results from a correlation analysis and MANOVA that analyse the effect of 
experience on the intuitiveness of actions performed by security screeners are 
presented (Section 6.3). Third, categories of knowledge utilised during each activity 
were analysed by fitting a linear mixed model using generalised estimating equations. 
Pair-wise tests using the Tukey-Kramer multiple comparisons were performed to 
compare expert and non-expert security screeners (Section 6.4). The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the results of the analyses. 
6.1 Coding Scheme 
Video and eye-movement data collected from Tobii eye-tracking glasses during 
field observations were coded using Noldus The Observer v.10.5 (Noldus, 2013). The 
primary aim of coding was to identify and compare the knowledge types and 
intuitiveness of actions underlying the activities performed by expert and non-expert 
security screeners. The secondary aim was to identify the contexts and actions that 
coincide with the knowledge and processing styles utilised by the two groups. 
The coding scheme consists of two levels. The first level of coding identified the 
type of activity being performed by the security screener. The second level is 
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comprised of sub-codes that are used to describe the knowledge types and intuitiveness 
of the activities performed. Sub-codes also describe specific actions performed during 
certain activities, and the context in which these activities are performed. The 
following sub-sections describe each activity type and the corresponding sub-codes. 
Appendix D (pp. 269-277) contains the full coding scheme, including a comprehensive 
set of coding heuristics. 
6.1.1 Search Activity 
The search activity code was applied when participants were performing visual 
interactions with on-screen stimuli for the purpose of locating threats. Sub-codes were 
applied to search activity to specify the intuitiveness of, and knowledge utilised during 
search activity (Table 8).  


















Variable scanpath, some regressive saccades 
Non-
Intuitive 
Extensive verbalisations  
Exhaustive attention to visual features 
Knowledge 
Perceptual 
Frequent and isolated knowledge retrieval during search 
(e.g., scanpath characterised by short saccade length 
with short fixation clusters) 
Procedural 
Continuous search activity indicated by efficient 
scanpath 
Strategic 
Goal-directed and organised search activity incorporated 
into problem-solving activity 
Situational 
Search process adapted to a specific and changing 
situational condition(e.g., performing search activity in 
response to a visual feature or object that might suggest 
the presence of a possible associated threat object) 
Insufficient Inability to perform search activity 
 
6.1.2 Examination Activity 
Examination activity was coded when participants fixated on an area or object of 
interest for the purpose of identification or evaluation. Sub-codes were applied to 
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examination activity to describe the intuitiveness of, and knowledge utilised during the 
examination. Additionally, a context sub-code was applied to examination activity to 
identify the focus of the examination (Table 9). 


















Non-verbal process  
Immediate recognition of an object 
Partially-
Intuitive 
Limited verbalisations  
Minor delay during identification of an object 
Non-
Intuitive 
Verbalisations indicating effortful identification of an 
object  
Exhaustive attention to a visual feature 
Knowledge 
Perceptual 
Isolated fixation on a visual feature or object for the 
purpose of identification 
Procedural 
Examination of a visual feature integrated with other 
activity (e.g., fixations closely linked with the transition 
to another activity) 
Strategic 
Examinations integrated in complementary sequences of 
problem-solving action 
Situational 
Adapting examination to specific and changing 
situational conditions (e.g., performing examination in 
response to a visual feature that might suggest the 
presence of an associated threat object) 
Insufficient Verbalisations indicating uncertainty 
Context 
Clutter High density area of superimposed objects 
Opaque Area/single object that is opaque 
Isolated 
Object 
Isolated object unaffected by high opacity, clutter, or 
other type of occlusion 
Organic Area/single object that is comprised of organic material 
Threat  Real threat object or fictional threat object (TIP) 
 
6.1.3 Interface Interaction Activity 
Interface interaction activity codes were used when participants performed 
physical interactions with the x-ray machine interface. These interactions were 
performed for the purpose of applying image enhancement functions (IEFs). Sub-
codes were applied to interface interaction activity to record the IEF type used, and the 
context in which the IEF was used for investigation. Sub-codes were also applied to 
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specify how intuitive the interface interactions were, and the type of knowledge 
underlying the interaction (Table 10).  





















Rapid transition between antecedent action and 
interface interaction   
Partially-
Intuitive 
Limited verbalisation of interaction 




Verbalisation of interaction 
Slow and deliberate transition between antecedent 
action and interface interaction 
Knowledge 
Perceptual 
Associating meaning of objects to IEFs (e.g., 
deliberating over choice of IEF)  
Procedural 
Knowledge of how and when to perform an interface 
interaction (e.g., stating that an image is dark and 
specifying use of the black and white filter) 
Strategic 
Performing a goal-directed sequence of complementary 
interface interactions  
Situational 
Adapting problem-solving to specific and changing 
situational conditions (e.g., changing perspective or 
adapting strategy to suit situational requirements) 




Application of a primary IEF: Black and White, Pseudo 
Colour, Inorganic, Organic  
Secondary 
Function 
Application of a secondary IEF: Negative, High/Low 
Penetration, Edge Enhance, Density Toggle, Fade 
Zoom 
Function 
Application of  Zoom IEFs: 2x Zoom, 4x Zoom, 8x 
Zoom and 16x Zoom 
Context 
Clutter High density area of superimposed objects 
Opaque Area/single object that is opaque 
Isolated 
Object 
Isolated object unaffected by high opacity, clutter, or 
other type of occlusion 
Organic Area/single object that is comprised of organic material 
Threat Real threat object or fictional threat object (TIP) 
6.1.4 Screener Interaction Activity 
Screener interaction activity codes were applied when a participant performed 
interactions with assisting security officers. Screener interactions were performed in 
order to request various actions to be performed or to ask for assistance. Sub-codes 
were used to specify the type of screener interaction performed, and the type of 
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knowledge underlying that activity (Table 11). It should be noted, while intuitiveness 
sub-codes were applied to each of the other activity codes, they were not applied to 
screener interaction activity codes. This is because a key characteristic used to measure 
intuition is the presence and extent of verbalisations (Section 3.2). As screener 
interactions are inherently a verbal interaction, the intuitiveness of the activity could 
not be reliably coded. 





















Demonstrating knowledge of visual concepts and their 
meanings during discussion 
Procedural 
Knowledge of how and when to perform a screener 
interaction (e.g., identifying a difficult object and 
requesting that a relevant action be performed) 
Strategic 
Identifying and facilitating learning situations (e.g., 
reviewing unfamiliar object following its removal) 
Situational 
Rich knowledge of a problematic image state, and 
adapting problem solving to overcome the image state 
(e.g., adapting a strategy to suit situational requirements) 
















Requesting that a bag be manually searched in order to 
find an object and obtain its identity 
Object 
Removal 
Requesting that a prohibited object be removed  
 
6.1.5 Object Interaction Activity 
Object-interaction activity codes were applied when a participant performed a 
visual or physical interaction with the physical object being screened. Object 
interactions were typically performed as part of examinations and screener 
interactions. They were comprised of quick glances or physical interactions for the 
purpose of removing the item from the x-ray machine so that further action could be 
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performed. Due to their role in other activities, object interactions were considered as 
transition activities and were not a major focus of this research. 
6.1.6 Coding Application  
The application of codes was performed at different levels. The first level of 
codes to be applied was activity codes. These codes were mutually exclusive, meaning 
that a single segment of video was only assigned one activity code (Figure 7). For 
instance, at time 235.30 seconds, the security screener performed an interface 
interaction. This was followed by a short examination at 238.30; this was followed 
immediately by an additional interface interaction at 238.46; and this was then 
followed by an examination at 240.63 seconds. Mutually exclusive activity codes also 
required that all segments of the video were coded, including segments that did not 
correspond to an activity code. In such instances, these segments of the video were 
coded as either ‘downtime’ or ‘not coded’. This signified that no active screening 
activity was being performed. 
 
Figure 7. Observer XT interface and example of coding application 
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Sub-codes (specified in Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, and 6.1.4) were applied to 
each activity code to describe the nature of the activity being performed. Application 
of sub-codes varied depending on the type of sub-code. Intuitiveness, context, and 
screener interaction type sub-codes were mutually exclusive, and only one sub-code 
from each category was applied to a single activity code. In contrast, knowledge, and 
IEF type sub-codes were not mutually exclusive, allowing for multiple knowledge and 
IEF type codes to be applied to a single activity code. For example, viewing the 
interface interaction code at (time) 235.30, five sub-codes are applied. The type of 
interface interaction is described by the ‘zoom’ sub-code. The context of the interface 
interaction is described by the ‘opaque’ sub-code. Describing the knowledge types 
utilised during this interface interaction are ‘strategic knowledge’ and ‘procedural 
knowledge’ sub-codes. Describing the intuitiveness of the interface interaction is the 
‘intuitive’ sub-codes.     
Once coding was complete, coded observations were converted to quantitative 
data, and exported as spreadsheets for further analysis. For this research, data was 
exported as total time durations of sub-codes. Time durations were then converted to 
percentages for further analysis. The specific methods used for the analysis of coded 
data are described in each of the following analysis sections.  
6.2 Security Screening Activity Composition  
This section focuses on the activities performed by security screeners during the 
x-ray screening task. Results show overall task composition, relationships among 
activities, the contexts in which activities were performed, and the actions that were 
performed. Mean percentages reported for activity types, activity contexts and the 
actions performed during specific activities were computed first for each individual 
participant, and then averaged over all participants. For figures with percentages that 
do not sum to 100%, variations of plus or minus 1% are due to rounding to the nearest 
whole percentage. Data tables reporting standard deviation and standard errors are 
shown in Appendix F (pp. 281-282). This section is intended to provide a basis for 
understanding the contexts associated with the results presented in the following 
sections. The activities performed by expert and non-expert security screeners are 
shown in Figure 8. The percentage of total screening time that each activity represents 
and standard errors are shown.  
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Figure 8. Activities performed, and average percentage of overall time taken by expert and non-
expert screeners 
 Search activity comprised most screening activity for both expert (59%), and 
non-expert (61%) screeners. Examinations were the second most prominent activity 
performed for expert (17%) and non-expert (18%) screeners. This was followed by 
screener interactions, which was the third highest percentage of screening activity for 
both experts (13%) and non-experts (12%). Interface interactions and object 
interactions comprised smaller percentages of the overall task during the field 
observations.  
The activities performed by security screeners are performed in sequences. The 
types of sequences performed are dependent on the image context and the goals of the 
security screener. To investigate these sequences and determine the relationship 
among different activities, a lag sequential analysis was performed. The lag sequential 
analysis allowed the probability of transitions between each activity to be identified 
and represented (Figure 9). The visualisation is comprised of activity nodes, and 
connections between each node. Connections with the same colour as the activity node 
represent transitions originating from that activity. The width of the connections is 
relative to the transition probability; this is numerically recorded—between 0 and 1—
alongside each transition connection. A probability of 0 represents a transition that 
never occurs, while a probability of 1 represents a transition that always occurs. 
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transition matrix detailing the relationships and transition probabilities that are 
illustrated in Figure 9.  
Transitions occur most frequently between search, examination, interface 
interaction, and object interaction (Figure 9). Few transitions occur to and from 
screener interactions. However, this can be expected, as screener interactions are 
generally performed at the end of a sequence. Of these transitions, two transition pairs 
are characterised by strong reciprocal relationships. The first of these pairs is ‘search 
and examination’. Search activity is often found to transition to examination (0.29), 
and examination is often found to transition to search (0.32). Search activity also 
frequently transitions to different types of search activity (0.37), forming sequences of 
search activity; for example, intuitive search can transition to non-intuitive search.  
 
Figure 9. Relationships among screening activities, showing activity transition probability  
The second strong reciprocal pair is ‘examination and interface interaction’. 
Examination activity frequently transitions to interface interaction (0.37), and interface 
interaction frequently transition to examination (0.60). This type of transitional 
sequence is generally used for problem solving; for example, when an IEF is applied 
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in order to improve image clarity and support a subsequent examination. Problem-
solving activity is also comprised of transitions from examination to screener 
interaction (0.13).  
The two primary activity groupings described above represent the two distinct 
activity phases performed during the screening activity. The search phase is comprised 
of visual interactions, and is the default state of the security screener. The problem-
solving phase is comprised of both visual and physical interactions and, as the name 
suggests, is used for the purpose of problem solving. In the following sub-sections the 
context and nature of the activities performed during each of these phases is presented.  
6.2.1 Search Phase 
Activity in the search phase makes up the majority of screening activity 
performed by security screeners. Search is typically performed continuously where 
there are no objects or features of an image that require further investigation. For 
example, several bags can be searched during one continuous search sequence if no 
objects or areas of concern are identified. Transitions from search to examination are 
initiated when an object identified during the search phase requires greater scrutiny. 
Examinations that occur during the search phase are performed without the assistance 
of any image enhancement functions. Average percentages and standard errors are 
shown for each context in which examinations are performed during the search phase 
(Figure 10).  
 






































 Chapter 6: Knowledge, Intuition, and Task Performance 99 
Transitions to examinations are predominantly initiated by clutter (33%) and 
isolated objects (32%). Examination of organic objects (16%), opaque objects (14%), 
and threat objects (5%) were less commonly performed during search sequences.  
6.2.2 Problem-solving Phases 
Problem-solving phases are initiated when an object or area of interest that 
requires the use of problem-solving procedures to assist in object recognition and 
evaluation is encountered. Average percentages and standard errors are shown for each 
context in which examinations are performed during problem-solving phases (Figure 
11). 
 
Figure 11. Context of security screeners’ attention during problem-solving phases  
Examinations performed during problem-solving phases were predominantly 
performed to investigate cluttered images (48%) and opaque objects (36%). 
Examinations of isolated objects (14%) were less frequently performed, and 
examinations of organic objects (3%) were rarely the focus during problem-solving 
phases. Examinations during problem-solving phases were not performed to 
investigate threat objects. 
During problem-solving phases, interface functions and interactions with other 
security screeners are performed to support visual examinations. Transitions between 
examinations and interface interactions comprise the majority of activity during 
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image enhancement functions (IEFs) in order to apply image enhancement functions 
(IEFs). In total, there are thirteen IEFs (Appendix D, pp. 274-275) which are divided 
into three categories: primary, which enable selective and alternate presentation of 
colours; secondary, which offer various enhancements to highlight aspects of the 
image; and zoom, which is comprised of a number of zoom increments from 2x to 16x. 
The average percentages of use and standard errors for each IEF used during problem-
solving examinations are shown in Figure 12. IEFs not used by security screeners are 
not shown. 
 
Figure 12. Image enhancement functions used during problem-solving phases 
Of the available IEFs, security screeners demonstrated a preference for only a 
select few. Black and white (41%) and fade (39%) were the most frequently used. 
Zoom x2 (15%), negative (4%), high/low penetration (1%) and edge enhance (1%) 
were used less frequently. The use of zoom x4 and density toggle both comprised less 
than 1% of total IEFs use by security screeners. 
Interactions with other security screeners assisted problem solving. Screener 
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is required to be removed; or where a problem requires solving. As a method for 
problem solving, interactions with security screeners are split into four different types: 
problem-solving discussion, requesting a manual search, requesting visual assistance, 
and requesting a re-run of the bag. The average percentages of use and standard errors 
for each type of screener interaction are shown in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. Types of actions performed during security screener interactions  
Re-runs (35%) were the most frequently requested action during screener 
interactions. Re-runs are requested in order to get a clearer image of the bag. Contents 
of the bag might be separated, shaken, or placed at a different angle prior to the re-run. 
Manual searches were the second most frequent action requested (30%). Manual 
searches were performed in order to identify an object, or to clarify an area of the 
image that could not be resolved during visual interaction. Problem-solving 
discussions (23%) were the third most frequently performed interactions with security 
screeners. Problem-solving discussions were performed to validate security screeners’ 
opinions of an object or an area of an image. The least frequently performed screener 
interaction were requests for visual assistance (12%). These were also sought to 
receive an outside opinion of an object, or area of an image. 
6.3 Intuition and Security Screening Activities 
This section examines the relationship between security screener experience and 
intuitiveness of search, examination, and interface interaction activities. A correlation 
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(MANOVA) were used to show the relationship between experience and the 
intuitiveness of activities performed. Slope estimates, r-square and p-values are 
reported in text. Results from the correlation analysis and MANOVA show that there 
is a strong relationship between security screener experience and intuitiveness of 
actions performed during each activity. Results also indicate that the activity type has 
an influential role in inducing the processing style available to security screeners. 
Appendix F (p. 283) contains result tables outlining slope estimates, correlation 
coefficients, r-square, and p-values for each analysis. 
6.3.1 Intuitiveness of Search 
Search activity was predominantly performed intuitively (mean=48.28%) for all 
security screeners. A significant positive relationship (slope=0.31; R2=0.23; P=0.002) 
between experience and intuitive search was observed. As participants’ experience 
increases, the percentage of search performed intuitively increases significantly 
(Figure 14).   
 
Figure 14. Relationship between experience and intuitive search 
Non-intuitive search comprised only a small percentage of total search activity 
(mean=9.83%). For all security screeners, the percentage of non-intuitive search 
remained lower than intuitive search (Figure 15). No significant effect of experience 
on non-intuitive search was observed (slope=-0.11; R2=0.09; P=0.053).  
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Figure 15. Relationship between experience and non-intuitive search 
6.3.2 Intuitiveness of Examinations 
For all security screeners, a low percentage of examinations were performed 
intuitively (mean=5.52%). A positive relationship was observed between experience 
and intuitive examination. As experience increased, intuitive examinations increased 
significantly (slope=0.09; R2=0.14; P=0.016). Despite this increase, intuitive 
examinations remained low for all participants (Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16. Relationship between experience and intuitive examinations 
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Security screeners’ examinations of objects and areas of interest were most often 
performed non-intuitively (mean=64.83%). A significant negative relationship was 
found between experience and non-intuitive examinations (slope=-0.21; R2=0.12; 
P=0.029). As experience increased, the percentage of examinations performed non-
intuitively decreased significantly (Figure 17). A comparison of Figure 16 and Figure 
17, reveals that the percentage of non-intuitive examinations is, on average, greater 
than the percentage of intuitive examinations for all experience levels.  
 
Figure 17. Relationship between experience and non-intuitive examinations 
6.3.3 Intuitiveness of Interface Interactions 
Intuitive interface interactions comprised only a moderate percentage 
(mean=19.97%) of total interface interactions performed by all security screeners. A 
strong positive relationship was observed between intuitive interface interactions and 
experience (Figure 18). As experience increased, intuitive interface interactions also 
increased significantly (slope=0.25; R2=0.18; P=0.007).  
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Figure 18. Relationship between experience and intuitive interface interactions 
Non-intuitive interface interactions comprised the majority (mean=51.56%) of 
interface interactions performed by all security screeners. A strong negative 
relationship was observed between experience and non-intuitive interface interactions 
(Figure 19). As experience increased, non-intuitive interface interactions decreased 
significantly (slope=-0.33; R2=0.18; P=0.006).  
 
Figure 19. Relationship between experience and non-intuitive interface interactions 
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A comparison of Figure 18 and Figure 19 shows that less experienced security 
screeners performed more non-intuitive than intuitive interface interactions. As 
experience increased, non-intuitive interface interaction decreased; therefore, at much 
higher levels of experience (>87 months), the percentage of intuitive interface 
interactions exceeded, or was at least on par with the percentage of non-intuitive 
interface interactions. These results show that as security screeners gain a substantial 
amount of experience, they are able to perform consistently intuitive interface 
interactions during problem solving. 
6.4 Expert and Non-expert Knowledge  
The previous section investigated the relationship between the experience of 
security screeners and the intuitiveness of search, examinations, and interface 
interactions. This section aims to build on these results by also examining the type of 
knowledge underlying the performance of x-ray screening activities. Where the 
previous section analysed search, examination, and interface interaction activities 
only, this section also reports the results from interactions performed with other 
security screeners. Furthermore, the knowledge utilised by experts and non-experts is 
directly compared. This approach is used to address the second objective of this 
research; that is, to compare the types of knowledge and processing styles utilised by 
expert and non-expert security screeners. Detail of the participant experience 
groupings was earlier described in Section 5.1.4.  
6.4.1 Knowledge Categorisation 
The knowledge types analysed in this section are perceptual knowledge, 
procedural knowledge, strategic knowledge, situational knowledge, and insufficient 
knowledge. These knowledge types have been previously described in the common 
coding scheme in Section 5.5.3. These were further categorised in order to distinguish 
between the different qualities of the knowledge used by security screener. 
Categorisation of each knowledge type is based on the notion that knowledge is not 
only defined by type, but also by quality (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996), as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The categorisations of knowledge for this analysis were 
determined by their co-occurrence with intuitiveness and interaction type sub-codes. 
Table 12 shows the activity which the knowledge categories are applied to, the 
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knowledge category, and the co-occurring sub-codes that each knowledge category is 
based on.  
The categories of knowledge associated with the search activity are used to 
provide an example of how knowledge categories are formed (Table 12). Search 
activity is associated with four different knowledge categories. For instance, it can be 
seen that the ‘intuitive perceptual’ knowledge category is comprised of the sub-codes 
‘intuitive’ and ‘perceptual knowledge’. This indicates that the search activity 
associated with these sub-codes utilised perceptual knowledge and was performed 
intuitively. This can be compared to the ‘non-intuitive perceptual’ knowledge category 
that indicates that the associated search activity utilised perceptual knowledge and was 
performed non-intuitively. These two distinctions result in two different categories of 
perceptual knowledge: one accessed intuitively, and the other accessed non-intuitively.  
Table 12. Knowledge quality categories 
Activity Knowledge Category  Co-occurring Sub-codes 
Search 
 
Intuitive Perceptual  (Perceptual Knowledge) + (Intuitive) 
Non-Intuitive Perceptual  (Perceptual Knowledge) + (Non-Intuitive) 
Intuitive Procedural  (Procedural Knowledge) + (Intuitive) 
Non-Intuitive Procedural  (Procedural Knowledge) + (Non-Intuitive) 
Examination 
Intuitive Perceptual (Perceptual Knowledge) + (Intuitive) 
Non-Intuitive Perceptual (Perceptual Knowledge) + (Non-Intuitive) 
Intuitive Procedural (Procedural Knowledge) + (Intuitive) 
Non-Intuitive Procedural (Procedural Knowledge) + (Non-Intuitive) 
Strategic (Strategic Knowledge) + (Any intuitiveness) 
Insufficient (Insufficient Knowledge) + (Any intuitiveness) 
Interface 
Interaction 
Intuitive Procedural (Procedural Knowledge) + (Intuitive) 
Non-Intuitive Procedural (Procedural Knowledge) + (Non-Intuitive) 
Strategic (Strategic Knowledge) + (Any intuitiveness) 
Insufficient (Insufficient Knowledge) + (Any intuitiveness) 
Screener 
Interaction 
Procedural Removal (Procedural Knowledge) + (Threat Removal) 
Procedural Problem 
Solving 
(Procedural Knowledge) + (Re-Run / 
Discussion / Manual Search) 
Situational Problem 
Solving 
(Situational Knowledge) + (Re-Run / 
Discussion / Manual Search) 
Insufficient  (Insufficient Knowledge) + (Any screener 
Interaction type) 
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These distinctions of knowledge, based on intuitiveness sub-codes, occur for 
search, examination, and interface interaction activity. As screener interactions were 
not coded for intuitiveness, the knowledge categories for screener interactions were 
based on the knowledge type and the type of screener interaction being performed. 
In some cases, multiple knowledge type codes were applied to a single activity. 
For example, strategic knowledge was frequently coded with procedural knowledge. 
Where more than one knowledge type was coded for an individual activity, compiled 
knowledge types took precedence over foundation knowledge types (Figure 20). 
Where insufficient knowledge co-occurred with other knowledge types, it took the 
highest precedence due to its strong effect on cognition and action. Figure 20 shows 
the hierarchy of knowledge types used to determine code categorisation.  
 
Figure 20. Knowledge type hierarchy for knowledge categories 
This hierarchy of knowledge is based on the development of knowledge 
described in Section 3.4. Although knowledge types have qualitatively different 
characteristics, they are not mutually exclusive. In practice, individual knowledge 
types are closely linked to, and often subsumed into more developed knowledge types. 
For example, perceptual knowledge is closely linked to many other knowledge types, 
as it includes an understanding of concepts and meaning (Eraut, 1990). Similarly, 
McCormick (1997) suggests that when procedural knowledge becomes more reliant 
on problem-solving, it becomes increasingly reliant on strategic knowledge.  
6.4.2 Data Analysis and Reporting of Results 
Knowledge categories were analysed by fitting a linear mixed model, using 
generalised estimating equations to account for correlation among an individual’s 
observations. Pair-wise tests, using the Tukey-Kramer multiple comparisons, were 
performed. Two sets of results from this analysis are presented for each activity type: 
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i. An analysis of the composition of knowledge utilised during each activity 
within each experience group (This analysis identified the most prominent 
knowledge categories utilised by the respective experience groups, and 
examined the relative importance of each knowledge category within each 
activity.) 
ii. A comparison of knowledge categories used by expert and non-expert security 
screeners for each activity (This analysis aimed to identify differences and 
similarities in the knowledge used by expert and non-expert security screeners 
during performance of screening activities.) 
Results are presented in box plots that show the median, 25th percentile, 75th 
percentile, maximum and minimum values, and outliers for each knowledge category 
utilised by expert and non-expert security screeners. Mean percentages for each 
knowledge category, as well as z-values and p-values for each analysis, are reported. 
Tables in Appendix F (pp. 284-292) contain estimates, standard error, z-values, and p-
values for each analysis. 
6.4.3 Search Activity and Knowledge Composition 
Search activity performed by expert and non-expert security screeners was 
comprised of four categories of knowledge: intuitive procedural, non-intuitive 
procedural, intuitive perceptual, and non-intuitive perceptual. The composition of 
these knowledge types during search for expert and non-expert security screeners is 
presented in Figure 21.   
Expert security screeners utilised intuitive procedural knowledge 
(mean=57.75%) significantly more than non-intuitive procedural knowledge 
(mean=0.05%)(z=13.95, p=<.001), non-intuitive perceptual knowledge 
(mean=4.89%)(z=-10.91, p=<0.001), and intuitive perceptual knowledge 
(mean=0.54%)(z=-14.62, p=<0.001). No significant differences were observed among 
the percentages of search performed using intuitive perceptual, non-intuitive 
perceptual, and non-intuitive procedural knowledge (Appendix F, pp. 284-285). These 
knowledge types had limited influence on search performed by expert security 
screeners.  
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Figure 21. Comparison of knowledge types used by expert and non-expert security screeners 
during search activity 
The composition of knowledge utilised during non-expert security screener 
search was similar to that utilised by experts. Non-expert security screener search was 
predominantly performed using intuitive procedural knowledge (mean=41.35%). 
Significantly more intuitive procedural knowledge was utilised than non-intuitive 
procedural knowledge (z=-8.94, p=<.001), intuitive perceptual knowledge (z=-9.72, 
p=<0.001), and non-intuitive perceptual knowledge (z=-5.84, p=<0.001). 
Additionally, non-intuitive perceptual knowledge (mean=11.1%) was found to be 
influential during search performed by non-experts. Significantly more non-intuitive 
perceptual knowledge was used than intuitive perceptual knowledge (z=-4.72, 
p=<.001) and non-intuitive procedural knowledge (z=4.33, p=<0.001). No significant 
differences were observed between intuitive perceptual and non-intuitive procedural 
knowledge; these were rarely utilised during non-experts’ search activity (Appendix 
F, pp. 284-285).  
6.4.4 Comparing Expert and Non-Expert Search Knowledge 
Results comparing the knowledge categories utilised by expert and non-expert 
security screeners during search are presented under the following knowledge type 
headings: Procedural Knowledge, and Perceptual Knowledge.  
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Procedural Knowledge  
Expert security screeners (mean= 57.75%) utilised more intuitive procedural 
knowledge than non-expert security screeners (mean= 41.35%) during search. 
However, there was no significant difference between the percentage of intuitive 
procedural knowledge (z=2.84, p=0.16) utilised by expert and non-expert screeners. 
Comparatively, a significant difference was found between the percentage of non-
intuitive procedural knowledge utilised by expert and non-expert security screeners 
(z=-3.75, p=0.01). However, non-intuitive procedural knowledge comprised only a 
small percentage of total search activity performed by expert (mean=0.05%) and non-
expert (mean=3.75%) screeners. This significant difference is unlikely to have a 
substantial effect on search performance. 
Perceptual Knowledge 
Non-expert security screeners (mean=11.1%) utilised more non-intuitive 
perceptual knowledge than expert screeners (mean=4.89%). No significant difference 
was found between the percentage of non-intuitive perceptual knowledge (z=-2.11, 
p=0.62) utilised by expert and non-expert screeners. Non-expert (mean= 2.43%) and 
expert (mean= 0.54%) screeners utilised only small percentages of intuitive perceptual 
knowledge during search activity. The difference in percentage of intuitive perceptual 
knowledge utilised by expert and non-expert screeners was not significant (z=-2.66, 
p=0.25). 
6.4.5 Examination Activity and Knowledge Composition 
Examinations performed by expert and non-expert security screeners were 
comprised of six knowledge categories: intuitive perceptual, non-intuitive perceptual, 
intuitive procedural, non-intuitive procedural, strategic, and situational (Figure 22).  
Expert security screener examinations were predominantly comprised of non-
intuitive perceptual knowledge (mean=42.25%). Significantly more examinations 
were performed utilising non-intuitive than intuitive perceptual knowledge (z=-7.06, 
p=<0.001); the latter was rarely used (mean=3.92%). Similarly, intuitive procedural 
(mean=3.49%), non-intuitive procedural (mean=3.29%), insufficient (mean=7.99%), 
and strategic knowledge (mean=5.73%), were not frequently utilised during 
examinations by expert security screeners. There were no significant differences 
among intuitive perceptual, intuitive procedural, non-intuitive procedural, strategic, 
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and insufficient knowledge utilised during expert examinations (Appendix F, pp. 286-
288). 
 
Figure 22. Comparison of knowledge types used by expert and non-expert security screeners 
during examination activity 
Similar to expert security screeners, non-experts predominantly utilised non-
intuitive perceptual knowledge (mean=47.16%) during examinations. Significantly 
more non-intuitive than intuitive perceptual knowledge (z=-8.26, p=<0.001) was 
utilised; the latter comprised a low percentage of overall knowledge used during 
examinations (mean=2.25%). Non-intuitive procedural (mean=4.45%), intuitive 
procedural (mean=1.85%), and strategic knowledge (mean=1.71%) also accounted for 
small percentages of the knowledge utilised during examinations. There were no 
significant differences among these knowledge types during examinations performed 
by non-experts (Appendix F, pp. 286-288).  
Insufficient knowledge (mean=12.84%) was the second most influential 
knowledge type demonstrated by non-expert security screeners during the 
performance of examinations. Insufficient knowledge was demonstrated significantly 
less that non-intuitive perceptual knowledge (z=-6.02, p=<0.001). Insufficient 
knowledge was demonstrated significantly more than intuitive perceptual (z=4.61, 
p=<0.001), intuitive procedural (z=4.49, p=<0.001), and strategic knowledge (z=4.96, 
p=<0.001). There was no significant difference between percentages of insufficient 
knowledge and non-intuitive procedural knowledge (Appendix F, pp. 286-288). 
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6.4.6 Comparing Expert and Non-Experts Examination Knowledge 
Results comparing the knowledge categories utilised by expert and non-expert 
security screeners during examination activity are presented under the following 
headings: Procedural Knowledge, Perceptual Knowledge, Strategic Knowledge, and 
Insufficient Knowledge. 
Procedural Knowledge 
Expert (mean= 3.29%) and non-expert (mean=4.46%) security screeners utilised 
similarly small percentages of non-intuitive procedural knowledge during 
examinations. There were no significant differences between the percentage of non-
intuitive procedural knowledge utilised by expert and non-expert screeners (z=0.59, 
p=1). Similarly, small percentages of intuitive procedural knowledge were utilised by 
both expert (mean= 3.49%) and non-expert (mean=1.85%) screeners. Therefore, the 
percentages of intuitive procedural knowledge utilised by expert and non-expert 
security screeners were not significantly different (z=0.31, p=0.99). 
Perceptual Knowledge 
The percentage of intuitive perceptual knowledge utilised was low for both 
expert (mean= 3.92%) and non-expert (mean= 2.25%) security screeners. Expert and 
non-expert screeners did not utilise significantly different amounts of intuitive 
perceptual knowledge (z=0.14, p=0.98). In comparison, non-intuitive perceptual 
knowledge was the most prominent knowledge category used during examinations. 
Expert screeners utilised less non-intuitive perceptual knowledge (mean= 42.25%) 
than non-expert screeners (mean= 47.16%). However, the difference in the percentage 
of non-intuitive perceptual knowledge utilised by expert and non-expert screeners was 
not found to be significant (z=-0.60, p=1). 
Strategic Knowledge 
Expert security screeners (mean=5.73%) utilised more strategic knowledge 
during examinations than non-experts (mean=1.71%). However, the percentages of 
strategic knowledge used were low for both expert and non-expert screeners, and no 
significant difference was observed (z=2.18, p=0.71). 
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Insufficient Knowledge  
A higher percentage of insufficient knowledge was demonstrated during 
examinations by non-expert (mean=12.84%) than expert (mean=7.99%) security 
screeners. However, this difference was not found to be significant (z=-1.46, p=0.99). 
6.4.7 Interface Interaction Activity and Knowledge Composition 
Interface interactions performed by expert and non-expert security screeners 
were comprised of four knowledge categories: intuitive procedural, non-intuitive 
procedural, strategic, and insufficient knowledge (Figure 23).  
 
Figure 23. Comparison of knowledge types used by expert and non-expert security screeners 
during interface interaction activity 
Expert security screeners’ interface interactions were primarily performed 
utilising strategic (mean=33.02) and non-intuitive procedural knowledge 
(mean=32.80). However, the percentage of overall interface interactions performed 
utilising non-intuitive procedural knowledge and strategic knowledge were not 
significantly different. Intuitive procedural (mean=6.32) and insufficient knowledge 
(mean=0.48%) comprised smaller percentages of knowledge used during interface 
interactions. Expert security screeners demonstrated significantly less insufficient 
knowledge compared to their use of non-intuitive procedural (z=-4.09, p=0.0017) and 
strategic knowledge (z=-4.27, p=<0.001). Experts’ utilisation of intuitive procedural, 
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non-intuitive procedural, and strategic knowledge was not significantly different. 
Similarly, percentages of insufficient knowledge and intuitive procedural knowledge 
were not found to be significantly different (Appendix F, pp. 289-290).  
Compared to expert security screeners, non-expert screeners had a stronger 
reliance on non-intuitive procedural knowledge during interface interactions. 
Significantly more non-intuitive procedural knowledge (mean=57.84%) was utilised 
by non-experts during interface interactions than intuitive procedural (z=-7.95, 
p=<.001), insufficient (z=-5.27, p=<.001), and strategic knowledge (z=6.14, p=<.001). 
Intuitive procedural (mean=3.21%), strategic (mean=5.45%), and insufficient 
knowledge (mean=7.21%) all comprised relatively small percentages of overall 
knowledge utilised during interface interactions. The percentage of overall interface 
interactions that these knowledge types comprised was not significantly different 
(Appendix F, pp. 289-290).   
6.4.8 Comparing Expert and Non-Expert Interface Interaction Knowledge 
Results comparing the knowledge categories utilised by expert and non-expert 
screeners during interface interaction activity are now presented under the headings of 
Procedural Knowledge, Insufficient Knowledge, and Strategic Knowledge.  
Procedural Knowledge 
Expert security screeners (mean=32.80%) utilised less non-intuitive procedural 
knowledge than non-experts (mean=57.84%). Despite this difference, the percentage 
of non-intuitive procedural knowledge utilised by expert and non-expert screeners 
during interface interactions was not significantly different (z=-2.33, P=0.37). Low 
percentages of intuitive procedural knowledge was utilised by both expert 
(mean=6.32%) and non-expert screeners (mean=3.21%). The percentage of intuitive 
procedural knowledge used by expert and non-expert screeners during interface 
interactions was not found to differ significantly (z=1.32, p=0.95).  
Insufficient knowledge  
Non-expert (mean=7.21%) security screeners performed a higher percentage of 
interface interactions demonstrating insufficient knowledge than experts 
(mean=0.48%), who rarely demonstrated insufficient knowledge. The percentage of 
insufficient knowledge demonstrated during interface interactions performed by 
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expert and non-expert security screeners was not significantly different (z=-1.49. 
p=0.9). 
Strategic Knowledge 
Expert (mean=33.02%) security screeners utilised a higher percentage of 
strategic knowledge compared to non-expert (mean=5.45%) screeners. Although 
expert screeners utilised more strategic knowledge, the percentage of strategic 
knowledge utilised by expert and non-expert screeners was not significantly different 
(3.09, p=0.6). 
6.4.9 Screener Interaction Activity and Knowledge Composition 
The interactions performed with other security screeners were characterised by 
four knowledge categories: procedural problem solving, procedural removals, 
situational problem solving, and insufficient knowledge (Figure 24).  
 
Figure 24. Comparison of knowledge types used by expert and non-expert security screeners 
during interactions with other security screeners 
Expert security screeners’ interactions with other security screeners were 
predominantly performed utilising procedural-removal knowledge (mean=44.82%). 
This was followed by similar percentages for procedural problem-solving 
(mean=27.55%) and situational problem-solving (mean=26.58%) knowledge. There 
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were no significant differences for the percentage of procedural problem solving, 
procedural removal, and situational problem-solving knowledge utilised by experts 
during screener interactions. Insufficient knowledge was rarely demonstrated by 
expert screeners (mean=1.05%), and was demonstrated significantly less than 
procedural problem-solving (z=-3.31, p=0.02), situational problem-solving (z=-5.75, 
p=<0.001), and procedural-removal (z=-7.41, p=<0.001) knowledge (Appendix F, pp. 
291-292). 
For non-expert security screeners, insufficient knowledge (mean=36.05%) had 
a stronger influence on screener interactions. The percentage of insufficient knowledge 
demonstrated during screener interactions was similar to that for procedural-removal 
knowledge (mean=36.20%), which was the most prominent knowledge category 
utilised during screener interactions. The third most prominent knowledge category 
demonstrated by non-experts during interactions with other screeners was procedural 
problem-solving knowledge (mean=23.47%). The percentage of procedural-removal, 
insufficient and procedural problem-solving knowledge utilised by non-experts during 
screener interactions did not differ significantly. Situational problem-solving 
knowledge (mean=4.28%) was least frequently performed by non-expert security 
screeners. Significantly less situational problem-solving knowledge was utilised than 
procedural problem-solving (z=3.37, p=0.02), procedural-removal (z=4.93, 
p=<0.001), or insufficient knowledge (z=4.44, p=<0.001) (Appendix F, pp. 291-292). 
6.4.10 Comparing Expert and Non-Expert Screener Interaction 
Knowledge 
Results comparing the knowledge categories utilised by expert and non-expert 
security screeners during screener interactions are presented under the following 
headings: Procedural Problem-solving Knowledge, Procedural-removal Knowledge, 
Situational Problem-solving Knowledge, and Insufficient Knowledge. 
Procedural Problem-solving Knowledge 
Expert (mean=27.55%) security screeners utilised marginally more procedural 
problem-solving knowledge than non-experts (mean=23.47%) during interactions 
with other screeners. The percentage of procedural problem-solving knowledge 
utilised by expert and non-expert screeners was not found to be significantly different 
(z=0.53, p=0.9995).  
 118 Chapter 6: Knowledge, Intuition, and Task Performance 
Procedural-removal Knowledge 
Both expert and non-expert security screeners utilised high percentages of 
procedural-removal knowledge. Experts (mean=44.82%) utilised more procedural-
removal knowledge than non-experts (mean=36.20%). The percentage of procedural-
removal knowledge was not found to be significantly different for expert and non-
expert screeners (z=1.22, p=0.93).  
Situational Problem-solving Knowledge 
Situational problem-solving knowledge was rarely utilised by non-expert 
security screeners during interactions with other security screeners (mean=4.27%). Its 
use was limited to a few individual participants, with the remaining non-expert 
screeners not found to utilise situational problem-solving knowledge. Situational 
problem-solving knowledge was more prominent in expert security screeners 
(mean=26.57%), with most utilising some situational problem-solving knowledge. 
Expert screeners were found to utilise significantly more situational problem-solving 
knowledge than non-experts during interactions with other security screeners (z=3.85, 
p=0.003).  
Insufficient Knowledge 
Expert security screeners’ interactions with other security screeners were 
characterised by a small percentage of insufficient knowledge only (mean=1.05%); 
that is, most expert screeners were not found to demonstrate insufficient knowledge 
during screener interactions. Outliers presented in Figure 24 show that only a small 
number of expert screeners demonstrated insufficient knowledge. In comparison, non-
expert screeners demonstrated a much higher percentage of insufficient knowledge 
during interactions with other screeners (mean=36.05%). Insufficient knowledge was 
demonstrated by most non-expert screeners, with a high upper extreme and low lower 
extreme (as shown in Figure 24). Therefore, the percentages of insufficient knowledge 
demonstrated by expert and non-expert security screeners during interactions with 
other screeners was significantly different (z=-4.34, p=<0.001).  
6.5 Discussion 
Analysis of the relationships among screening activities shows that security 
screeners perform sequences of transitioning activities during task performance. These 
sequences are performed in two distinct activity phases: a search phase, and a problem-
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solving phase. The simulated experiments that are typical of airport security screening 
research are representative of the types of activity performed during search phases. 
Participants are required to search images and examine objects, ultimately deciding if 
a threat is present or not. However, the sequences of activities performed during the 
problem-solving phases have not been the focus of previous research. Addressing this 
knowledge gap, this chapter has investigated the knowledge and processing styles 
underlying task performance in both the search phase and the problem-solving phase. 
Results show that the experience of security screeners has a strong effect on the 
overall intuitiveness of the visual and physical interactions performed during screening 
activities (Section 6.3). As the experience of security screeners increased, so too did 
the percentage of search, examination, and interface interaction activity that was 
performed intuitively. While intuition has not previously been investigated in the 
security screening context, these results are not unexpected. For instance, experienced 
security screeners are generally found to exhibit faster reaction times and more 
efficient allocation of attention than less experienced participants (e.g. Koller, et al., 
2009; Liu & Gale, 2011; Liu, et al., 2007; McCarley, et al., 2004; Schwaninger, 2004). 
These findings are also in line with intuition and visual perception research. 
Experience with a task and stimuli is widely attributed to more efficient processing 
(Bastick, 1982; Blackler, et al., 2010; Bravo & Farid, 2012; Myles-Worsley, et al., 
1988; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005; Stanovich & West, 2000; Wolfe, et al., 2011).  
Analysis of the categories of knowledge underlying security screeners’ 
performance of activities showed a different trend to that for overall processing style. 
In most cases, the knowledge underlying the performance of screening activity was 
not found to differ significantly between expert and non-expert security screener 
groups (Section 6.4). This was particularly the case for search and examination 
activity. For these activities, experts and non-experts were only found to differ 
significantly in their use of non-intuitive procedural knowledge during search activity. 
However, non-intuitive procedural knowledge accounted for only a small percentage 
of overall knowledge utilised during search activity for both expert (0.05%) and non-
expert security screeners (3.75%). Due to the minor role of non-intuitive procedural 
knowledge, the impact of this difference in the performance of search activity is likely 
to be limited.  
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The greatest differences between expert and non-expert security screener groups 
were identified in the categories of knowledge underlying the performance of interface 
interactions and screener interactions. For interface interactions, a significant 
percentage of expert activity was performed utilising strategic knowledge and non-
intuitive procedural knowledge. In comparison, non-experts demonstrated limited use 
of strategic knowledge, and an almost exclusive reliance on non-intuitive procedural 
knowledge.  
Experts’ greater access to strategic knowledge suggests a transition from 
procedural knowledge to strategic knowledge as a result of experience. This transition 
is consistent with the related literature findings discussed in Chapter 3. As a result of 
highly developed procedural knowledge, decision makers become problem-solving 
focused, and access structured and adaptable problem-solving knowledge (Chi, Glaser, 
& Farr, 1988). The development of knowledge that facilitates effective problem 
solving in the security screening context is supported by Flint et al.’s (2014) study, 
where it was found that high-performing security screeners were able to identify when 
and how to use specific problem-solving strategies in relation to cues experienced in 
the environment.  
Experience had a similar effect on the knowledge accessed by security screeners 
during screener interactions. Expert security screeners were found to utilise 
significantly more situational knowledge than non-experts. In comparison, non-
experts utilised very little situational knowledge; rather, they were found to 
demonstrate a significantly higher percentage of insufficient knowledge than experts. 
As discussed in the literature review, situational knowledge is characterised by an 
understanding of how concepts relate. It enables observation of process, and the 
selection and adaptation of actions that are relevant to the constraints of a situation (de 
Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). In terms of activity performed, this enables experts 
to perform highly relevant and effective problem-solving interactions, using bag re-
runs and discussions with other security screeners. Lacking in the adaptive and specific 
knowledge associated with situational knowledge, non-experts experience knowledge 
limitations. Insufficient knowledge results in the deferral of problem-solving activity, 
a high percentage of requests for assistance, and manual identification of objects.  
An interesting trend that emerged in the data was the presence of a dominant 
knowledge and processing style associated with each activity. This is particularly the 
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case for search activity and examination activity that were both strongly influenced by 
a single knowledge type and processing style. For both expert and non-expert security 
screeners, search activity was primarily performed with an intuitive processing style 
(Figure 14), and the use of intuitive procedural knowledge (Figure 21). Conversely, 
examinations were primarily performed with a non-intuitive processing style (Figure 
17) and the use of non-intuitive perceptual knowledge (Figure 22).  
The contrasting knowledge categories and processing styles utilised during 
search and examination correspond strongly to the pre-attentive and attentive stages of 
vision. The high percentage of use of an intuitive processing style during search is 
consistent with the pre-attentive visual processes that facilitate parallel processing of 
basic visual features (Pylyshyn, 2003; Roda, 2011a; Wilder, et al., 2011; Wolfe, 2003, 
2010). Pre-attentive processes allow attention to be restricted to information relevant 
to search goals, without the observer becoming overwhelmed by the complexity of the 
task (Bowman, Su, Wyble, & Barnard, 2011; Wilder, et al., 2011). The dominance of 
non-intuitive perceptual knowledge utilised during examinations is consistent with 
attentive processes. The latter are engaged when greater scrutiny is required for 
purposes of identification and evaluation (Wolfe, et al., 2011). The innate development 
of pre-attentive and attentive processes (Roda, 2011a) could explain why only 
relatively small differences were found between expert and non-experts during search 
and examination activity. It is likely that the dominant processing styles and 
knowledge types underlying search and examination are the result of effective transfer 
of these processes to the demands of the task.  
Activities performed in the problem-solving phase showed the lesser influence 
of a dominant knowledge category and processing style. This was particularly the case 
as security screeners gained more experience. This is illustrated in Figure 18 and 
Figure 19 where, at low experience levels, security screeners performed a higher 
percentage of non-intuitive interface interactions compared to intuitive interface 
interactions. As experience of security screeners increased, non-intuitive interface 
interaction decreased. At high levels of experience (>87 months), the percentage of 
intuitive interface interactions increased to the point where they exceeded, or were at 
least on par with the percentage of non-intuitive interface interactions. Similarly, 
expert security screeners were shown to use a greater diversity of knowledge during 
interface interactions (Figure 23). This greater diversity of knowledge was also 
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observed for the performance of screener interactions (Figure 24). This greater 
variance between high and low experience security screeners suggests that the nature 
of problem-solving activities has less influence on the processing style used to perform 
the task. As security screeners gain a substantial amount of experience, they are better 
able to adapt to the problem-solving context, rather than relying on standard 
procedures.  
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented and discussed the results of the analysis of data 
collected from field observations. These results focused on the analysis of three areas: 
First, on the security screening task composition and the sequences of activities 
performed by security screeners; second, on identification of the effect of experience 
on the intuitiveness of activities performed by security screeners; and, third, on the 
differences between expert and non-expert security screeners’ utilisation of knowledge 
during each activity. It has been shown that screening activities are performed in two 
distinct activity phases: a search phase comprised of search and examination activity, 
and a problem-solving phase comprised of examination, interface interaction, and 
screener interaction activity.  
Results from a correlation analysis and MANOVA have shown that there is a 
strong relationship between security screener experience and the intuitive performance 
of activities. As security screener experience increased, so too did the percentage of 
search, examination, and interface interactions that were performed intuitively. In 
contrast, experience was found to have a less significant effect on the categories of 
knowledge utilised by experts and non-experts. Results show that for most activities 
performed, the knowledge utilised by experts and non-experts did not differ 
significantly. This suggests that for most activities performed by expert and non-expert 
security screeners, while intuitiveness of interactions increases, the types of knowledge 
underlying performance remain similar.  
Exceptions to this were observed during some problem-solving activities. Expert 
security screeners utilised a substantial amount of strategic knowledge during interface 
interactions, while non-experts rarely utilised strategic knowledge. Similarly, during 
screener interactions expert security screeners demonstrated the use of significantly 
more situational knowledge than non-experts. Non-experts were found to demonstrate 
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significantly more insufficient knowledge than experts. These results suggest that as a 
result of experience, security screeners develop domain-specific knowledge that 
facilitates effective problem-solving and aids in the mitigation of knowledge 
limitations. 
Building on these findings, Chapter 7 now focuses on the knowledge differences 
that were identified in the problem-solving phase. Specifically, it investigates the 
effects that strategic knowledge, situational knowledge, and insufficient knowledge 
have on the behaviour and actions of security screeners. 
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Chapter 7:  Problem-solving Behaviour and Action 
The previous chapter examined the activities performed by security screeners, 
and investigated the knowledge and processing styles underlying their performance of 
these activities. Results show that the activities performed by security screeners are 
separated into search and problem-solving phases. The overall performance of these 
activities is found to become more intuitive as a result of increased experience. 
However, few differences were observed in the categories of knowledge utilised by 
expert and non-expert screeners during task performance. Differences did emerge in 
the performance of interface interactions and screener interactions during problem-
solving phases: experts were found to use strategic knowledge and situational 
knowledge during problem-solving activity, while non-experts experienced 
insufficient knowledge. The aim of this chapter is to further investigate these 
categories of knowledge in order to determine the effect they have on problem-solving 
sequences and decision making.  
This chapter responds to the first objective of this research; to investigate the 
influence that different knowledge types and processing styles have on the 
performance of x-ray screening activities in the field. Moreover, based on the 
differences identified between experts and non-experts in Chapter 6, results from this 
chapter also contribute to objective two; that is, to explore the differences between 
expert and non-expert security screeners. It begins with an overview of the lag 
sequential analysis method, which was used to explore each target activity and 
knowledge category. The results of lag sequential analyses are then presented for 
interface interactions that use strategic knowledge, screener interactions that use 
situational knowledge, and screener interactions that are performed as a result of 
insufficient knowledge. The results presented make a significant contribution to the 
main aim of this research; to gain an understanding of security screening activity and 
the cognitive processes underlying task performance, to determine the role of intuitive 
expertise in uncertain contexts. 
7.1 Method and Analysis 
Target activities and knowledge categories explored in this chapter are interface 
interactions utilising strategic knowledge, screener interactions utilising situational 
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knowledge, and screener interactions performed as a result of insufficient knowledge. 
Lag sequential analyses were used to investigate the effect that each target activity and 
knowledge category has on security screener behaviour and action. Lag sequential 
analyses are used widely in behavioural research and human computer interaction 
studies (Sanderson & Fisher, 1994). They are an effective method of identifying 
patterns and relationships in data sequences (Cuomo, 1994).  
In order to identify the activities and knowledge categories that were performed 
before and after each target activity and knowledge category, a time lag sequential 
analysis was used. A time lag sequential analysis calculates the probability that each 
activity state occurs during a specified time interval originating from the target 
activity. This method was chosen as it allows for activity and behaviour patterns over 
a large temporal span  to be analysed (Cuomo, 1994; Sanderson & Fisher, 1994). This 
is in contrast to a state lag sequential analysis that recognises only a singular adjacent 
action and can, therefore, only represent singular sequential relationships (Cuomo, 
1994; Sanderson & Fisher, 1994).  
The time interval specified for each lag sequential analysis was +10 seconds and 
-10 seconds from the target activity and knowledge category (Figure 25). Using this 
temporal span, insights are gained into the activities and nature of activities that are 
performed both before and after each target activity and knowledge category.  
 
Figure 25. Range of activity capture from +/-10 second time lag sequential analysis 
Lag sequential analyses were performed using The Observer (Noldus, 2013). 
Separate lag sequential analyses were performed for each expert and non-expert 
participant. While each of the target activities were performed to different extents by 
experts and non-experts, including data from both experience groups was important to 
accurately represent the effect that each target activity and knowledge category had on 
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the surrounding activity sequences. Moreover, including all data in the analysis 
ensured that findings were based on the maximum available data. The resulting lag 
sequential analysis data were exported to Excel and used to compute the probability 
that each activity and knowledge category was performed within the +/-10 second time 
interval of all other activities and knowledge categories. In order to isolate the data 
relevant to only the target activities and knowledge categories, Grasshopper (Robert 
McNeel & Associates, 2016), an algorithmic modelling plug-in for Rhinoceros, was 
used. Grasshopper enabled relevant data from each participant to be retrieved and then 
aggregated into a single Excel spreadsheet. Aggregated data showed the number of 
instances that each activity and knowledge category occurred before and after each 
target activity and knowledge category. This data was then converted into percentages 
and organised into results tables (Appendix G, pp. 293-298). Visualisations of this data 
are presented in the following sections.  
In addition to lag sequential analysis visualisations, graphs are presented in each 
section which show the contexts preceding each target activity, and the actions 
performed during the target activity. Percentages for each context preceding the target 
activity and knowledge category were computed from the aggregated lag sequential 
analysis results. Percentages for actions performed during target activities and 
knowledge categories were computed for each participant, and then averaged across 
all participants who performed the target activity. Standard errors were then calculated. 
For figures with percentages that do not sum to 100%, variations of plus or minus 1% 
are due to rounding to the nearest whole percentage. Data tables reporting average 
percentages, standard deviation and standard errors are shown in Appendix G (pp. 293-
298). 
7.2 Strategic Knowledge and Interface Interactions 
This section investigates the activity context surrounding interface interactions 
utilising strategic knowledge. The use of strategic knowledge played a substantial role 
during the interface interactions performed by expert security screeners. In 
comparison, non-experts rarely utilised strategic knowledge during these interactions 
(Section 6.4.7). Interface interactions performed using strategic knowledge are 
characterised by evidence of clear problem-solving goals, resulting in structured 
interactions within the problem-solving context.  
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7.2.1 Context of Strategic Knowledge and Interface Interactions 
The contexts in which interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge were 
performed are shown in Figure 26. Interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge 
were predominantly performed to address the problem of opaque objects (52%) and 
clutter (42%). Threat objects (0%), organic objects (2%), and isolated objects (4%) 
were rarely the focus of strategic interface interactions.  
 
Figure 26. Image context and features leading to interface interactions utilising strategic 
knowledge 
To overcome these difficulties, security screeners used IEFs. Figure 27 shows 
the average percentages of use and standard errors for each IEF used during interface 
interactions utilising strategic knowledge. Similar percentages of primary, secondary, 
and zoom image enhancement functions were used. From these categories, three main 
IEFs were used: Black and white (43%), zoom x2 (34%), and negative (18%). The 
high usage rate of individual IEFs in each category indicate that during strategic 
interface interactions, IEFs were applied in sequences relying primarily on the most 
frequently used functions from each group. Other secondary functions did not have 
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Figure 27. Image enhancement function types used during interface interactions utilising 
strategic knowledge 
7.2.2 Strategic Knowledge and Interface Interaction: Effect on Behaviour 
and Action 
After gaining an understanding of the context and actions, the next step was to 
explore the activities performed, and the knowledge used in the context of interface 
interactions that utilised strategic knowledge. The activities and the categories of 
knowledge utilised before and after interface interactions that used strategic 
knowledge are shown in Figure 28. The circles in the left column represent activities 
performed before the target activity; those in the right column represent activities 
performed after the target activity. The circle diameter represents the probability that 
each activity occurs before and after the target activity. Segments within each circle 
identify the percentage of each knowledge category that is used for the performance 
of that activity. Each activity probability and knowledge category percentage was 
calculated using the lag sequential analysis data.   
Before interface interactions that used strategic knowledge, search (0.7), 
examination (0.62) and interface interactions (0.68) had similar probability 
occurrences. After interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge, the probability 
of interface interactions remained constant (0.68); meanwhile, search activity (0.28) 
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limited role both before (0.00) and after (0.05) interface interactions utilising strategic 
knowledge. The decrease in search activity suggests a shift from scanning behaviour 
to more focused visual interactions. The high probability of examinations and interface 
interactions both before and after the target activity, show that these activities were 
often performed in complementary sequences.  
 
Figure 28. Lag sequential analysis results for interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge 
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Examination of the knowledge underlying interface interaction activity before 
and after interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge, reveals a consistently 
strong use of strategic knowledge. This is clearly seen as the most influential 
knowledge type used during interface interactions before (90%) and after (93%) the 
target activity. The remaining knowledge types had limited roles. The consistency of 
knowledge used during interface interactions shows that these interactions are closely 
integrated. 
Search activity prior to interface interactions that utilised strategic knowledge 
was efficiently performed. Most search activity was performed using intuitive 
procedural (60%) and partially intuitive procedural (18%) knowledge. Overall, 
partially intuitive perceptual (16%), non-intuitive perceptual (3%), and intuitive 
perceptual (3%) knowledge had less influence. Following interface interactions that 
used strategic knowledge, search was performed with a greater influence from 
perceptual knowledge, and in a less intuitive processing style. Intuitive procedural 
knowledge (19%) decreased substantially, while partially intuitive perceptual (34%), 
intuitive perceptual (12%), and non-intuitive perceptual (12%) knowledge became 
more prominent.  
Examinations performed in the context of interface interactions that utilised 
strategic knowledge, underwent a similar change. Prior to interface interactions that 
utilised strategic knowledge, examinations were predominantly performed using 
partially intuitive procedural knowledge (54%); non-intuitive perceptual (16%), 
intuitive perceptual (13%), and intuitive procedural (10%) knowledge had less 
influence. Following strategic interface interactions, deliberative and perceptual 
knowledge categories had greater influence. Non-intuitive perceptual (25%), partially 
intuitive perceptual (20%), non-intuitive procedural (10%), strategic (13%), and 
insufficient knowledge (5%) all increased. With these increases, the prominence of 
partially intuitive procedural (12%), intuitive perceptual (5%), and intuitive procedural 
(7%) knowledge decreased.  
Following interface interactions that used strategic knowledge, rather than 
deferring the problem solving, screener interactions with other screeners occurred as 
an extension of the problem-solving process. This is indicated by actions comprised of 
situational problem-solving knowledge (71%), and procedural problem-solving 
knowledge (28%). 
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7.3 Situational Knowledge and Screener Interactions 
This section examines the context of activity surrounding screener interactions 
that use situational knowledge. Expert security screeners used a significantly higher 
percentage of situational knowledge during screener interactions than non-experts 
(Section 6.4.9). The use of situational knowledge during interactions with other 
security screeners was characterised by a detailed articulation of the problem-solving 
context and an understanding of relevant actions. 
7.3.1 Context of Situational Knowledge and Screener Interactions 
Screener interactions utilising situational knowledge were performed to address 
a range of problems faced (Figure 29), but were predominantly performed in response 
to cluttered images (40%). To address other issues, their use was similar: in response 
to isolated objects, 21%; opaque objects, 19%; and organic objects, 17%. Threat 
objects (5%) were rarely the focus of attention leading to strategic screener 
interactions.  
 
Figure 29. Image context and features found to precede screener interactions that used situational 
knowledge 
The average percentages of use and standard errors for each type of screener 
interaction used during screener interactions utilising situational knowledge are shown 
in Figure 30. Screener interactions that utilised situational knowledge had a strong 
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and problem-solving discussions (42%). Requests for objects to be removed and 
manually identified (16%) were rarely made. Requests for visual assistance were not 
made at all (0%). 
 
Figure 30. Screener interaction types during screener interactions utilising situational knowledge 
7.3.2 Situational Knowledge and Screener Interaction: Effect on 
Behaviour and Action 
The activities and the categories of knowledge utilised before and after screener 
interactions that used situational knowledge are shown in Figure 31. Prior to screener 
interactions that used situational knowledge, activities are predominantly focused on 
visual interactions. Examinations (0.60) and search (0.60) had the highest occurrence 
probabilities, while interface interactions (0.43) were less frequent. This moderate use 
of interface interactions suggests that security screeners attempted to resolve the 
problem prior to requesting a screener interaction. After screener interactions that used 
situational knowledge, the probability of examinations (0.02) and interface 
interactions (0.00) reduced substantially. Although the probability of search decreased 
after the target activity, it also had the highest occurrence probability (0.45). Screener 
interactions rarely occurred before (0.04) or after (0.06) screener interactions that used 
situational knowledge. This drastic reduction in interface interactions and 
examinations after the target activity, suggests the resolution of the problem and a 
return to search activity within the next bag. 
The knowledge used during search activity before and after screener interactions 
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intuitive procedural knowledge was most prominent both before (76%) and after 
(70%) the target activity. The remaining categories of knowledge each had minor roles. 
The consistency of search activity suggests that screener interactions that use 
situational knowledge have a limited impact on the nature of the search activity.  
 
Figure 31. Lag sequential analysis results for screener interactions that used situational 
knowledge 
Examinations performed prior to screener interactions using situational 
knowledge are comprised of diverse knowledge categories. This diversity suggests two 
primary characteristics of these examinations: first, that these focussed and isolated 
examinations are influenced by non-intuitive perceptual (25%), intuitive perceptual 
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(11%), and partially intuitive perceptual (14%) knowledge; and, second, examinations 
that are integrated into the problem-solving sequence are indicated by the influence of 
strategic knowledge (14%), partially intuitive procedural (14%), and intuitive 
procedural knowledge (11%). Insufficient knowledge (7%) was experienced 
occasionally during examinations prior to screener interactions utilising situational 
knowledge. Examinations were rarely performed after screener interactions utilising 
situational knowledge. When they were, they were always (100%) performed using 
partially intuitive perceptual knowledge. 
Interface interactions that occurred prior to screener interactions utilising 
situational knowledge were characterised by knowledge used for deliberative and 
strategic problem solving. Non-intuitive procedural knowledge (50%) was most 
prominent, followed by strategic knowledge (20%), and partially intuitive procedural 
knowledge (15%). Remaining knowledge types were less prominent.  
Screener interactions had a limited role before and after screener interactions 
utilising situational knowledge. Before target screener interactions, screener 
interactions utilised situational (50%) and procedural problem-solving knowledge 
(50%). After target screener interactions, situational problem-solving knowledge 
(33%) was less influential, while procedural problem-solving knowledge (67%) was 
more influential. 
7.4 Insufficient Knowledge and Screener Interactions 
This section examines the context of activity surrounding screener interactions 
that used insufficient knowledge. Non-expert security screeners were found to 
demonstrate significantly more insufficient knowledge during screener interactions 
than expert screeners (Section 6.4.9). Interactions with security screeners that utilised 
insufficient knowledge were characterised by uncertainty, hesitation, and poor 
communication of goals.  
7.4.1 Context of Insufficient Knowledge and Screener Interactions 
Screener interactions utilising insufficient knowledge were predominantly 
performed in response to isolated objects (45%). Opaque (24%) and organic objects 
(17%) were also commonly the focus of attention prior to screener interactions 
utilising insufficient knowledge. Clutter (9%) and threat objects (5%) were rarely the 
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focus of attention prior to the performance of screener interactions utilising insufficient 
knowledge (Figure 32). 
 
Figure 32. Image context and features preceding screener interactions utilising insufficient 
knowledge 
The average percentages of use and standard errors for each type of screener 
interaction used during screener interactions utilising insufficient knowledge are 
shown in Figure 33.  
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The actions requested during screener interactions utilising insufficient 
knowledge were predominantly assistive actions. Requests for visual assistance (43%) 
were most common, and requests for objects to be removed and manually identified 
(41%) were similarly prominent. Problem-solving discussions (8%), and requests for 
objects and bags to be re-run in order to improve the image quality, rarely featured 
(8%). 
7.4.2 Insufficient Knowledge and Screener Interaction: Effect on 
Behaviour and Action 
The activities and the categories of knowledge utilised before and after screener 
interactions utilising insufficient knowledge are shown in Figure 34. Examinations 
(0.67) were most frequently performed before screener interactions utilising 
insufficient knowledge. This was followed by search (0.42), and interface interactions 
(0.24), both less frequent. The low probability of interface interactions suggests that 
examinations are frequently unassisted. Screener interactions are then initiated 
following unsuccessful examinations.  
Following screener interactions utilising insufficient knowledge, there was a 
substantial reduction in the probability of search (0.23), examination (0.08), and 
interface interactions (0.08). This suggests that screener interactions utilising 
insufficient knowledge are generally the final stage in the process; additional problem-
solving interactions are only occasionally required. The low probability of search 
suggests a period of inactivity prior to resuming the search of bags. Interactions with 
other security screeners had a limited role both before (0.06) and after (0.06) screener 
interactions utilising insufficient knowledge. 
A change in behaviour was observed during search performed before and after 
screener interactions utilising insufficient knowledge. Prior to target screener 
interactions, intuitive procedural knowledge (46%), and partially intuitive procedural 
knowledge (39%) accounted for most searches. Following target screener interactions, 
the influence of intuitive procedural knowledge (33%) reduced, while partially 
intuitive procedural knowledge (60%) increased substantially. The fact that search 
became less intuitive overall, suggests that security screeners become more tentative 
in their search activity as a result of insufficient knowledge.  
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Figure 34. Lag sequential analysis results for screener interactions utilising insufficient 
knowledge 
Examinations performed prior to screener interactions utilising insufficient 
knowledge were predominantly comprised of effortful and unsuccessful visual 
interactions. This was evidenced by a high percentage of examinations performed with 
insufficient knowledge (52%) and non-intuitive perceptual knowledge (23%). Partially 
intuitive perceptual (14%), intuitive perceptual (9%), and intuitive procedural 
knowledge (2%) each had limited influence. The high percentage of insufficient 
knowledge suggests a link between insufficient knowledge during examinations and 
insufficient knowledge during the target activity of screener interactions. It is likely 
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that insufficient knowledge demonstrated during examinations transfers to screener 
interactions  
Examinations following screener interactions utilising insufficient knowledge 
showed notably different characteristics to those performed prior. These examinations 
were predominantly performed using partially intuitive perceptual knowledge (60%), 
strategic knowledge (20%), and non-intuitive perceptual knowledge (20%). The 
influence of strategic knowledge suggests that these subsequent examinations were 
occasionally used to remember features of the objects—insufficient knowledge of 
which was the cause of the examination in the first place.  
Interface interactions occurring prior to, and subsequent to screener interactions 
utilising insufficient knowledge were characterised by deliberation and uncertainty. 
Preceding interface interactions were predominantly characterised by non-intuitive 
procedural knowledge (50%), insufficient knowledge (25%), and partially intuitive 
procedural knowledge (25%). Subsequent actions were also predominantly 
characterised by non-intuitive procedural knowledge (60%) and insufficient 
knowledge (40%). The primacy of these knowledge types indicates problem-solving 
sequences comprised of inefficient and ineffective interactions. 
Repeated interactions with other security screeners in the context of insufficient 
knowledge had a limited role. Screener interactions occurring both before and after the 
target activity were predominantly influenced by insufficient knowledge (75%). 
Procedural knowledge was also influential, with procedural removals (25%) requested 
before target screener interactions, and procedural problem-solving (25%) performed 
after target screener interactions.  
7.5 Discussion 
Results reported in this chapter built on the findings reported in Chapter 6. Lag 
sequential analyses were used to further investigate the effect that key differences 
between expert and non-expert security screeners have on the performance of 
screening activity. Interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge, screener 
interactions utilising situational knowledge, and screener interactions utilising 
insufficient knowledge.  
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7.5.1 Interface Interactions and Strategic Knowledge  
Interface interactions performed utilising strategic knowledge were 
characterised by focused and repeated problem-solving actions. These problem-
solving actions were comprised predominantly of interface interactions interleaved 
with examinations. In the study of human computer interaction, repetition of 
interactions can indicate potentially interesting usability behaviours. For example, 
Siochi and Hix (1991) suggest that repeated patterns might indicate usage problems 
such as trial and error, or might also indicate commonly used, but inefficient, 
procedures. Alternatively, Sanderson and Fisher (1994) suggest that repeated and 
alternating patterns of interactions indicate the presence of behavioural sub-routines. 
As sub-routines, interactions are performed continuously and are often suited to a 
specific purpose (Rasmussen, 1983). Based on the strong influence of strategic 
knowledge and the specific image contexts (Figure 26) that interactions occur in, it is 
more likely that interaction sequences occur as efficient sub-routines used for problem 
solving.  
The consistently high use of strategic knowledge during interface interactions 
suggests their routine and efficient application. Examinations performed between 
interface interactions are performed under the strong influence of partially intuitive 
perceptual knowledge. The prominence of partially intuitive perceptual knowledge 
illustrates an increase in the efficiency of examinations at this stage, compared to their 
efficiency at other stages of screening activity. For example, in Section 6.4.4, it was 
shown that both experts (42%) and non-experts (47%) predominantly performed 
examinations non-intuitively, using perceptual knowledge.  
For examinations performed in relation to interface interactions that utilised 
strategic knowledge, non-intuitive perceptual knowledge had limited influence. The 
latter was used during only 16% of examinations prior to the target activity, and during 
25% of examinations performed after the target activity. The relative efficiency of 
examinations performed in this context might be representative of their use for 
monitoring problem-solving processes, rather than for the effortful identification of 
objects. The presence of partially intuitive processes provides strong support for 
attention-dependent automaticity, where some but not all control over cognition is 
relinquished (Baylor, 2001).   
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7.5.2 Screener Interactions, Situational Knowledge and Insufficient 
Knowledge  
By comparing the effects of situational knowledge and insufficient knowledge 
during security screener interactions, a number of considerable differences between 
expert and non-expert screeners can be seen. Situational knowledge used during 
screener interactions was characterised by its integration with problem-solving 
activity, and a focus on adaptable problem-solving action. The integration of screener 
interactions that used situational knowledge into existing problem-solving is shown by 
the high probability of interface interaction prior to target screener interactions (Figure 
31). In this activity sequence, interface interactions initially occurred as an attempt to 
overcome the problem context encountered. When a decision could not be made, bag 
re-runs (Figure 30) during target screener interactions allowed the security screener to 
adjust the problem context and alter the perspective from which the bag and its 
contents were shown. This allowed security screeners to continue problem-solving 
activity without the need for a manual search. 
Consistent with these findings, Schraw (1998) identifies that a key feature of 
situational knowledge is that it facilitates planning, monitoring, and evaluation of 
action. Based on an understanding of cause and effect, situational knowledge 
facilitates highly specific actions in expected situations, and the adaptation of actions 
in unexpected situations. Relating these characteristics to the wider study of expertise, 
the adaptation of problem-solving activity is representative of metacognition during 
problem solving. Metacognition facilitates on-line monitoring, evaluation, and 
adjustment of actions (Chi, 2006; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Klein & Hoffman, 1992; 
Salas, et al., 2009). With an awareness of ongoing actions and their possible outcomes, 
experts are able to simulate the outcome of proposed actions, and adjust their 
perspective to avoid fixation on a particular solution (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). 
By comparison, insufficient knowledge during screener interactions was 
characterised by poor adaptation to the problem context. Insufficient knowledge 
resulted in a preference for manual identification of unknown objects, and requests for 
visual assistance (Figure 33). Problem-solving actions, such as re-runs or separations, 
were rarely requested when insufficient knowledge was demonstrated. The move away 
from problem-solving actions as a result of insufficient knowledge was further 
illustrated by the strong reliance on examinations, and the relatively infrequent use of 
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interface interactions (Figure 34). Problem-solving actions were only occasionally 
engaged in prior to initiating screener interactions. Rather, results show that most 
target screener interactions were directly transitioned to from unassisted examinations.  
The activity preferences discussed here suggest that non-expert security 
screeners experience uncertainty as a result of insufficient knowledge. In particular, 
their actions are consistent with the concepts of functional fixedness (Chi, 2006) and 
propelled action (Hall, 2002) that manifest as a result of first order uncertainty. To 
further support the presence of uncertainty, insufficient knowledge was observed as a 
pervasive and continuous component in the activity context surrounding the target 
screener interactions. This was particularly the case for examinations, where over half 
of examinations performed prior to the target activity were performed with insufficient 
knowledge (Figure 34). This result shows that insufficient knowledge demonstrated 
during one activity is also likely to transfer to subsequent activities. 
While this discussion suggests the negative aspects of screener interactions, it 
should also be noted that they clearly have an important role to play in the context of 
uncertainty. The actions performed by security screeners as a result of insufficient 
knowledge are strategies to reduce uncertainty and gain knowledge. This assertion is 
based on the work of Bordia, et al. (2004), who identify communication and 
involvement with people as a key strategy for reducing uncertainty. Security screeners 
use interactions with others to alleviate the pressure of decision making during times 
of uncertainty. This is an important point to note when considering how best to support 
inexperienced decision makers in this context. 
7.6 Summary 
The focus of this chapter was to build on the results presented in Chapter 6 by 
investigating the differences in the types of knowledge accessed by expert and non-
expert security screeners. The specific differences investigated were: strategic 
knowledge used during interface interaction; situational knowledge used during 
screener interactions; and insufficient knowledge demonstrated during screener 
interactions. Lag sequential analyses were conducted to investigate these differences, 
with the aim of showing the effect that each target activity had on the surrounding 
activity context. 
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Results show that access to strategic knowledge during interface interactions was 
characterised by consistent and repetitious sequences of examinations and interface 
interactions. These sequences of activity were predominantly performed in response 
to cluttered images or images with opaque areas. These results suggest that strategic 
knowledge utilised during interface interactions results in the development of well 
learned and efficient sub-routines for use in specific problem situations. During 
screener interactions, access to situational knowledge was characterised by a strong 
engagement with the problem-solving context and execution of adaptive problem-
solving action. A feature of screener interactions utilising situational knowledge was 
the use of bag re-runs to facilitate and improve problem solving. In comparison, 
insufficient knowledge experienced during screener interactions was shown to result 
in screener interactions that are detached from the problem-solving context. As a result 
of insufficient knowledge, security screeners were found to frequently defer problem-
solving activity by asking for help, or asking for objects to be manually identified. 
Insufficient knowledge demonstrated during screener interactions was also found to 
be frequently preceded by insufficient knowledge during examinations. These results 
suggest that security screeners experience uncertainty as a result of insufficient 
knowledge. 
This chapter completes the analysis of field observation data. Chapter 8 now 
details the data analysis and the results from the semi-structured interviews with 
security screeners. 
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Chapter 8:  Representation of Expert and Non-Expert Knowledge 
This chapter presents and discusses results from interviews conducted with 
airport security screeners. Interviews were designed to support the results from field 
observations by providing further analysis of security screeners’ knowledge. Results 
from this chapter address objectives one and two of the research. This is done by 
comparing the structure and quality of knowledge accessed by expert and non-expert 
security screeners, and analysing how the quality of this knowledge affects the 
representation of screener activity. Analysis of these aspects of knowledge enable 
inferences to be made about the development of knowledge as a result of experience, 
and how this development contributes to intuitive expertise in the airport security 
screening context.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the coding scheme and the method of 
analysis. Results of a relational analysis that illustrates and compares the structure of 
knowledge accessed by expert and non-expert security screeners are then presented. 
Results from a relational analysis that investigates the influence of different qualities 
of knowledge on expert and non-expert security screeners’ activity representations are 
then reported. Results from these analyses are then discussed. 
8.1 Method and Analysis 
Participant recruitment and data collection procedures have previously been 
described (Section 5.4). Following data collection, audio-recorded interviews were 
transcribed in order to facilitate textual analysis. Transcribed interviews were coded 
and analysed using ATLAS.ti (2014) qualitative analysis software.  
8.1.1 Coding Scheme 
The interview coding scheme is comprised of three code categories: activity 
representation, knowledge quality, and context (Table 13). These code categories are 
based on the observation coding scheme (Section 5.5.3). Each code category in the 
interview coding scheme is comprised of codes and sub-codes. Codes and sub-codes 
focus on eliciting details of security screeners’ activity representations, and the 
qualities of knowledge associated with task performance. The use of similar concepts 
in the interview and observation coding schemes was intended to facilitate stronger 
 146 Chapter 8: Representation of Expert and Non-Expert Knowledge 
analysis of concepts according to the strengths of the respective data collection 
methods. The full coding scheme—including heuristics for activity representation, 
knowledge quality, and context sub-codes—is outlined in Appendix E (pp. 278-280). 
Table 13. Interview coding scheme 





Selective and context-responsive search (e.g., 
‘my eyes were drawn to the dark spot 
immediately’) 
Structured 
Search performed with a pre-determined strategy 
(e.g., scanning left to right) 
Serial Step-by-step search for each object category 
Examination 
Effortful 
Examination requiring problem-solving and 
deliberation 




Describing the use of an IEF (e.g., black and 
white, inverted, fade, zoom) 
Screener 
Interaction 
Assistance Asking for an object to be manually identified 
Removal Asking for a threat object to be removed 




Superficial Object categories and basic features 
Abstract 
Relationship between abstract visual concepts 
and object categories and features 
Procedural 
Descriptive Action steps and rules determining their use 
Compiled 
Integrated sequences of action and their 
relationship to context 
Situational 
Analytic 
Understanding of situations and outcomes of 
actions 
Rich 




Implementing learning opportunities and 
methods 
Structured 
Simulation, performance, and validation of 




Improvised explosive device (e.g., cables, 
detonator, and some organic material) 
LAGs Liquids, aerosols and gels (e.g., bottle of water) 
Firearms Guns, bullets, grenade 
Sharps Knife, scissors 
Threat  Non-specific reference to a ‘threat object’ 
TIP 
Specific reference to a fictional threat that is part 
of the threat image projection system 
Everyday Item Clothes, laptop, food 
Concept 
Feature Small spring, screw, shape of handle 
Angle 
Reference to the angle at which an object is 
presented (e.g., ‘hard to see at some viewpoints’) 
Clutter 
High density, complex, or superimposed image 
or area of an image  
Colour/ 
Material 
Colour and/or the material of an object (e.g., ‘it 
was blue so I knew it was metallic’) 
Opacity 
The opacity and density of an object (e.g., ‘dark’; 
‘couldn’t see through it’) 
Typicality 
Reference to an image or object that feels 
familiar and typical 
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Activity representation codes were used to specify the type and nature of the 
activity described by the security screener (Table 13). These codes include Search, 
Examination, Interface Interaction, and Screener Interactions. Sub-codes were 
applied to each activity representation code in order to specify the nature of the activity 
being described. For example, the activity representation sub-codes for search include 
Guided, Structured, and Serial. The Guided sub-code is applied to descriptions of 
search activity that demonstrate selective processing of visual information. An 
example of guided search is when attention is automatically drawn to certain features 
of an image. The Structured sub-code is applied to descriptions of search activity that 
demonstrate a pre-determined search procedure. A typical method of structured search 
is scanning an image from left-to-right and top-to-bottom. The Serial sub-code is 
applied to descriptions of search that demonstrate non-selective processing of visual 
information. For instance, typical serial search involves visual attention directed to 
individual areas of the display in order to rule out the presence of a threat.  
Knowledge quality codes were used to specify the type of knowledge and the 
quality of the knowledge type demonstrated by security screeners (Table 13). Codes 
used to specify knowledge type are consistent with codes used in the observation 
coding scheme: Perceptual, Procedural, Situational and Strategic knowledge. Sub-
codes were used to specify the qualities associated with each knowledge type. 
Knowledge quality refers to the concepts used to describe the characteristics of a 
particular type of knowledge (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). Distinctions 
between different qualities of knowledge in the coding scheme are used to describe the 
function and calibre of a particular knowledge type. For example, the distinction 
between structured strategic and reflective strategic knowledge is used to define two 
separate functions of strategic knowledge: structured strategic knowledge is used for 
the planning and execution of actions, while reflective strategic knowledge is 
associated with recognising and engaging in learning. Alternatively, the distinction 
between superficial and abstract perceptual knowledge is used to define the different 
characteristics of knowledge used for the same purpose: superficial perceptual 
knowledge is characterised by surface level understanding of an object or concept, 
while abstract perceptual knowledge is characterised by an understanding of the 
relationships between abstract visual concepts and associated objects.  
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  The sub-codes used to specify knowledge quality were derived from the 
literature addressing the quality and development of knowledge (Section 3.4) (e.g. de 
Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Eraut, 1990; McCormick, 1997). Constructs such as 
modality and structure (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996) were influential in 
determining the qualities associated with each knowledge type in the coding scheme. 
Knowledge quality sub-codes were further refined during open coding so that they 
were applicable to the task of security screening. Heuristics used for the consistent 
application of knowledge quality sub-codes were developed based on the knowledge 
development and quality literature discussed in Section 3.4. 
Context codes were used to specify the visual focus of a participant’s response. 
There were two types of context codes: visual concept, and object. Sub-codes were 
used to identify the different types of visual concepts and objects described by 
participants. Visual concept sub-codes specified various types of visual elements that 
were not specific to a particular object; for example, Clutter, or an Opaque area of the 
display. Visual concepts also described more abstract perceptual concepts such as 
typicality, which refers to the feeling of familiarity associated with an image. Object 
codes, on the other hand, were used to specify the different objects that were referred 
to by security screeners. Sub-codes applied to objects were based on specific 
categories of objects mentioned. For example, if a participant mentioned a gun, this 
would be coded as Firearm. Similarly, mention of a knife would be coded as Sharps. 
Context codes were developed inductively from data analysis during open coding. 
8.1.2 Coding Application 
An extract from a coded interview transcript showing how codes were applied 
to textual data is presented in Figure 35. In this example, a participant is describing 
search process. The coding scheme is used to describe the type of search, the context 
of the search activity, and the underlying quality of knowledge demonstrated.  
 
Figure 35. Coded extract showing application of codes 
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In the blue highlighted text in Figure 35, the overall type of search and the quality 
of knowledge is coded to the relevant textual data. In this case, the participant is 
describing search activity that is drawn to dark objects. This textual data is coded as 
Guided Search and Compiled Procedural knowledge. As the participant is describing 
the context of this search, part of this text is also coded as Sharps and Opacity, and is 
shown by the red box. The text in the red box is also characterised by an understanding 
of the relationship between a visual concept and the object mentioned. As a result, this 
section of text is also coded as Abstract Perceptual knowledge. An example of a full 
coded interview transcript is available in Appendix H (pp. 299-300). 
8.1.3 Relational Analysis 
After coding of data was complete, a relational analysis was performed using 
ATLAS.ti (2014). A relational analysis is a content analysis method used to explore 
relationships between coded elements. Relationships between coded elements are 
determined by their proximity in the text (Wilkinson & Birmingham, 2003). When two 
coded elements in the text overlap, this is referred to as a ‘co-occurrence’ (ATLAS.ti, 
2014). An example of overlapping (co-occurring) codes is shown in Figure 35, on the 
previous page. The strength of a relationship between two codes is determined by the 
frequency with which they co-occur, and can be expressed in a data matrix as a ‘co-
occurrence probability’. A high co-occurrence probability shared between codes 
indicates a strong relationship (ATLAS.ti, 2014). 
For this research, the purpose of the relational analysis was to examine two 
different relationships associated with security screeners’ quality of knowledge. First, 
a relational analysis was performed to identify relationships between each knowledge 
quality, for both expert and non-expert screeners. By analysing the relationships 
between knowledge qualities, it was expected that insights could be gained about the 
structure and integration of knowledge for each respective experience group. Second, 
a relational analysis was performed to explore the relationships between knowledge 
quality and the activity representations formed.  
Having selected the code categories to explore in the relational analysis, co-
occurrence probability matrices were generated for expert and non-expert security 
screeners, using ATLAS.ti. (2014). Data from co-occurrence probability matrices was 
visualised in order to represent the strength of each relationship identified. 
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Visualisation techniques are described in their respective relational analysis sections 
(Sections 8.2 and 8.3). 
8.2 Structure of Knowledge 
Relationships among knowledge qualities are visualised using chord diagrams. 
Separate chord diagrams are presented for expert (Figure 36) and non-expert (Figure 
37) security screeners. Each knowledge quality and its use is represented by a coloured 
circle on the outside of the diagram. Knowledge qualities of the same knowledge type 
are represented by the same colour. For instance, both abstract perceptual and 
superficial perceptual knowledge are coloured blue. This indicates the qualities of 
knowledge that need to be compared in order to make inferences about the overall 
quality of the knowledge base. 
 Black lines connecting each knowledge quality represent the strength of the 
relationship between the respective knowledge qualities. The strength of the 
relationship is determined by the probability that they co-occur (Section 8.1.3). The 
width of the connecting line represents the strength of the relationship relative to each 
quality. Co-occurrence probabilities are recorded for each relationship, and are given 
for both qualities in the relationship. Co-occurrence probabilities for both knowledge 
quality codes are reported to mitigate distorted co-occurrence probabilities due to code 
frequencies that are substantially different (ATLAS.ti, 2014). For example, if there 
were 100 instances of code A and 10 instances of code B, and Code A and Code B co-
occurred 10 times, this would result in vastly different co-occurrence probabilities for 
each code. Code A would have a co-occurrence probability of 0.10, while code B 
would have a co-occurrence value of 1. Reporting both co-occurrence probabilities 
allows the strength of relationships for each respective code to be understood. In each 
chord diagram, co-occurrence values of less than 0.05 are not reported, as they do not 
represent a substantial relationship. Appendix I (pp. 301-302) includes transition 
matrices detailing the co-occurrence relationships between each knowledge quality 
that are illustrated in Figure 36 and Figure 37.   
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Figure 36. Chord diagram showing relationships between different qualities of knowledge for 
expert security screeners 
 
Figure 37. Chord diagram showing relationships between different qualities of knowledge for 
non-expert security screeners 
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Figure 36 illustrates the percentage of total knowledge that each knowledge 
quality represents for expert security screeners. Procedural knowledge is shown as the 
most influential knowledge for this group. The quality of procedural knowledge 
demonstrated was predominantly descriptive (32%) and compiled (21%). Perceptual 
knowledge was the second most influential knowledge for expert security screeners. 
A higher percentage of abstract perceptual knowledge (17%) than superficial 
perceptual knowledge (11%) was demonstrated. Each quality of situational knowledge 
and strategic knowledge accounted for a small percentage of expert security screeners’ 
knowledge. Similar influences of rich situational (6%), analytic situational (5%), and 
structured strategic (5%) knowledge were demonstrated. Reflective strategic 
knowledge (2%) was found to be the least influential knowledge for expert security 
screeners.  
Analysis of the relationships between knowledge qualities shows 16 relationship 
pairs for expert security screeners (Figure 36). The strength of each relationship is 
represented by the probability occurrence, and the corresponding thickness of the 
connecting line. Compiled procedural knowledge shares many of the strongest 
relationships that occur between knowledge qualities. The strongest of these 
relationships is between compiled procedural and structured strategic knowledge. This 
relationship is such that when structured strategic knowledge was used, it was always 
(1.0) performed in conjunction with compiled procedural knowledge. Of all instances 
of compiled procedural knowledge, structured strategic knowledge (0.36) was 
performed in a third of cases. Using the symbol ‘<>’ to represents a relationship 
between the two qualities of knowledge, this relationship can be expressed as: 
Compiled Procedural (0.36) <> Structured Strategic (1) 
This strong relationship shows that with compiled procedural knowledge, expert 
security screeners frequently engage in strategic problem solving through the use of 
structured strategic knowledge. Along with this relationship, similarly strong 
relationships originating from compiled procedural knowledge include: 
Compiled Procedural (0.26) <> Rich Situational (0.86) 
Compiled Procedural (0.19) <> Analytic Situational (0.82) 
Compiled Procedural (0.33) <> Abstract Perceptual (0.29) 
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The strength relationships that compiled procedural knowledge has with rich 
situational, analytic situational knowledge and abstract perceptual knowledge show 
that compiled procedural knowledge is closely reliant on a detailed understanding of 
task situations and visual concepts. Analytic situational knowledge is also linked to 
structured strategic knowledge in a strong relationship.  
Structured Strategic (0.42) <> Analytic Situational (0.45) 
The strong relationships between each of these qualities of knowledge represent 
an integration of compiled procedural, analytic situational, and structured strategic 
knowledge.  
In comparison to expert security screeners, non-experts demonstrated less use of 
compiled procedural knowledge, and a much stronger reliance on descriptive 
procedural knowledge (Figure 37). Indeed, descriptive procedural knowledge (54%) 
was the most influential quality of knowledge demonstrated by non-experts. This was 
followed by perceptual superficial knowledge (17%). Perceptual abstract (10%) and 
compiled procedural (9%) knowledge each had less influence for non-expert security 
screeners, and each quality associated with strategic and situational knowledge had 
limited influence for this group.  
From these knowledge qualities, 15 relationship pairs are observed for non-
expert security screeners (Figure 37). Consistent with the reliance on descriptive 
procedural knowledge, the strongest relationships between qualities of knowledge are 
comprised of descriptive procedural knowledge. Descriptive procedural knowledge is 
closely related to superficial perceptual knowledge and abstract perceptual knowledge: 
Descriptive Procedural (0.09) <> Superficial Perceptual (0.28) 
Descriptive Procedural (0.05) <> Abstract Perceptual (0.29) 
Despite the strength of the relationship indicated by the width of these 
connections, the co-occurrence probabilities of these two relationships are low. This 
suggests that although these pairs occur frequently, their frequency of co-occurrence 
is relatively low in relation to the overall number of times each quality was used. This 
is particularly the case for descriptive procedural knowledge, which has low co-
occurrence probabilities in relation to both superficial perceptual knowledge (0.09) 
and abstract perceptual knowledge (0.05). These low co-occurrence probabilities are 
representative of the high usage of descriptive procedural knowledge in isolation. 
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In comparison to relationships that form with descriptive procedural knowledge, 
relationships that form with compiled procedural knowledge have higher co-
occurrence probabilities. For instance, compiled procedural knowledge is strongly 
related to structured strategic, analytic situational, rich situational, and abstract 
perceptual knowledge: 
Compiled Procedural (0.33) <> Abstract Perceptual (0.29) 
Compiled Procedural (0.21) <> Structured Strategic (0.83) 
Compiled Procedural (0.13) <> Rich Situational (1) 
Compiled Procedural (0.13) <> Analytic Situational (0.75) 
It is shown that when structured strategic, analytic situational, and rich analytic 
knowledge are used, they are almost always used in relation to compiled procedural 
knowledge. However, each of these relationships has a low prominence, as shown by 
the thickness of the connection between each quality of knowledge (Figure 37). 
Despite high co-occurrence probabilities between each knowledge quality, the low 
frequency of the relationships shows that these knowledge types are strongly related 
when used; however, ultimately, they are used infrequently by non-experts. 
An interesting outcome (seen in Figure 36 and Figure 37) is that the relationship 
pairs that are formed between qualities of knowledge are similar for both expert and 
non-expert security screeners. For both groups, the pairs with highest co-occurrence 
probabilities are linked to compiled procedural knowledge. Compiled procedural 
knowledge forms strong relationships with structured strategic, abstract perceptual, 
analytic situational, and rich situational knowledge for both experts and non-experts. 
However, while the pairs formed between knowledge qualities and the co-occurrence 
probabilities are similar, there are clear differences in the prominence of the 
relationships, as indicated by the thickness of the connections. Experts rely much more 
on compiled procedural knowledge that is integrated with structured strategic, analytic 
situational, and rich situational knowledge; less reliance is placed on descriptive 
procedural knowledge. This is shown to be relatively isolated, with low occurrences 
with other knowledge, relative to its overall use. The relationships between knowledge 
qualities described in this section provide an indication of how knowledge is developed 
and structured for task performance in the security screening context.  
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8.3 Quality of Knowledge and Activity Representation 
The purpose of this section is to investigate how activity representations formed 
by security screeners are affected by the quality of knowledge that they access. 
Relationships between knowledge quality and activity representations are discussed 
for search, examination, interface interaction, and screener interaction activities. Bar 
graphs are presented at the beginning of each section that compare the percentages of 
activity representations described by expert and non-expert screener groups. 
Percentages were calculated from the aggregated number of mentions made of each 
activity representation for a particular activity by expert and non-expert security 
screener groups. For figures with percentages that do not sum to 100%, variations of 
plus or minus 1% are due to rounding to the nearest whole percentage. 
Relationships between activity representation and knowledge quality are 
investigated using Fineo diagrams. Fineo diagrams visualise relationships between 
activity representation and knowledge quality, and allow the strength of each 
relationship to be compared side-by-side (Ciuccarelli, Caviglia, Mauri, Masud, & 
Ricci, 2010). In each Fineo diagram, the width of connections between each activity 
representation and each quality of knowledge represents the strength of the 
relationship. The strength of each relationship is also assigned a value between 0 and 
1; this value represents the co-occurrence probability between the activity 
representation and quality of knowledge. The higher the co-occurrence probability, the 
stronger the relationship between the quality of knowledge and the activity 
representation. A value of 0 indicates the activity representation never co-occurs with 
the respective knowledge quality. A value of 1 indicates that the activity representation 
always co-occurs with the respective knowledge quality. Relationships with values of 
less than 0.05 were not labelled or discussed, as they do not represent a substantial 
relationship between activity representation and knowledge quality. Co-occurrence 
matrices showing all co-occurrence relationships between knowledge qualities and 
activity representations for both expert and non-expert security screeners are provided 
in Appendix I (pp. 303-306).  
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8.3.1 Search Activity and Knowledge 
Representations of search activity formed by expert and non-expert security 
screeners are comprised of guided search, structured search, and serial search (Figure 
38).  
 
Figure 38. Search activity representations formed by expert and non-expert security screeners 
Expert security screeners predominantly represented search activity as ‘guided’ 
(61%). Smaller percentages of search activity were described as ‘structured’ (20%) 
and ‘serial’ (20%). Non-expert security screeners demonstrated less variance in their 
representation of search activity. Similar percentages of search activity were 
represented as ‘guided’ (37%) and ‘serial’ (35%) in non-expert security screeners’ 
interview responses. The percentage of search activity represented as ‘structured’ 
(27%) was lower than both guided and serial search representations.  
To investigate the influence of knowledge quality on search activity, co-
occurrences between search activity representations and qualities of knowledge were 
analysed. For comparison, co-occurrence results are presented in Fineo diagrams for 
both expert (Figure 39) and non-expert (Figure 40) security screeners. Co-occurrence 
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Figure 39. Fineo diagram showing relationships between search types and knowledge qualities 
for expert security screeners 
 
Figure 40. Fineo diagram showing relationships between search types and knowledge qualities for 
non-expert security screeners 
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Guided search was predominantly influenced by compiled procedural 
knowledge for both experts (0.29) and non-experts (0.15) (Figure 39 and Figure 40). 
The stronger influence of compiled procedural knowledge for experts resulted in a 
greater representation of guided search by this group than the non-expert group. 
Abstract perceptual knowledge had a similar influence for expert (0.09) and non-expert 
(0.07) representations of guided search. Compiled procedural and abstract perceptual 
knowledge facilitated the understanding of relationships between objects and visual 
concepts. Integration of this knowledge into the search process resulted in selective 
attention and guidance of attention to task-relevant information. For example, 
Participant 10, a non-expert security screener, stated: It’s usually the dark objects that 
your eyes are drawn to first as they usually mean a weapon or a knife or something.  
In addition to compiled procedural and abstract perceptual knowledge, expert 
security screeners’ representation of guided search was strongly influenced by rich 
situational knowledge (0.16). Non-experts’ representation of guided search, on the 
other hand, was not found to be influenced by rich situational knowledge at all. Rich 
situational knowledge was demonstrated by an immediate comprehension of the scene 
during guided search. For example, Participant 5, an expert, stated:  
You somehow do a… an almost like an, umm, like a screen shot in your mind, you do a quick 
look at the screen and you, somehow you know after experience, know that there is nothing 
dangerous in there… 
The strength of rich situational knowledge in relation to guided search is a key 
differentiating factor between expert and non-expert representation of search activity. 
Both serial search and structured search were predominantly influenced by 
descriptive procedural knowledge (Figure 39 and Figure 40). For serial search, the 
strength of the relationship between descriptive procedural knowledge and serial 
search was greater for non-experts (0.25) than experts (0.09). For this reason, expert 
security screeners represented less search activity as ‘serial’ than non-experts. The 
influence of descriptive procedural knowledge on serial search was characterised by a 
sequential and rule-based search process. For instance, Participant 6, a non-expert, 
stated:  
So you check for anything that might look like its sharp. Anything that might look like it’s 
dangerous. You check for any LAGs, if there might be oversized or a huge amount and if there 
is nothing else then you let it go. 
The relationship between descriptive procedural knowledge and structured 
search was stronger for non-experts (0.17) than it was for experts (0.08). With strong 
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influence from descriptive procedural knowledge, structured search for non-experts 
was expressed by descriptions of a rule-based search process. This was typically 
characterised by the use of predetermined strategy for allocating visual attention. For 
example, Participant 3, a non-expert, described a structured search process based on 
the direction of visual scanning:  
Pretty much just like reading a book. I just start left the moment it comes on the screen and I’ll 
start to scan up and down like that and then when it goes through.  
8.3.2 Examination Activity and Knowledge 
Representations of examination activity formed by expert and non-expert 
security screeners were comprised of effortful examination and effortless examination 
(Figure 41). Both expert and non-expert screeners demonstrated similar 
representations of examination activity. Experts (64%) represented slightly more 
examination activity as ‘effortful’ than non-experts (60%), and non-experts (40%) 
represented more examination as ‘effortless’ than experts (36%). 
 
Figure 41. Examination activity representations formed by expert and non-expert security 
screeners 
To investigate the influence of knowledge quality on the representation of 
examination activity, co-occurrences between activity representations and qualities of 
knowledge were analysed. For comparison, co-occurrence results are presented in 
Fineo diagrams for expert (Figure 42) and non-expert (Figure 43) security screeners. 
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Figure 42. Fineo diagram showing relationships between examination activities and knowledge 
qualities for expert security screeners 
 
Figure 43. Fineo diagram showing relationships between examination activities and knowledge 
qualities for non-expert security screeners 
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Effortful examinations were typically described in relation to problem-solving 
activity to assist the examination of objects and areas of an image. Representation of 
examination activity as ‘effortful’ was influenced by strong relationships with 
descriptive procedural knowledge for both expert (0.31) and non-expert (0.45) 
screeners. The influence of descriptive procedural knowledge on effortful 
examinations was characterised by reference to the steps in an examination procedure, 
and the conditions under which examinations are performed. For example, Participant 
13, an expert, stated:  
Sometimes you get different shaped buckles and you have to zoom it up and then you’ve got 
to actually physically have a look at the bag, and look at the screen and compare it and its fine. 
As well as descriptive procedural knowledge, expert security screeners’ 
representation of effortful examination activity were also influenced by compiled 
procedural knowledge (0.14) and structured strategic knowledge (0.07). Relationships 
between these knowledge types and effortful examination were not strong for non-
experts, both having co-occurrence probabilities of less than 0.05. For expert security 
screeners, the influence of compiled procedural and structured strategic knowledge on 
effortful examinations was characterised by clear goals, and an understanding of the 
cause and effect of actions. For example, Participant 7, an expert, describes the context 
of the examination, and the result of action in relation to the examination:  
If we get things really dense, so again like jewellery or coins it’s hard to see through. Um, 
usually I will always zoom in first of all. Then I select black and white. It takes away all the 
organic things you don’t have to worry about like your clothes and shoes that might be in the 
bag. It focusses on the dense item you are looking at. 
 
The relationship between abstract perceptual knowledge and effortful 
examinations was comparable for expert (0.07) and non-expert (0.07) security 
screeners. Abstract perceptual knowledge facilitated understanding of the links 
between the real world appearance of objects and their appearance under x-ray. For 
example, Participant 1, an expert, described the link between objects and concepts: 
So if you look at it in general it looks like a flare gun. If you put it through an x-ray machine 
you can actually identify that it’s only got the spring. And then when you further read it you 
can see the outline but because the style of spring that it has in it, it helps identify that that 
could possibly be a threat.  
The relationship between effortful examination and superficial perceptual 
knowledge was stronger for non-experts (0.09) than for experts, for whom the 
relationship was less than 0.05. In relation to effortful examination, superficial 
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perceptual knowledge was associated with describing objects that had similar 
appearance. For example, Participant 8, a non-expert, stated:  
Sometimes the shapes of the pocket knives end up looking like USBs… When I do come across 
them they are sort of suspicious they look like a pocket knife or sometimes you think it looks 
like something else. 
Effortless examinations were not characterised by a dominant knowledge quality 
in the same way that effortful examinations were. For both expert and non-expert 
security screeners, representations of effortless examinations were similarly 
influenced by the respective qualities of procedural and perceptual knowledge. 
Relationships between descriptive procedural knowledge and effortless examinations 
were similar for both expert (0.08) and non-expert (0.10) screeners. Descriptive 
procedural knowledge during effortless examinations was characterised by the 
description of a decision-making process during examinations. For example, 
Participant 12, an expert, stated:  
I have looked at it and if there is nothing in there that shouldn’t be there… then there is no 
reason to keep it. You just send it on its way.  
In comparison, relationships between compiled procedural knowledge and 
effortless examination were stronger for expert security screeners (0.07) than non-
experts, for whom the relationship was less than 0.05. Compiled procedural knowledge 
during effortless examinations was characterised by object recognition that was highly 
integrated into task performance. For example, Participant 5, an expert stated:  
It’s the last thing in fact on your mind. You are looking for guns bombs and knives. One of 
these things comes through and it’s instant. You know the shape. 
For both expert and non-experts, abstract perceptual and superficial perceptual 
knowledge had similar relationships to effortful examinations. The relationship 
between abstract perceptual knowledge and effortless examinations was stronger for 
expert (0.10) than non-expert screeners (0.06). Abstract perceptual knowledge in 
relation to effortless examinations was characterised by knowledge of the relationships 
between visual concepts and physical objects. For example, Participant 7, an expert, 
described identifying a knife based on a specific visual concept associated with knives:  
It’s just a long thick blade pretty much. It stands out from the crowd so to say; from the rest of 
the things in the bag because it is usually longer than everything else. 
The relationship between superficial perceptual knowledge and effortless 
examinations was stronger for non-experts (0.07) than for experts (0.05). The 
relationship between superficial perceptual knowledge and effortless examinations 
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was characterised by explicit knowledge of an object and its basic features. For 
example, the overall shape and size of an object was often cited when referring to 
effortless examinations. Participant 13, an expert, stated that aerosols were easy to 
identify: Because they are quite big, they are easy to spot. In um, you can tell by the 
shape and size of them. 
8.3.3 Interface Interaction Activity and Knowledge 
The influence of knowledge quality on the representation of interface interaction 
activity was examined by investigating the co-occurrences of interface interaction 
activity representations and qualities of knowledge. For comparison, co-occurrence 
results are presented in Fineo diagrams for both expert (Figure 44) and non-expert 
(Figure 45) security screeners. Co-occurrence data matrices are shown in Appendix I 
(p. 305). 
Expert security screeners’ representations of interface interaction activity were 
strongly related to compiled procedural (0.31), descriptive procedural (0.30), and 
structured strategic (0.18) knowledge (Figure 44). In comparison, non-expert 
screeners’ representation of interface interactions had a dominant relationship with 
descriptive procedural knowledge (0.73). Both compiled procedural (0.13) and 
structured strategic knowledge (0.06) had less influential relationships with interface 
interaction (Figure 45). 
The contrasting knowledge qualities demonstrated by expert and non-expert 
security screeners resulted in two divergent representations of the performance of 
interface interactions. The strong influence of descriptive procedural knowledge for 
non-experts resulted in the use of rules that determined the types of interface functions 
to use, and the image conditions in which to use them. These rules were generally 
expressed as propositional statements that lacked clear goals or reasoning. For 
example, Participant 17 described the use of interface functions in relation to a 
cluttered bag:  
When it’s pretty full with stuff like electronics or food or some other stuff then you usually go 
for 2x and then if I still can’t figure it out I go black and white and fade the colour or go another 
angle up and down and zoom in and out.  
In this example, clear condition-action rules are stated. These rules are split into 
two parts. The initial rule states to zoom in to have closer look. If this is not successful, 
the problem goal is revised and involves additional interactions.  
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Figure 44. Fineo diagram showing relationships between interface interaction activity and 
knowledge qualities for expert security screeners 
 
Figure 45. Fineo diagram showing relationships between interface interaction activity and 
knowledge qualities for non-expert security screeners 
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Compiled procedural and structured strategic knowledge, on the other hand, 
resulted in representation of interface interactions that were integrated with related 
processes, and characterised by clear goals. For example, the relationships among 
interface interactions, structured strategic knowledge, and compiled procedural 
knowledge are evident in Participant 15’s description of their typical problem-solving 
activity: 
Black and white is usually the one that I stick to… Using shading with that as well I am able 
to see and get a clearer image and outline of the objects inside the bag. I usually use that where 
there is a bit of clutter in the bag without having to um get a separation done on the bag.  
From this description, clear goals and sequenced actions are evident. Interface 
interactions are closely integrated with the visual process, with a clear understanding 
of their resulting effects. 
Expert security screeners’ representation of interface interaction activity also 
had moderate relationships with abstract perceptual (0.08) and analytic situational 
knowledge (0.08). For non-experts, both of these knowledge qualities had a limited 
influence on the representation of interface interaction activity (<0.05). The influence 
of these knowledge qualities on expert representations were characterised by a link 
between visual knowledge and the representation of interface interaction. For example, 
Participant 37, an expert, stated:  
An individual item within a bag that’s say got a whole lot of coins. It’s just going to show up 
as blue or black or even yellow if it is very dense. So by going to black and white and enhancing 
it to 2 or 4 times and then fading through. You fade through and you can see the round images 
of the coins um and you keep fading through if there is anything that is straight in there, a 
definite straight line we will need to have a look at.  
The strong link between perception and action facilitated a clear understanding 
of cause and effect. By understanding the effect of actions and developing 
expectations, security screeners could evaluate the effectiveness of their actions. 
8.3.4 Screener Interaction Activity and Knowledge 
Representations of security screener interaction activity were based on three 
different types of actions performed during screener interaction: screener interactions 
for the purpose of receiving assistance, requests for re-runs, and prohibited object 
removals (Figure 46).  
Expert security screeners predominantly represented screener interactions as a 
problem-solving activity in the form of ‘re-runs’ (65%). Representations as an activity 
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for ‘assistance’ (16%) and ‘threat removals’ (18%) were less prominent for expert 
screeners. In comparison, non-expert screeners showed a greater representation of 
screener interaction activity as requests for ‘assistance’ (42%). A similar percentage 
of screener interactions were represented as ‘re-runs’ (41%). A relatively small 
percentage of screener interactions were represented as object ‘removals’ (17%)  
 
Figure 46. Screener interaction activity representations formed by expert and non-expert 
security screeners 
To investigate the influence that knowledge quality has on these activity 
representations, co-occurrence relationships between knowledge quality and activity 
representations for security screener interactions are analysed. Co-occurrence results 
are presented in Fineo diagrams for expert (Figure 47) and non-expert (Figure 48) 
screeners. Co-occurrence data matrices are shown in Appendix I (p. 306). 
For both expert and non-expert security screeners, representation of screener 
interaction activity as ‘re-runs’ was predominantly influenced by descriptive 
procedural knowledge. The relationship between re-runs and descriptive procedural 
knowledge was similar for expert (0.32) and non-expert (0.30) screeners. The 
relationship between re-runs and descriptive procedural knowledge was based on rules 
that determined the use of re-runs. For example, Participant 16, an expert, describes 
the process for re-runs as well as the conditions under which they were used:  
If the image is very dark and you can’t see it properly then you have to separate the bag, take 
some of the stuff out. And put it [through] again, so that it gives you a clear view of what’s in 
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Figure 47. Fineo diagram showing relationships between screener interaction activities and 
knowledge qualities for expert security screeners 
 
Figure 48. Fineo diagram showing relationships between screener interaction activities and 
knowledge qualities for non-expert security screeners 
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For expert security screeners, representation of screener interactions as ‘re-runs’ 
were also related to compiled procedural knowledge (0.13) and structured strategic 
knowledge (0.05); for non-expert security screeners, on the other hand, influence from 
these qualities of knowledge were negligible (<0.05). Influence from compiled 
procedural knowledge and structured strategic knowledge was characterised by 
descriptions of re-runs as an extension of the problem-solving process, rather than a 
deferral of action. For example, Participant 15, an expert, stated:  
If I’ve been questioning electrical wires or coins I’ll usually go black and white then fade in 
and out to see if I can see through the images. If I can’t of course then I’ll separate the bag and 
get it shaken up for a better look.  
This extract shows a consecutive transition between examination, interface 
interactions, and screener interactions. In this case, the screener interaction is used to 
improve the image condition in order to support visual problem solving. 
Representations of security screener interactions as ‘requests for assistance’ and 
‘object removals’ were both strongly related to descriptive procedural knowledge. The 
relationship between requests for assistance and descriptive procedural knowledge was 
stronger for non-experts (0.31) than experts (0.08). This difference accounts for the 
greater overall representation of screener interaction activity as ‘requests for 
assistance’ by non-expert screeners. Like re-runs, the influence of descriptive 
procedural knowledge on requests for assistance was characterised by the statement of 
rules for the use of requests for assistance, and the conditions of their use. For example, 
Participant 35, a non-expert, stated as a conditional rule: If I need to I will zoom and 
that... If I still can’t determine it then I get the bag searched. 
Non-expert representations of security screener interactions for assistance were 
influenced by reflective strategic knowledge (0.06). Expert representation of screener 
interactions for assistance, on the other hand, demonstrated no such influence. The 
influence of reflective strategic knowledge on requests for assistance was characterised 
by the identification and performance of learning opportunities. For example, 
Participant 23, a non-expert, stated that they used requests for assistance in order to 
physically inspect and remember problematic objects:  
I would probably say if I haven’t seen it before then I’ll get it pulled out and have a… check it 
out and then I’ll just store that in my head, then you build up a lot of things you see along the 
way, then you get used to seeing them. 
The relationship between representations of screener interaction as ‘threat 
removals’ and descriptive procedural knowledge was similar for expert (0.12) and non-
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expert (0.15) security screeners. The influence of descriptive procedural knowledge 
on threat object removals represented knowledge of the standard process that is 
required in response to identification of a threat objects. For example, Participant 26, 
an expert, described the process they used after identifying a sharp object:  
A long object, so I just get them to remove them out of their bags and surrender the item 
because obviously it can go because it’s sharp. Or they have the option to check it in. um, other 
than that it gets surrendered. 
8.4 Discussion 
The results presented in this chapter show that procedural knowledge has a 
dominant role in expert and non-expert security screeners’ representation of screening 
activity. The strong influence of procedural knowledge is consistent with the findings 
presented in Chapter 6, which identified procedural knowledge as having a significant 
role in the performance of search, interface interaction, and screener interaction 
activities. Alternatively, perceptual, situational, and strategic knowledge have less 
substantial roles (Chapter 6). Building on Chapter 6, this chapter provided a greater 
understanding of the role and development of these knowledge types. In particular, an 
understanding of knowledge quality and its relation to the representation of screening 
activity has been attained. 
Results show that expert security screeners access a more superior quality of 
knowledge than non-expert screeners (Figure 36 and Figure 37). This superior quality 
is best illustrated by the strong influence of compiled procedural, abstract perceptual, 
structured strategic, rich situational, and analytic situational knowledge in experts’ 
interview responses.  
As a result of superior knowledge quality, in turn, experts were also shown to 
access a more integrated knowledge base. This was particularly the case for the 
development of structured strategic knowledge, rich situational, and analytic 
situational knowledge. Each of these knowledge qualities was found to have strong 
relationships to compiled procedural knowledge. Expert security screeners’ 
development and integration of strategic and situational knowledge qualities is 
consistent with the results presented in Chapter 6, where situational and strategic 
knowledge was reported to play a substantial role in experts’ performance of problem-
solving activity. In comparison, the composition of non-expert screeners’ knowledge 
base showed less integration of knowledge qualities. Both descriptive procedural and 
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superficial abstract knowledge showed limited and low strength relationships with 
other knowledge qualities (Figure 37).  
The development of knowledge qualities and their relationships to 
representations of activity share strong similarities with, and reflect the general 
properties of knowledge development described in the literature. Most prominent in 
the case of less experienced security screeners, a strong influence from descriptive 
procedural knowledge resulted in activity representations characterised by simple rule-
based statements. This is consistent with procedural knowledge at an early stage of 
development, where it is often comprised of rules for the production of activity 
(Akerkar & Sajja, 2010). This type of knowledge was pervasive in the representation 
of examination, interface interaction, and screener interaction activity, where rules 
were used to identify situations and link them to corresponding actions.   
With greater experience, there was a transition away from descriptive procedural 
knowledge, towards a greater influence of compiled procedural knowledge. With 
stronger input from compiled procedural knowledge, activity representations were 
characterised by descriptions of integrated sequences of action, with strong goals and 
expectations. At this higher level of development, procedural knowledge is more 
suitable for task performance. Actions are less reliant on following individual steps; 
rather, they become automatic, and are integrated into task performance (Nickols, 
2000).  
The representation of guided search is a good example of this stage of procedural 
knowledge development. With the strong influence of compiled procedural 
knowledge, search process is described as an automatic process. Visual attention 
during search is responsive to the environment, and attention is guided to task-relevant 
features. Without the rigidity of rules, activity can be adapted to the variety of changes 
faced in the context of activity.  
The development of strategic and situational knowledge as a result of highly 
developed procedural knowledge is a known principle in the literature. Procedural 
knowledge is described as a foundation for the development of strategic and situational 
knowledge. Consistent with the findings presented in this chapter, the integration of 
situational and strategic knowledge occurs at higher levels of experience (de Jong & 
Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Eraut, 1990; McCormick, 1997). A particular trait of 
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structured strategic knowledge discussed in this chapter was the understanding and 
expression of causal relationships between problem context and action.  
Actions described by expert security screeners were often discussed in relation 
to the effect they have on visual elements within an image. This characteristic has been 
described as the spontaneous access to adaptable knowledge (Phye & Sanders, 1992). 
A hallmark of strategic knowledge, spontaneous access to knowledge facilitates the 
recognition of relationships between different sources of information and knowledge. 
Relationships are observed during task performance, and this observation allows 
actions to be monitored to ensure their applicability, and to allow in-line adjustments 
if expectations are not met.  
8.5 Summary 
Interviews were conducted to clarify and elaborate field observation data. The 
focus of this chapter was the investigation of the structure and quality of the knowledge 
accessed by security screeners. To this end, the relationships between various qualities 
of knowledge and screeners’ activity representations were illustrated. 
Results show that procedural knowledge was a dominant influence in both expert 
and non-expert security screeners’ activity representations. As a result of experience, 
expert screeners were found to access a higher quality of procedural knowledge. In 
accordance with results from field observations, expert screeners demonstrated greater 
access to situational and strategic knowledge. They also demonstrated access to a more 
integrated knowledge base. This was evidenced by the strong relationships between 
compiled procedural, structured strategic, analytic situational, and rich situational 
knowledge. 
With access to a higher quality and greater integration of knowledge, experts’ 
activity representations were associated with efficient and integrated activity. Experts’ 
descriptions of problem-solving activity were expressed as well-integrated processes, 
with an understanding of cause and effect. In comparison, non-experts’ representation 
of screening activities were predominantly expressed as rule-based statements that 
identified situational conditions, and linked them to appropriate actions.  
In the following chapter, the outcomes of Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are discussed in 
relation to the broader literature and the research question. The implications of these 
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outcomes are discussed in relation to the airport security screening context and 
complex visual tasks. As a result of this discussion, a number of recommendations are 
then presented. 
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Chapter 9:  Discussion 
This research investigated the role of intuitive expertise in the uncertain context 
of airport security x-ray screening. Underlying the research was the question: How 
does intuitive expertise facilitate technology-mediated visual tasks in uncertain 
contexts? This research question was associated with three primary objectives. The 
first objective was to investigate the influence that knowledge and processing style has 
on the performance of screening activity; the second was to compare the knowledge 
and processing styles used by experts and non-experts in order to infer the nature, 
development, and role of intuitive expertise; and the third was to develop conceptual 
performance models from research findings that describe key aspects of security 
screener knowledge and task performance. 
In this chapter, the results and discussions presented in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are 
consolidated in order to address the underlying research question. A focus of the 
chapter is to address the first two research objectives. In the first section, the role of 
knowledge and processing styles in the security screening task are discussed. In the 
second section, security screener knowledge is discussed in relation to the concept of 
intuitive expertise. In particular, the use of situational and strategic knowledge for 
effective problem-solving in routine and non-routine task conditions is discussed. 
Together, these two sections address the overarching research question: How does 
intuitive expertise facilitate technology-mediated visual tasks in uncertain contexts? 
The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of the research findings for the 
security screening task. A number of recommendations for design in the airport 
security screening context are presented in response to the implications identified. 
9.1 The Role and Development of Knowledge in Security Screening 
Throughout this research, the importance of perceptual knowledge for visual 
tasks was discussed. The development of perceptual knowledge as a result of 
experience is reliably shown to result in more effective visual processes (Bravo & 
Farid, 2012; Huestegge & Radach, 2012; Mruczek & Sheinberg, 2005; Mruczek & 
Sheinberg, 2007; Myles-Worsley, et al., 1988). Unsurprisingly, then, the development 
of perceptual knowledge is viewed with great importance in the airport security 
screening context. Research measuring perceptual knowledge and its effect on threat-
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detection tasks has been, and continues to be a key focus for airport security screening. 
Other types and qualities of knowledge, however, have not been a focus of airport 
security x-ray screening research. The research documented here has addressed this 
gap by investigating a greater range of knowledge used by security screeners. In 
addition to perceptual knowledge, it has investigated procedural, strategic, and 
situational knowledge.  
The role of these knowledge types in x-ray screening tasks has two general 
purposes. The first is the comprehension and processing of stimuli. This role is 
performed by perceptual knowledge and situational knowledge, which are used to 
understand and give meaning to visual stimuli. The second purpose is the selection and 
execution of actions, and this is performed with the use of procedural and strategic 
knowledge. 
In a more complex interpretation, defining the exact purpose of a knowledge 
type is not so clear. This research has shown that the different types of knowledge 
share strong relationships, and that more than one knowledge type is required for the 
representation and performance of activity (Chapter 8). This section discusses the 
nature of security screener knowledge, and its role in relation to both the 
comprehension of task situations and the performance of action. 
9.1.1 Mental Representation and Integration of Knowledge 
Effective comprehension of sensory input is strongly reliant on perceptual 
knowledge and the development of mental representations (Rumelhart & Ortony, 
1978). Substantial perceptual knowledge, gained through both general and domain-
specific experience, enables an individual to develop effective mental representations. 
The content and structure of knowledge in mental representations facilitate beliefs 
about, and expectations of situations that are experienced. For this reason, access to 
appropriate mental representations plays a significant role in ongoing information 
processing, situational comprehension, and the formulation of appropriate action 
(Strasser, 2010).   
The composition of knowledge accessed by expert and non-expert security 
screeners gives an indication of the nature and development of mental representations. 
With experience, the composition of knowledge in mental representations shifts from 
discrete knowledge to connected knowledge (Chapter 8). For example, the activity 
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representations described by non-expert security screeners were strongly influenced 
by descriptive procedural knowledge and superficial perceptual knowledge. These 
knowledge types shared a strong relationship; however, they showed weak 
relationships with other knowledge types (Figure 37). Alternatively, experts’ activity 
representations were characterised by the stronger influence of more sophisticated and 
integrated qualities of knowledge. These included compiled procedural knowledge, 
analytic situational, rich situational, structured strategic, and abstract perceptual 
knowledge (Figure 36).  
Expert security screeners’ development of an integrated knowledge base is not 
unexpected. Superior structure and quality is typical of expert knowledge (de Jong & 
Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). The development of a connected knowledge base is 
attributed to the modality of knowledge and the abstraction of the mental 
representation (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1978; Strasser, 2010). At a low level of 
abstraction, a representation, and the knowledge within a representation, is non-
pictorial. Non-pictorial representations are lexical and explicit, existing as 
propositional representations that deal with discrete concepts (de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996; Johnson-Laird, 1980; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1978; Strasser, 2010). In 
security screening, low level abstraction of knowledge is consistent with descriptive 
procedural and superficial perceptual knowledge. At this level, knowledge manifests 
predominantly as explicit statements that link situations to actions. Objects are 
frequently represented using explicit categorical representations (e.g., guns, knives, 
and bombs) or concepts (e.g., clutter, opacity). These are then directly matched to 
general actions such as ‘take a closer look’ or ‘I’ll zoom in’.  
At a high level of abstraction, representations are pictorial (de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996; Strasser, 2010). In pictorial representations, the structure of knowledge 
is analogous to the object or concept being represented (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 
1996; Johnson-Laird, 1980; Strasser, 2010). Analogous representations enable the 
organisation, summary, and retrieval of flexible and adaptable information (Johnson-
Laird, 1980; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1978). For representation of visual concepts, 
abstraction facilitates the generalisation of knowledge, and the storage of only the most 
important information; for example, the characteristics of a group of objects, rather 
than an explicit object. In this state, knowledge can be adapted to allow for a greater 
range of objects to be recognised as familiar (Hampton, 2003).  
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Knowledge quality plays a primary role in determining the effectiveness of 
mental models developed by users to help guide their interactions with technology 
(Payne, 2003). With analogous mental models, it is easy for a user to understand how 
a system will behave in relation to input. Users are able to anticipate and develop 
expectancies about how actions will result in changes to an object. It is suggested that 
this allows for related concepts to be pulled together to form sequences of actions that 
are planned against anticipated changes (Young, 1983 in Payne, 2003; Rumelhart & 
Ortony, 1978).  
These characteristics were demonstrated in experts’ activity representations that 
were influenced by compiled procedural, abstract perceptual, structured strategic, 
situational rich, and situational analytic knowledge. Activity representations 
influenced by these knowledge qualities were characterised by the expression of goals, 
and an understanding of relationships between context and action. For example, expert 
security screeners often described sequences of problem-solving action in relation to 
their goal and the expected outcome (Chapter 8). Experts’ rich understanding of 
context was shown to result in the performance of highly efficient sequences of 
problem-solving actions (Chapter 7).  
Less effective mental models only relate a task to a set of actions suitable to 
perform the task. This type of representation is referred to as ‘task-action mappings’ 
(Tauber, 1990, p. 310), and is consistent with the rule-based descriptions associated 
with descriptive procedural knowledge. According to Tauber (1990), a user employing 
only task-action mappings would not be able to take full advantage of a system, as they 
are not considering the behaviour of the system in relation to actions.  
9.1.2 The Perception-Action Relationship 
The previous section discussed the relationships between quality of knowledge 
and mental representations. It explained how the development of effective mental 
representations is essential for the perception of a situation, as well as for the selection 
of actions. Building on this previous discussion, this section further discusses security 
screener knowledge, and the relationship between perception and action.  
The relationship between perception and action is essential for task performance 
in the security screening context. Much of the activity performed by security screeners 
is based on transitions between activities that are performed utilising perceptual 
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knowledge and activities performed utilising procedural knowledge. Examination 
activity, for example, was a central activity in both the search and problem-solving 
phase activity sequences (Chapter 6, Figure 9). During search phases, transitions occur 
between procedural knowledge-driven search and perceptual knowledge-driven 
examinations. During problem-solving phases, transitions occur between perceptual 
knowledge-driven examinations and procedural knowledge-driven interface 
interactions. In each of these relationships, the perceptual knowledge underlying 
examinations is used to determine and evaluate actions that are performed using 
procedural knowledge. Despite the prominence of these types of transitions, discussion 
of the perception-action relationship has largely been absent from current x-ray 
security screening research; rather, most research has focused on perception of stimuli 
without consideration of its relationship to action (e.g. Koller, et al., 2009; 
Schwaninger, 2004; Schwaninger, et al., 2005; Schwaninger & Wales, 2009). 
Beyond the field of security screening research, the relationship between 
perception and action is well documented. For example, the relationship between 
perception and action is addressed in concepts such as condition-action pairs (Roda, 
2011b), productions (Anderson, 1982), schema activation (Norman & Shallice, 1986), 
and the action cycle (Norman, 1992).  These concepts are based on the relationship 
between declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge. Smith (1994) contends 
that declarative knowledge is inseparable from procedural knowledge in that 
procedural knowledge forms the sequences of operations that respond to declarative 
knowledge (Smith, 1994).  
From an activity perspective, perception and actions are linked in a process 
where the selection of cognitive or physical action is determined by its association with 
specific trigger conditions. Meaningful cues in a situation are encountered and 
identified, and this triggers the retrieval of related information from memory. 
Retrieved information is organised, evaluated, and integrated in order to formulate 
cognitive or physical action (Anderson, 1982; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Tenenbaum 
& Summers, 2011). 
An effective relationship between perception and action is predominantly 
determined by the development of the underlying procedural knowledge. In its very 
early stages, procedural knowledge is declarative; that is, it is based on rules and facts 
(Anderson, 1982; Nickols, 2000; Smith, 1994). Using these rules, procedural 
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knowledge is matched to perceived situations and facts, to generate behaviour. At this 
stage, transitions from perception to action are slow and error-prone.  
With experience, individual knowledge of facts and rules is compiled in order to 
form schemata. The formation of schemata allows an individual to apply continuous 
sequences of actions. Known actions can be applied to familiar situations with limited 
intervention from the perceptual process previously needed to interpret the state of the 
situation (Anderson, 1982). The final stage of development involves ‘strengthening’ 
and refinement of procedural knowledge. Through repeated use, the links between 
perception and action are more specific, and result in lower thresholds for activating 
procedural knowledge. With lower thresholds, in turn, the time taken to match 
information processed in an environment to the relevant procedural knowledge stored 
in memory is reduced (Anderson, 1982; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Anderson, 1987 in 
Smith, 1994).  
There are strong consistencies between the nature of procedural knowledge 
exposed in this research and the stages of procedural knowledge development 
described by Anderson (1982). Both expert and non-expert security screeners relied 
strongly on procedural knowledge for the performance of screening tasks. It was found 
that in each activity, their use of procedural knowledge did not differ significantly 
(Chapter 6). However, as shown by the different qualities of knowledge that comprised 
their activity representations (Chapter 8), the quality of their procedural knowledge 
changed. Non-experts relied heavily on descriptive procedural knowledge 
characterised by rule-based descriptions. Alternatively, experts demonstrated greater 
access to compiled procedural knowledge. With this shift to compiled procedural 
knowledge, the representation of activity was less reliant on rules and steps. Rather, 
screeners described cogent sequences of actions that integrated a detailed 
understanding of context, action, and expected outcomes. This shift from descriptive 
procedural knowledge to compiled procedural knowledge is consistent with the 
strengthening of procedural knowledge described by Anderson (1982).  
In addition to action that was performed in response to visual input, action was 
also initiated by the goals of the security screener. This initiation of action was 
observed during search activity, and was evident in the high percentage of procedural 
knowledge underlying the representation and performance of search (Chapters 6 and 
8). According to Anderson (1987 in Smith, 1994), in this arrangement, procedural 
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knowledge is ‘fired’ prior to receiving input from declarative knowledge that has been 
activated by the environment. Rather than acting on declarative knowledge, fired 
procedural knowledge facilitates the construction of declarative knowledge. Top-down 
influence ascribes meaning to elements experienced in the environment, and actions 
guide the expectation of what should be seen next (Norman, 1992, p. 44). Procedural 
knowledge that is ‘fired’ is generally associated with automatic cognitive and motor 
skills, as attention can be selectively allocated within a scene (Anderson, 1982; 
McCormick, 1997; Nickols, 2000). This particular characteristic is consistent with the 
findings of this research, where participants of all experience levels performed search 
activity with the predominant use of intuitive procedural knowledge (Chapter 6).  
9.2 The Role of Intuitive Expertise 
For the purpose of defining ‘intuitive expertise’, two primary distinctions were 
made in the literature review. First, in naturalistic settings, intuitive expertise was 
discussed in terms of exceptional performance under exceptional circumstances. The 
performance of experts in these situations is often associated with unconscious 
decision making and gut feeling (Klein, 1998). Second, and in addition to unconscious 
decision making, intuitive expertise is strongly associated with reason and deliberation 
(Baylor, 1997; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). It is this second intuitive expertise 
distinction that is most consistent with the findings of this research.  
The association between intuitive expertise and reason is based on the premise 
that the intuitive performance of experts is only mostly unconscious. If needed, the 
processes behind decision making can be recalled and adjusted if needed. This concept 
has previously been discussed in the literature review, and refers to deliberative 
rationality and metacognition (Section 3.3.2). Reasoning in the form of metacognition 
allows an expert to plan actions through mental simulation, and to also monitor and 
modulate actions during task performance (Baylor, 2001; Dreyfus, 1997; Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 2005; Klein & Hoffman, 1992). The use of reason in this way is 
representative of the problem-solving activity performed by expert security screeners 
when using strategic and situational knowledge. These types of knowledge facilitate 
efficient planning and execution of actions, as well as adaptable problem solving.  
In the following sections, these two observed outcomes of situational knowledge 
and strategic knowledge are discussed. These sections explicitly address the research 
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question with the aim of understanding the role of intuitive expertise in uncertain 
contexts. 
9.2.1 Strategic Knowledge and Attention-dependent Automaticity 
It has been established that all naturalistic environments are comprised of at least 
some non-routine aspects, due to their inherent complexity and natural variation 
(Chapter 2). In addition to environmental characteristics, the complexity of a task is 
dependent on the experience of the decision maker. As familiarity is gained with non-
familiar tasks and situations, what was at one point a non-routine task becomes 
increasingly routine (Lillrank, 2003). This routinisation of a task is characterised by 
the applicability of standardised processes and repetitive decision rules (Lillrank, 
2002, 2003). In the security screening context, results indicate that many of the 
activities performed involve standard actions and processes that are used by security 
screeners. This is evident in the strong presence of procedural knowledge used during 
search, interface interaction, and screener interaction activity by both experts and non-
experts (Chapter 6).  
Although standardised procedures are used during most screening activities, 
results also show that security screener interactions improve as a result of experience. 
This has previously been linked to the strengthening of procedural knowledge 
characterised by the shift from rule-based knowledge to integrated knowledge (Section 
9.1.2) (Anderson, 1982; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Anderson, 1987 in Smith, 1994).  
The development of procedural knowledge is also associated with access to 
strategic knowledge. Strategic knowledge is developed as the isolated facts and 
heuristics held in procedural knowledge are adapted and compiled to form problem-
solving schemata (Schraw, 1998). With repeated use, schemata become more refined, 
and tailored to specific variables faced in the activity domain (Anderson, 1982). 
Specific strategies are matched to specific input conditions, thus facilitating the 
effective sequencing of actions (Schraw, 1998).  
Performance of efficient interaction sequences is a hallmark of strategic 
knowledge and well-learned problem schemata. However, this is not to say that 
activity sequences are exclusive to strategic knowledge. Sequencing of activity is also 
facilitated by procedural knowledge. This is evident in the procedural knowledge-
driven interface interactions that are frequently used to act on examinations (Chapter 
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6). According to Payne, Howes and Reader (2001), transitions that are based on 
interleaved visual and physical interactions are common during technology-mediated 
tasks. A complete interaction sequence is rarely formulated before acting. Rather, 
information is read from the device during the task in order to plan and evaluate action, 
and to distribute the cognitive load between the device and the user (Payne, et al., 
2001). Although this does work to reduce the cognitive load during interactions, 
switching between tasks can also reduce efficiency. When two activities are performed 
in sequence, one goal must be suspended while the other is strengthened and then 
activated (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Roda, 2011a). It is common for a delayed action 
to occur when there are limited cues in the environment, or in an individual’s memory, 
to aid the retrieval and activation of the goals that drive each respective activity 
(Altmann & Trafton, 2002). According to Cowan (1988), some effortful activities 
result in greater interference than others. For interface interactions driven by 
procedural knowledge, interference can be inferred by the predominantly non-intuitive 
processing style underlying both examination and interface interaction activity 
(Chapter 6).  
The negative effects of task switching that are experienced during sequences of 
interface interaction and examinations are mitigated by experts as a result of access to 
strategic knowledge. Expert security screeners who used strategic knowledge were 
found to perform efficient sequences of examination and interface interactions 
(Chapter 7, Figure 28). The consistent repetition of interface interactions and 
examinations suggests that they are performed as well learned sub-routines (Sanderson 
& Fisher, 1994). Examinations during interaction sequences were performed 
efficiently as short visual checks resulting in minimal interference to the concurrent 
performance of interface interactions. Moreover, interaction sequences were 
performed almost exclusively to overcome cluttered and opaque images. This suggests 
that these interactions are specifically planned for use under these circumstances.  
The features of task performance that result from strategic knowledge are 
consistent with the concept of attention-dependent automaticity. Attention-dependent 
automaticity is a type of automaticity that emerges out of well-practiced memory 
(Logan, 1992) and the compilation of knowledge into schemata (Anderson, 1982, 
1986). With knowledge in this compiled state, interpretive processes are not required 
(Anderson, 1982, 1986). Rather, solutions can be retrieved and performed in a single 
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step (Logan, 1992; Roda, 2011a). Although this process is considered automatic, it 
does not share the same pre-conscious characteristics that are often associated with 
intuition (Logan, 1992). Rather, attention-dependent automaticity is deliberative, and 
dependent on conscious attention (Bargh, 1992 in Logan, 1992). Attention is allocated 
to the highest possible level of processing only, while lower level processing is 
performed automatically (Logan, 1992). Attention to the higher level of processing 
allows operations to be performed efficiently, but also enables the modulation of 
actions if they do not conform to expectations (Rasmussen, 1983).  
The characteristics of strategic knowledge and attention-dependent automaticity 
are similar to task performance characteristics observed in other interactive activity 
domains. In Popovic and Kraal’s study (2008), experienced and inexperienced nurses 
were observed during the activity of bandaging leg ulcers. Experienced nurses were 
found to engage in planning prior to applying the bandage. This initial stage of 
planning resulted in continuous interaction and engagement with bandaging, without 
shifting focus to other tasks. Popovic and Kraal compare the skill demonstrated by 
experienced nurses to Verbeek’s (2005 in Popovic & Kraal, 2008) concept of ‘focal 
engagement’. Focal engagement is defined as the simultaneous engagement of a higher 
goal, and the processes needed to reach that goal. In Popovic and Kraal’s research, 
focal engagement is reflected in the nurse’s simultaneous awareness of the bandage, 
as well as in the higher goal of treating the patient (Popovic & Kraal, 2008). This type 
of task performance associated with attention- dependent automaticity and focal 
attention is particularly effective for technology-mediated decision making, where 
attentional shifts between complementary processes are required. It provides the 
ability to engage multiple processes of action without it interfering with other 
processes (Norman & Schiller, 1996 in Roda, 2011a, p. 29). 
9.2.2 Situational Knowledge and Adaptable Problem Solving 
In addition to routine problem situations, this research shows that security 
screeners encounter non-routine problem situations. These are comprised of input 
conditions that are outside their experience and do not correspond to expected actions 
and processes (Lillrank, 2003; Roda, 2011a). In this research, the presence of non-
routine situations is represented by screeners’ experience of insufficient knowledge.  
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In response to insufficient knowledge, the actions of expert and non-expert 
security screeners have contrasting effectiveness. Both expert and non-expert 
screeners were found to experience a similar percentage of insufficient knowledge 
during the coding of examination activity (Section 6.4.6). The insufficient knowledge 
of expert security screeners, however, was found to be isolated to examination activity, 
with very little insufficient knowledge experienced during other activities. In 
comparison, the insufficient knowledge experienced by non-experts during 
examinations was frequently found to transfer to screener interactions (Section 7.4.2). 
Non-experts demonstrated significantly more insufficient knowledge during screener 
interactions than experts (Section 6.4.9). For non-experts, this resulted in requests for 
assistance and the deferral of decision making. This type of behaviour is significant in 
non-expert security screeners’ interactions; this suggests that it might be a form of 
decision avoidance, where a person seeks an easy way out of a problem by postponing 
or deferring a solution (Anderson, 2003). However, it should also be considered that 
engagement with other security screeners is used as a measure to avoid uncertainty. 
As stated by Bordia et al. (2004), communication and engagement are strategies to 
regain some control in a situation.  
In order to overcome non-routine situations, two primary methods are mentioned 
in the literature: fitting standardised actions to the problem and developing new 
schemata to address the problem (Lillrank, 2003; Norman & Shallice, 1986). In either 
case, the effectiveness of problem solving is dependent on the adaptability of existing 
knowledge and problem-solving schemata. The process of adaptation is performed by 
executive control functions—voluntary information processing operations that interact 
with memory (Cowan, 1988). These operations are described in models such as the 
Supervisory Attentional System (Norman & Shallice, 1986) and the concept of 
knowledge compilation (Anderson, 1986), and involve the refinement of problem-
solving and learning processes.  
According to Norman and Shallice (Norman & Shallice, 1986), the supervisory 
attentional system works by activating or inhibiting additional schemata in response 
to a novel problem. Through activation of additional schemata, new schemata are 
created to address novel problems (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Roda, 2011a). 
Tenenbaum and Summers (2011) postulate that the supervisory attentional system is a 
key factor that differentiates the performance of experts and non-experts in activities 
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that rely on strong perception-action relationships. For instance, Williams (2000, in 
Vestberg, Gustafson, Maurex, Ingvar, & Petrovic, 2012) found that expert soccer 
players were better at picking up new information, and also demonstrated the use of 
greater diversity of strategies in different play situations. Similarly, in the task of x-
ray security screening, Flint et al. (2014) found that exceptional security screeners 
demonstrated a greater variety of problem-solving strategies than less capable 
screeners. 
The development of extensive situational knowledge plays a key role in 
facilitating the adaptation of schemata for use in novel situations. Accessing situational 
knowledge is considered a requirement for the development and use of effective 
problem-solving schemata (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Klein & Hoffman, 
1992). Also influential in this process, is strategic knowledge. According to Gruber, 
the adaptability afforded by situational knowledge is facilitated by the vocabulary that 
is shared between it and strategic knowledge (Gruber, 1989). This relationship has 
been demonstrated in this research by the strong co-occurrence relationship between 
structured strategic and analytic situational knowledge (Figure 36, Section 8.2). The 
relationship between these qualities of knowledge is similar to the perception-action 
relationship described earlier in this chapter (Section 9.1.2). Individuals with relevant 
situational knowledge are able to recognise task-relevant cues in a problem situation, 
as well as be aware of limitations or obstacles that must be taken into account. This 
deep understanding of a situation is instrumental in planning, as it allows for predictive 
inferences to be made about how a situation will develop in relation to planned actions. 
As a result, individuals can adapt to new task constraints and ensure the appropriate 
selection of strategic action (Gruber, 1989; Kirschner & Van Vilsteren, 1997).    
The shared vocabulary of situational and strategic knowledge allows an 
individual to make decisions in regard to a situation even when available information, 
or their own knowledge, is incomplete (Gruber, 1989). With appropriate schemata, an 
individual can make inferences on incomplete knowledge and information by 
activating additional schemata that are related to the situational constraints (Rumelhart 
& Ortony, 1978). The knowledge held within the activated schemata is linked to the 
concepts experienced in the situation, filling in missing information by way of 
prediction, or matching actions associated with similar schemata. This characteristic 
of situational knowledge was demonstrated by experts’ frequent use of bag re-run. Re-
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run requests were used as an extension of previously performed problem-solving 
activity engaged through the use of interface interactions and examinations (Chapter 
7). Rather than deferring the decision to another security screener, this process allowed 
the problem-solving context to be adapted, based on the problem-solving goals and 
requirements identified by the security screener. The ability to adapt to novel and 
unfamiliar problem contexts is a particularly important aspect of situational 
knowledge, as it provides resilience to knowledge limitations and complex task 
environments (Gruber, 1989). 
9.3 Implications for Airport Security X-Ray Screening 
This chapter has discussed the findings of this research and the role of intuitive 
expertise in airport security screening. As it investigated the x-ray security screening 
tasks, its findings have direct implications for this context. However, these findings 
can also be transferred and applied more generally to other activity domains that are 
characterised by uncertainty, and by dynamic task conditions. It is believed that an 
understanding of the cognitive factors that contribute to effective interactions can lead 
to the design of systems and interfaces that support skill development and effective 
task performance.   
This section now outlines the implications of the research findings, focussing on 
three areas: visual attention, skill development, and future systems for passenger 
screening. In discussing these implications, several recommendations are made for the 
design of future systems and processes for the airport security x-ray screening context. 
Recommendations specifically target the design of systems and interfaces that are 
responsive to the requirements of both experienced and inexperienced operators.  
9.3.1 Visual Attention 
The importance of visual interactions in the x-ray screening task has been made 
clear in this research. The performance of search and examination activity is essential 
for locating task-relevant cues for the identification of dangerous objects in 
passengers’ bags. Often used with interface interactions, the examinations performed 
by security screeners must be adaptable and robust enough to overcome challenging 
image conditions. However, the transitions between these visual and physical 
interactions can affect the continuity of screeners’ activity as a result of their attention 
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shifting between visual stimuli on the screen and the interface control panel (Section 
9.2.1).  
Improving the focus and efficiency of interactive sequences performed by 
security screeners is a highly desirable outcome in the screening context. Roda (2011a) 
suggests that unnecessary attentional changes in visual tasks should be avoided in 
order to maintain focus on the primary visual activity. Zhang and Norman (1994 in 
Payne, et al., 2001) suggest that artefacts should be designed to maximise the potential 
for cognitive offloading in order to reduce cognitive load. In the security screening 
context, this would result in placing greater focus on examinations, and reducing the 
focus on interface interactions. This is possible through the facilitation of positive 
visual habits that can shift a user’s attention away from the interface and onto the target 
task (Raskin, 2000`in Roda & Thomas, 2005). Two recommendations are made: (i) to 
minimise visual and physical clutter; and (ii) to design for speed and accessibility. 
i. Minimise Visual and Physical Clutter  
In order to foster effective visual interactions during search and problem solving, 
it is important to minimise visual and physical clutter. Roda, (2011a), for example, 
suggests that care should be taken when designing features of a device so that they do 
not detract from critical visual processes. Visual clutter on the display should be 
minimised to reduce distraction during both search and problem-solving tasks. 
Essential on-screen cues and functions within the field of vision should be presented 
so as to minimise their distraction; that is, only critical events should capture the 
attention, and non-essential visual elements should be minimised or removed. For 
instance, non-essential elements might include unnecessary movement of a visual 
element, or changes in appearance that might distract the attention of the security 
screener.  
Attention distraction should also be considered when designing the layout of the 
screening environment, the screen position, and peripheral features. The security 
checkpoint is a dynamic space, with passengers and staff constantly moving through. 
Placement and orientation of x-ray screening consoles should ensure minimal visual 
distraction, but also enable efficient interactions with other security screeners in the 
event that assistance is required. 
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ii. Design for Speed and Accessibility 
To support continuity of visual interactions, interface functions should be 
designed to maximise both their accessibility, and the speed of their application. This 
can be achieved by using naturally-mapped interfaces that reduce the load on motor 
and cognitive processes during interactions (Djajadiningrat, Overbeeke, & Wensveen, 
2002; Norman, 1988). Naturally-mapped interfaces provide design cues that reduce 
the distance between the goals of a user and the way in which they are communicated 
to the system (Hutchins, Hollan, & Norman, 1985). Two key principles of natural 
mapping are relevant for interfaces in x-ray screening tasks: the method of input, and 
the physical mapping of functions.  
First, input methods should clearly indicate their purpose, so as to facilitate fast 
and accessible interactions. A number of interface functions available to security 
screeners are based on arbitrary image states; for example, black and white, pseudo 
colour and high contrast. Security screeners must identify and match relevant functions 
to the current task goal. Improved accessibility to these functions could be achieved 
by designing functions that correspond more closely to the goals in the security 
screening activity, rather than using arbitrary visual concepts. This is in line with the 
work of Altmann and Trafton (2002), who suggest that during critical periods of task 
switching, environmental cues must correspond to task goals. With the design of goal-
relevant features, security screeners might experience less cognitive load during 
activity transitions due to less distance between task goals and the cues communicated 
by the interface functions.  
Second, the spatial layout of interface functions should ensure ease of access, 
and relate to how functions are used during the task. Effective layout of functions can 
help a user understand the purpose of functions and reduce input errors 
(Djajadiningrat, et al., 2002; Hutchins, et al., 1985). These are both desirable qualities 
that can reduce attention on the interface. This can be achieved in the case of the 
interface functions available to security screeners. This research identified three levels 
of IEFs: zoom, primary, and secondary. These levels are designed to be used together 
in sequence. However, some functions are mutually exclusive and cannot be used 
together. For example, two primary functions cannot be paired as they alter the 
representation of the colours on the image. Alternatively, two secondary functions can 
be paired as they adjust separate qualities of the image, such as luminance and contrast. 
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The layout of these functions should represent the sequences and role that each plays 
in the problem-solving context: “If the mapping is done correctly, then both the form 
and the meaning of commands should be easier to acquire and retain” (Hutchins, et al., 
1985, p. 336). 
9.3.2 Skill Development 
A key outcome of this research is the identification of the knowledge limitations 
of non-expert security screeners (Section 6.4.9). During unfamiliar events, users often 
do not have knowledge of established problem-solving methods. In such situations, 
they are required to improvise, and are susceptible to making errors (Vicente & 
Rasmussen, 1992). Insufficient knowledge experienced by non-experts results in an 
inability to form appropriate representations for the comprehension and performance 
of action (Section 7.4.2).  
This identification of knowledge limitations of non-expert security screeners 
provides a design opportunity to help support them during critical parts of task 
performance. It has implications for interface design, as the errors that occur due to 
knowledge limitations cannot simply be overcome by improving human factors. 
Improvements to the layout and design of controls offers little assistance if the problem 
is not understood in the first place. Thus, these difficulties must be understood and 
addressed in terms of the cognitive factors that influence interactions (Vicente & 
Rasmussen, 1992).  
The findings of this research demonstrate experts’ ability to overcome 
knowledge limitations. Even when experts demonstrated insufficient knowledge in 
one situation, this limitation rarely persisted in subsequent problem-solving situations. 
One of the challenges for the design of interfaces in this situation is to ensure that they 
support security screeners of both lesser and greater experience. Four approaches to 
interface design are suggested, with the aim of supporting the interactions and 
problem-solving of both inexperienced and experienced security screeners: (i) design 
for accessibility; (ii) design for adaptability; (iii) match goals and actions, and (iv) 
training for problem-solving strategies. 
i. Design for Accessibility 
Designing for accessibility is based on similar principles to those described in 
the recommendation to ‘design for speed and simplicity’ (Section 9.4.1). However, 
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where design for speed and simplicity focuses on the outcome of reducing cognitive 
load, this recommendation focuses on building experience and schemata through 
repeated and frequent use of interface functions. 
Gray and Boehm-Davis (2000, in Payne, et al., 2001) state that the nature of user 
behaviour can be adjusted by small changes to the accessibility of an interface. By 
reducing the cognitive cost of interactions, interface functions become more accessible 
and are used more frequently. This results in greater experience with the interface, and 
the integration of knowledge into problem-solving schemata. As experience is gained 
and schemata are activated more frequently, problem schemata become refined and 
are more likely to be used (Anderson, 1982; Mandler, 1985; Norman & Shallice, 
1986). This is desirable as it improves the efficiency of interactions and their 
integration into effective task performance. 
ii. Design for Adaptability 
One possibility for addressing incomplete mental representations as a result of 
knowledge limitations is the design of responsive interfaces. Vicente and Rasmussen 
(1992) suggest that during unfamiliar situations, interfaces should be designed to 
capture the state of complexity in the context, and to visualise information in a way 
that supports the skill level of users. However, utilising interfaces that adapt to the 
state of the context in the security screening task is somewhat problematic. Interfaces 
that visualise important image features and suggest relevant functions to security 
screeners run the risk of causing unnecessary distraction to critical visual processes 
(Section 9.4.2). 
A possible alternative to context-adaptive interfaces is an interface that is 
attention-aware and can adapt to the state of the user. Attention-aware interfaces work 
by adapting interface behaviour “according to the attentional and affective state of the 
user” (Bowman, et al., 2011, p. 115). To adapt to the state of the user, these systems 
must be able to assess their state. This has been achieved by the use of a number of 
sensory-based mechanisms, including head position, gesture tracking, acoustic 
tracking (Roda & Thomas, 2005), electroencephalogram (Bowman, et al., 2011), and 
gaze tracking (Park, Park, Lim, Lee, & Hahn, 2009; Roda & Thomas, 2005).  
For security screening, an attention-aware system would be likely to use gaze 
tracking, due to its unobtrusiveness. Based on gaze patterns, the cognitive state of the 
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user could be considered before presenting information that might be useful in 
response to the problem context. This kind of system would ensure that there are no 
unnecessary interruptions during routine screening activity. Instead, assistance could 
be reserved for times when the user is experiencing difficulties. For instance, an 
attention-aware interface could identify when a security screener is performing 
effective search activity. In such instances, any alerts would be reserved for critical 
events; for instance, when explosive material is detected. Alternatively, when a 
security screener is experiencing uncertainty, an adaptive interface could recognise 
this and provide useful cues or information. In response to a long period of fixation, 
for example, actions could be suggested that might assist in information retrieval. Or, 
for very inexperienced security screeners, image cues could be highlighted to train 
attention to task-relevant visual features. According to VanLehn and Bell (1991, in 
Altmann & Trafton, 2002), the ability to identify relevant and useful cues is essential 
for the reconstruction of goals. Providing such features could assist the construction of 
mental models for problem-solving, and reduce the effects of knowledge limitations. 
iii. Match Goals and Actions 
It is recommended that interface functions be designed so that they are easy to 
incorporate into planning, and can be seamlessly integrated into activity sequences. To 
this end, they should provide affordances and visual cues that correspond to the task 
goals of the user. According to Creem-Regehr and Kunz (2010), embedding cues for 
potential action within perceptual information encourages and strengthens the link 
between perception and action. Based on this principle, the goals and potential actions 
that individuals develop as a result of perception should correspond closely to the 
functionality of the interface. Interface functionality should provide real-time feedback 
to allow for the rapid evaluation and modification of actions (Hutchins, et al., 1985).  
This concept is particularly important in the context of security screening, where 
sequences of interactions are often planned in-situ. The design of input methods that 
allow for fast corrections and adjustments will ensure that any errors do not cause 
major disruption to the goals of the security screener and the actions they perform. 
iv. Training for Problem-solving Strategies 
It is recommended that training programs provide useful strategies and practice 
opportunities for overcoming complex task situations experienced during screening 
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activity. At present, current in-situ training programs (e.g., Threat Image Projection 
systems) are focused on building visual knowledge of threat objects. While this 
training is effective for increasing detection performance in some situations, only small 
improvements to threat detection under difficult image conditions have been achieved 
(Schwaninger, et al., 2008; Schwaninger, et al., 2005). 
This is important to consider in the security-screening context, as difficult image 
conditions (clutter and high opacity) are commonly experienced by security screeners, 
and are the primary reason for problem-solving interactions (Chapter 6, Figure 11). 
Training programs should help security screeners develop reliable strategies to 
overcome these issues. Training should also address the use of complementary IEFs, 
and develop knowledge about the situations in which various IEF combinations are 
useful. The increased exposure to problem-solving and strategy formation will result 
in more refined problem-solving schemata, and their greater frequency of use 
(Anderson, 1982; Mandler, 1985; Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
9.3.3 Future Airport Security Screening Systems and Processes 
When considering the future of x-ray screening technology, it is hard to 
dissociate it from the automation of the systems and processes used. Already, many 
systems used for hold baggage screening are equipped with automated explosives- 
detection features. Progress is also being made with software that enables automated 
detection of certain threat objects. Experiments conducted by Turcsany, Mouton and 
Breckon (2013) have yielded positive results in feature detection for the identification 
of firearms in x-ray images of passenger luggage. At present, however, automated 
threat detection is not a standardised feature in passenger baggage screening (Wetter, 
2013). Thus, the security screener will continue to play a significant role in this system 
for some time. 
Wetter (2013) suggests that while automation is a necessary development for 
security screening, its integration into the screening task is problematic. One of the 
primary considerations that must be taken into account is the way in which automation 
should be integrated into current screening processes. As automated features begin to 
be rolled out, it is likely that security screeners will still be required to oversee 
screening of luggage and to validate automated detection alerts. Partial automation and 
assisted identification of certain threat categories might result in distractions that 
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interfere with screeners’ visual processes. This unnecessary distraction is undesirable 
in critical visual tasks (Roda, 2011a). The implementation of automated features has 
the potential to result in mistrust of the systems due to high false alarm rates. On the 
other hand, however, over-reliance on an automated system could result in missed 
threats, particularly in an environment where threats are constantly evolving (Graves, 
et al., 2011). 
Consideration must also be given to the immediate changes that are proposed for 
airport security screening processes. Central to this discussion is The International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) and Airports Council International’s (ACI) (2016) 
vision for ‘Smart Security’. Smart Security aims to re-imagine the security process and 
the processing of passengers by facilitating improved throughput and passenger 
experience. Already, Smart Security has been implemented in a select few airports 
around the world, such as Melbourne International Airport in Australia, and 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. For x-ray screening, the most notable change is the 
proposal for remote x-ray screening of passengers’ belongings (IATA, 2016). Remote 
screening is advantageous as it provides a quiet environment, conducive to high 
concentration. With a remote system, it is possible for a security screener to process 
images from a number of different security lanes. Images can be cued and distributed 
among security screeners in order to maximise human resources, reduce the number 
of security screeners needed, and allow multiple security screeners to look at 
problematic images (Wetter, 2013). 
In contrast, Wetter (2013) identifies the primary downside of remote screening: 
the separation of the screening officer and the physical bags. Wetter suggests that this 
would cause problems in cases where security screeners want to see an image from 
another angle, or when intervention is required. These concerns are supported by the 
findings of this research. In particular, it was found that expert security screeners often 
performed bag re-runs in order to improve the clarity and viewing angle of an image. 
With an increase in the amount of personal electronics that passengers are taking with 
them (Mendes, et al., 2012), affordances in the system that allow for separation of 
these items is important. Interactions with other security screeners were also necessary 
to remove and identify unknown objects. Object removals were used by inexperienced 
screeners as a learning opportunity, as these removals meant that the objects could be 
visually inspected and remembered for future encounters (Chapter 8). Three 
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recommendations are made: (i) design of learning opportunities; (ii) facilitate strategy 
engagement; and, (iii) management of automated features. 
i. Design of Learning Opportunities 
It is recommended that learning opportunities are incorporated into new system 
and process design in the x-ray screening context. One of the most widely cited 
concepts associated with the effective development of expertise is deliberate practice 
(Charness & Tuffiash, 2008; Ericsson, 1993; Kahneman & Klein, 2009) and the 
availability of feedback (Shanteau, 1992).  
One of the key methods for receiving feedback in the security screening context 
is through physical observation of a removed object. It is recommended that provisions 
for such feedback and deliberate practice should be maintained in the development of 
future x-ray screening process and technology. Feedback should be immediate, with 
simultaneous display of the physical object and the x-ray representation. This will 
allow consistency between representations of the physical object in the real world and 
under x-ray conditions.  
Developments in screening processes should also allow for reflection on, and 
correction of decision making during in-situ training. Current in-situ training (Threat 
Image Projection) systems do not provide information to security screeners in regard 
to fictional threat objects that are missed. Providing information about these objects, 
as well as the opportunity to reflect on, and correct these decisions, would improve 
understanding of these objects and how best to identify them. 
ii. Facilitate Strategy Engagement 
New technology and screening processes should enable security screeners to 
perform adaptable problem-solving strategies to assist problem solving. Both the 
process of screening and the technology utilised in the process, should afford either 
digital or physical alteration of the image context to overcome common image 
challenges. The primary image challenges needing to be addressed include clutter, 
superimposed objects, rotation of objects, and opacity. This recommendation applies 
specifically to remote screening processes, where security screeners are separated from 
the physical bags. Requesting and performing physical actions on passengers’ bags 
will be problematic in this type of arrangement. Thus, it is important that either the 
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arrangement of the screening process or the technology used allows for the 
implementation of effective strategies to overcome difficult image characteristics.  
iii. Management of Automated Features 
It will be important to ensure that the integration of automated threat-detection 
features does not interfere with the effectiveness of screening activity. At least in their 
early stages of integration, it is important that automated features do not have a 
distracting influence on visual interactions. This recommendation relates to principles 
discussed in recommendation (i) in Section 9.4.1. 
9.4 Summary 
This chapter has consolidated the findings from Chapters 6, 7, and 8, with the 
aim of addressing the research question ‘How does intuitive expertise facilitate 
technology-mediated visual tasks in uncertain contexts’. In response to this question, 
the first section of this chapter provided an understanding of the role and development 
of knowledge in the security screening context. Superior knowledge quality and 
integrated knowledge are linked to the construction of abstract mental representations, 
and to a detailed understanding of situations in the task domain. Building on this link, 
the knowledge that facilitates effective perception of a situation was discussed in terms 
of its relationship to the execution of action. This perception– action relationship has 
been identified as a primary role of knowledge in the security screening context. 
Having established the primary roles of knowledge in the airport security 
screening context, the second section of this chapter moved to directly address the 
research question. Intuitive expertise in this context is associated with the 
strengthening of procedural knowledge and the development of a structured 
knowledge base comprised of strategic and situational knowledge. Access to this 
knowledge facilitates efficient and adaptable problem-solving in both familiar and 
unfamiliar situations. Having a greater depth and structure of knowledge, experts were 
found to overcome unfamiliar situations as a result of adapting existing schemata and 
the development of new schemata. A discussion of the literature identified that 
intuitive expertise is dependent on a compilation of knowledge that allows higher order 
cognitive control over actions. 
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This chapter concluded with a discussion of the implications of this research for 
the airport security screening context. Implications and recommendations address 
effective visual attention in interactive tasks, the development of skilled knowledge, 
and the design of future security screening processes and technology. In Chapter 10, 
the underlying knowledge and processes engaged by security screeners are 
consolidated in separate models for expert and non-expert screeners.  
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Chapter 10:  Expert and Non-Expert Security Screener Models 
This chapter discusses the expert and non-expert models that have been 
developed from the analysis of the findings of this research. The development of 
models for expert and non-expert security screeners had two aims. The first aim was 
to represent the type and quality of knowledge underlying expert and non-expert 
security screener interactions. The models were designed to represent the relationships 
between knowledge qualities, and the features of task performance resulting from these 
relationships. The second aim of the models was to illustrate the role of knowledge in 
the sequences of activities undertaken by security screeners. As part of this second 
aim, the models are used to convey the key principles of intuitive expertise that 
emerged from this research.   
This chapter begins by addressing the first aim of the models. In Section 10.1, 
the elements that comprise each model component are described. Following this, 
model components for each activity are presented for expert (Section 10.2) and non-
expert (Section 10.3) screeners. Section 10.4 addresses the second aim of the model 
by illustrating a prominent problem-solving activity sequence that is performed by 
security screeners.  
10.1 Composition of Model Components 
Model components have been developed for each of the primary activities 
performed by security screeners: search, examination, interface interaction, and 
screener interaction. The model components for each of these activities are composed 
of five different elements: Activity Representation, Knowledge Type, Knowledge 
Quality, Relationship Group Links, and Task Performance Feature (Figure 49). These 
elements are based on concepts that have been explored in this research.  
Activity Representations in the model components are comprised of the 
knowledge types that are most prominent in the performance of the activity. The 
various activity representations are based on security screeners’ primary activities: 
search, examination, interface interaction, and screener interaction. 
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Figure 49. Elements of model components 
Knowledge Type nodes represent the types of knowledge that are used for the 
performance and representation of the activity. The knowledge type nodes included 
within each model component are determined by the results presented in Sections 6.4 
and 8.3. For example, the model component for expert search activity is comprised of 
the knowledge types that were most prominent in the performance and representation 
of search activity (Sections 6.4.3 and 8.3.1).  
Knowledge Quality nodes represent the qualities of knowledge used in the 
performance and representation of the activity. Knowledge qualities included in each 
of the model components are determined by the results presented in Section 8.3. For 
example, the qualities of knowledge in the model component for expert search activity 
are based on the most influential qualities of knowledge for search activity 
representations (Chapter 8.3.1). Knowledge quality nodes are always connected to 
their parent knowledge type. For example, compiled procedural knowledge is always 
connected to procedural knowledge. 
Relationship Group links are connections that represent relationships among 
different knowledge quality nodes. The different qualities of knowledge that are linked 
in relationship groups have been determined by the results presented in Figure 36 and 
Figure 37 (Section 8.2), and in the knowledge development literature. The colours 
associated with each Relationship Group are used to differentiate between each group. 
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Relationship groups formed among Knowledge Quality nodes result in Task 
Performance Features.  
Task Performance Features (Features) are represented by nodes that result from 
connections between Knowledge Quality nodes in Relationship Groups. Features 
describe the characteristics of task performance that are the result of relationships 
among types and qualities of knowledge. Task performance features identified in the 
model components are specific to the activity. The resulting Features from relationship 
groups are based on results presented in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. For example, this 
research identified that descriptive procedural knowledge results in rule-based 
decision action during search activity. To show this relationship, the feature node for 
‘formal rules’ is connected to the knowledge quality node for ‘descriptive procedural 
knowledge’. In the following sections, much of the focus is on the connections 
between qualities of knowledge and the resulting task performance features. 
10.2 Expert Model  
In the following sub-sections, expert model components are presented for search, 
examination, interface interaction, and screener interaction activity. 
10.2.1 Expert Search Component 
The model component for experts’ search activity is comprised of procedural, 
situational, strategic, and perceptual knowledge (Figure 50). Three relationship groups 
are identified based on the relationships that form between knowledge qualities. These 
relationships result in task performance features for both the comprehension of visual 
stimuli, and the allocation of attention during the performance of search activity.  
The first relationship group is between abstract perceptual and abstract 
superficial knowledge. This relationship facilitates the development of search goals, 
and the ongoing processing of visual stimuli during search activity. For experts, the 
features of task performance used for visual information processing include an 
understanding of relationships between visual concepts and objects, abstract concept 
representation, and large pattern perception.  
 
 200 Chapter 10: Expert and Non-Expert Security Screener Models 
 
Figure 50. Expert model: search component 
The second relationship group is formed between descriptive procedural 
knowledge and superficial perceptual knowledge. The relationship between these two 
qualities of knowledge results in formal rules about the performance of search process, 
and the development of search templates based on explicit threat objects or categories. 
These features of task performance result in serial allocation of attention during search 
activity, where visual stimuli are checked against knowledge of threat categories and 
objects. 
The third relationship group demonstrates the integrated nature of expert security 
screeners’ knowledge base. This group is comprised of relationships among abstract 
perceptual, rich situational, compiled procedural, descriptive procedural, and 
structured strategic knowledge. This relationship group integrates task performance 
features for both visual information processing and attention allocation. Based on an 
abstract concept representation, security screeners develop abstract threat templates to 
determine how attention is allocated. This facilitates selective perception of task-
relevant cues, and filters out irrelevant cues. With input from structured strategic 
knowledge and rich situational knowledge, experts have metacognitive control over 
attention, ensuring contextually appropriate and adaptable interactions during search 
activity. 
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10.2.2 Expert Examination Component 
The examination model component for experts is comprised of perceptual, 
procedural, and strategic knowledge (Figure 51). Three relationship groups are formed 
between knowledge qualities. The task performance features resulting from these 
groups facilitate comprehension and identification of stimuli, and the subsequent 
selection of actions.  
 
Figure 51. Expert model: examination component 
The first relationship group is based on the relationship between abstract and 
superficial perceptual knowledge. This relationship group facilitates understanding of 
the relationships between visual concepts and objects. The predominance of abstract 
perceptual knowledge underlying expert examinations (Chapter 8) facilitates the 
representation and understanding of abstract concepts in visual stimuli. These task 
performance features assist the comprehension of problem states that are not 
represented by explicit objects. For example, abstract concept representation facilitates 
the understanding of relationships between innocuous objects that could be 
collectively used in a threatening way.  
The second relationship group is formed between superficial perceptual 
knowledge and descriptive procedural knowledge. The features of task performance 
from this relationship group facilitate the transition from comprehension to the 
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selection of action. The primary feature of this transition is conditional reasoning, 
where formal rules about actions are matched to situational conditions and specific 
visual stimuli.  
The third relationship group includes connections among abstract perceptual, 
compiled procedural, and structured strategic knowledge. Relationships among these 
qualities of knowledge result in task performance features that facilitate the selection 
of actions based on visual input. With the integration of broad qualities of knowledge, 
experts develop problem-solving schemata and heuristics that facilitate rapid pattern 
matching and efficient sequencing of actions for problem solving. Experts are able to 
construct predictive inferences that facilitate effective planning, simulation, and 
validation of actions.  
10.2.3 Expert Interface Interaction Component 
The model component for experts’ interface interactions is comprised of 
perceptual, procedural, situational, and strategic knowledge (Figure 52). Two primary 
groups emerge from the relationship among qualities of knowledge in the expert 
interface interaction model component. The features of task performance are 
predominantly related to the execution of action. However, features for the 
comprehension and evaluation of image stimuli are also present.  
 
Figure 52. Expert model: interface interaction component 
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The first relationship group is formed between abstract perceptual knowledge 
and descriptive procedural knowledge. This relationship facilitates the execution of 
actions based on conditional reasoning. During task performance, knowledge of formal 
rules about the use of interface functions is matched to the visual stimuli experienced 
during screening tasks.  
The second relationship group is comprised of abstract perceptual, analytic 
situational, compiled procedural, descriptive procedural, and structured strategic 
knowledge. Task performance features of this relationship group facilitate the 
execution of action, as well as in-line monitoring and evaluation of actions. Execution 
of action is facilitated by the spontaneous access to knowledge and problem-solving 
schemata. These features of task performance contribute to the performance of 
efficient sequences of action in familiar situations, as well as to the adaptability of 
knowledge and problem-solving schemata for use in unfamiliar situations.  
In-line evaluation of action is facilitated by access to abstract concept 
representations and the construction of predictive inferences. With these features of 
task performance, expert security screeners develop a detailed understanding of 
problem contexts and their related visual concepts. The construction of predictive 
inferences allows expert security screeners to make detailed representations and 
simulations of the current and future state of the problem situation. Actions are 
planned, tested, and validated prior to task performance. Validating actions against 
expectations during task performance allows small corrections to be made if required, 
without interrupting task performance. The qualities are representative of the 
engagement of attention-dependent automaticity (Section 9.2.1).  
10.2.4 Expert Screener Interaction Component 
The model component for expert screener interactions is comprised of 
procedural, strategic, perceptual, and situational knowledge (Figure 53). Two distinct 
groups of relationships are identified between qualities of knowledge in the model 
component. The features of task performance resulting from these relationships assist 
the execution of action, as well as the validation and modulation of these actions during 
task performance.  
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Figure 53. Expert model: screener interaction component 
The first relationship group is comprised of abstract perceptual knowledge and 
descriptive procedural knowledge. The relationship between these knowledge qualities 
assists matching relevant screener interactions to visual stimuli. Underlying this 
process is conditional reasoning, which associates formal rules relating to actions to 
knowledge about visual concepts and their relationship to threat objects.  
The second group features relationships between abstract perceptual, analytic 
situational, compiled procedural, descriptive procedural, and structured strategic 
knowledge. Relationships between these knowledge qualities result in effective 
problem-solving that is efficient in familiar situations, and adaptable in unfamiliar 
situations. The integration of task performance features for the execution of actions, 
comprehension, and evaluation facilitates these characteristics. Task performance 
features for the execution of action include spontaneous access to knowledge and 
problem-solving schemata. These features facilitate the retrieval of problem-solving 
actions that can be directly matched to specific situations experienced. Spontaneous 
access to knowledge allows problem-solving schemata to be retrieved and adapted for 
use in novel situations.  
These features are integrated with knowledge that facilitates abstract problem 
representation and the construction of predictive inferences. Expert security screeners 
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are able to recognise complex problems, and to engage in the efficient and accurate 
simulation, planning, and execution of actions. Metacognitive control over these 
processes allows expert security screeners to approach a problem from multiple 
perspectives, and to monitor action in-line with task performance. If required, small 
adjustments to task performance can be made. 
10.3 Non-Expert Model 
In the following sub-sections non-expert model components are presented for 
search, examination, interface interaction, and screener interaction activity. 
10.3.1 Non-Expert Search Component 
The search component for non-experts is comprised of procedural and perceptual 
knowledge (Figure 54). Three relationship groups are formed between the qualities of 
knowledge in the model component. The features of task performance that result from 
these relationships represent the understanding of visual concepts and the allocation of 
attention during search activity. 
 
Figure 54. Non-expert model: search component 
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The first relationship group is comprised of abstract perceptual and superficial 
perceptual knowledge. The relationship between these knowledge qualities facilitates 
the understanding of visual concepts and their relation to threat objects. Results 
reported in Chapter 8 show that non-experts rely more strongly on superficial 
perceptual knowledge than abstract perceptual knowledge. Due to the greater influence 
of superficial perceptual knowledge, non-experts demonstrate small pattern perception 
in visual stimuli. Relationships between visual concepts are identified to assist the 
perception of task-relevant cues during search.  
The second relationship group is based on the relationship between descriptive 
procedural knowledge and superficial perceptual knowledge. This relationship 
facilitates the development of search goals, and determines the corresponding 
allocation of attention. The construction of explicit search templates and formal rules 
for their application, results in exhaustive search activity in which attention is 
inefficiently allocated to visual stimuli. Locations within visual stimuli are identified 
and checked against explicit threat templates in order to rule out the presence of objects 
belonging to threat categories.  
The third relationship group describes the task performance features resulting 
from abstract perceptual knowledge and compiled procedural knowledge. The 
relationship between these qualities of knowledge facilitates the development of 
abstract search templates based on an understanding of the relationship between visual 
concepts and objects. Abstract search templates guide attention to visual concepts that 
either require further investigation, or are likely to correspond to threat objects. As 
templates are abstract, attention is influenced by exogenous factors; this results in fast 
search processes, with minimal load placed on cognitive resources.  
10.3.2 Non-Expert Examination Component 
The examination component for non-experts is comprised of perceptual 
knowledge and procedural knowledge (Figure 55). Three relationship groups are 
formed between knowledge qualities in the examination component of the non-expert 
model. Task performance features from these relationships support the comprehension 
of visual input, and the selection of relevant actions.  
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Figure 55. Non-expert model: examination component 
The first relationship group is comprised of abstract perceptual knowledge and 
superficial perceptual knowledge. The task performance features resulting from this 
relationship include the understanding of visual concepts and their relationship to 
objects present in visual stimuli. Non-experts were found to rely predominantly on 
superficial perceptual knowledge (Chapter 8). For this reason, they demonstrate 
explicit concept representation. This task performance feature facilitates 
understanding of familiar objects and their related features during examinations.  
The second relationship group identified in the model component is superficial 
perceptual knowledge and descriptive procedural knowledge. This relationship is 
characterised by conditional reasoning, which relates formal rules about actions to the 
comprehension of visual stimuli. During examinations, visual stimuli is 
comprehended, and then linked to appropriate actions.  
The third relationship group is similar in function to the second. The relationship 
between abstract perceptual knowledge and descriptive procedural knowledge 
facilitates the selection of actions based on decision making heuristics. Having 
identified a familiar visual concept or object, heuristics are used to select common and 
previously correct actions.  
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10.3.3 Non-Expert Interface Interaction Component 
The interface interaction component for non-experts is comprised of procedural 
knowledge and strategic knowledge (Figure 56). The task performance features 
resulting from this relationship group reflect a strong focus on the execution of action. 
Two relationship groups that assist the performance of interface interactions are 
identified.   
 
Figure 56. Non-expert model: interface interaction component 
The first relationship group is comprised only of descriptive procedural 
knowledge and the resulting task performance features. Descriptive procedural 
knowledge is comprised of formal rules pertaining to interface functions and their use. 
Formal rules are dependent on conditional reasoning, which determines when and how 
interface interactions are used during task performance. As descriptive procedural 
knowledge is not related to other qualities of knowledge within the model component, 
the features of task performance are reliant on input from another model component; 
for example, from the examination model component. 
The second relationship group identified is comprised of compiled procedural 
knowledge, descriptive procedural knowledge, and structured strategic knowledge. 
Task performance features resulting from this relationship group include heuristics and 
schemata for problem solving. These task performance features result in rapid 
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matching of actions to a familiar situation. Sequences of action are efficiently executed 
based on their effectiveness in previous situations with similar qualities. 
10.3.4 Non-Expert Screener Interaction Component 
The model component for non-expert screener interaction is comprised of 
procedural knowledge, strategic knowledge, and insufficient knowledge (Figure 57). 
The performance features resulting from relationships between knowledge qualities 
reflect two dichotomous states associated with screener interactions. One of these 
facilitates the performance of screening actions as a response to visual input; the other 
results from knowledge limitations that affect the performance of action.  
 
Figure 57. Non-expert model: screener interaction component 
The first relationship group is comprised of task performance features resulting 
from descriptive procedural knowledge. Descriptive procedural knowledge is 
comprised of formal rules about screener interactions and their purpose of use. This 
results in conditional reasoning, which links situations to relevant actions. As 
descriptive procedural knowledge is not linked to other knowledge qualities, the use 
of these features for task performance is reliant on input from other model components; 
for example, from the examination component that is used for comprehension and 
selection of action.   
The second relationship group is based on insufficient knowledge and its 
relationship to reflective strategic knowledge. Insufficient knowledge in the model 
component for non-expert screener interactions results in uncertainty due to inability 
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to recognise a solution to the problem context. Task performance features that are 
associated with uncertainty include decision making breakdowns and early threshold 
activation. Breakdowns caused by uncertainty are characterised by hesitation, and the 
reluctance to make decisions. In comparison, early threshold activation results in rash 
decision making and inappropriate action. This early threshold activation is observed 
as an immediate interaction with a security screener with poor articulation of the 
problem context.  
In relation to insufficient knowledge, influence from reflective strategic 
knowledge enables security screeners to identify opportunities for learning. Non-
expert security screeners engage in deliberate in-context learning in order to build 
perceptual knowledge of objects under x-ray conditions. This knowledge generally 
manifests as requests for visual inspection, with the purpose of inspecting an 
unidentifiable or unfamiliar object once it has been removed. 
10.4 Relationships between Model Components and an Adaptable Model 
The previous sections of this chapter have presented individual model 
components for the activities performed by expert and non-expert security screeners. 
Each model component illustrated the key relationships between knowledge, and how 
these relationships contribute to features of task performance.  
In addition to operating as individual components, model components can be 
arranged in sequence to represent the activity sequences performed by security 
screeners. Activity sequences have been discussed throughout this research. It was 
identified that the type and purpose of sequences formed by security screeners 
corresponds to either the search phase, or the problem-solving phase (Chapter 6). The 
nature of activity sequences formed was further investigated in Chapter 7, where it was 
identified that the type of knowledge used by security screeners has a substantial effect 
on the nature of activity sequences performed in the problem-solving context. 
In order to illustrate these activity sequences, model components are presented 
consecutively, in a three-dimensional view. An example of how model components 
are configured to represent a transition between activities is presented in Figure 58.  
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Figure 58. Relationships between model components, showing both isolated and integrated 
knowledge 
Each model component in the activity sequence is comprised of an activity 
representation, knowledge types, and relationship groups. These elements are 
consistent with model components described in Sections 10.2 and 10.3. Time is 
represented vertically in the sequential arrangement of model components. Therefore, 
the activity sequence in Figure 58 shows a transition from Activity A to Activity B. A 
major feature conveyed by the transitions between model components is the vertical 
relationships between the knowledge in consecutive model components. Relationships 
between knowledge in consecutive model components means that the knowledge is 
continuous during the transition. Continuous knowledge is shown by procedural 
knowledge that is used in both Activity A and Activity B (Figure 58). Where there is 
no relationship between knowledge in consecutive model components, the knowledge 
is isolated. Isolated knowledge is demonstrated by the perceptual knowledge that only 
occurs in Activity A (Figure 58). 
A continuous relationship between knowledge types indicates that the 
knowledge is shared between the activity representations in each model component. 
This shared representation facilitates the transition between model components. As 
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only procedural knowledge is shared between model components, the transition 
between these two activities is driven by procedural knowledge (Figure 58). This 
principle is based on Altmann and Trafton’s (2002) goal-activation model that 
suggests that task cues stored in knowledge assist the activation of task goals and the 
subsequent execution of activity. When different task goals are activated 
consecutively, a transition between activities occurs. Knowledge shared between 
model components links task cues and task goals in the respective model components. 
This results in a transition between the consecutive components.  
In addition to vertical relationships, model configurations also present the 
relationship groups within each model component (Figure 58). These relationship 
groups are consistent with the relationship groups for each model component 
illustrated in Sections 10.2 and 10.3. Presentation of relationship groups enables the 
relationships between knowledge to be seen both within model components, and 
between model components during activity sequences.  
The transitions between model components and the effect of continuous 
knowledge are explored in the following sub-section. As there are potentially 
unlimited configurations of activity transitions that can occur, a prominent activity 
sequence for the problem-solving phase is illustrated. A model configuration for the 
search phase is presented in Appendix J (p. 307-309). 
10.4.1 Component Interactions during Problem-solving  
Activity sequences that occur in the problem-solving phase are diverse and 
complex. Problem-solving activity sequences are comprised of transitions between 
examination, interface interaction, and screener interactions (Chapter 6). The 
configuration and length of these sequences can vary substantially, depending on the 
problem context and goal of the security screener. While there are too many possible 
configurations to be able to represent them all in this chapter, a common activity 
sequence is used to demonstrate the interactions performed during problem solving.  
This section focuses on the transitions between examinations and interface 
interactions due to their prominence during problem-solving interactions. For both 
expert and non-expert security screeners, a problem-solving sequence characterised by 
the use of two complementary interface interactions is presented. 
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An activity sequence comprised of examination and interface interaction model 
components for expert security screeners is presented in Figure 59. The transition 
between activities is highlighted by perceptual, procedural, and strategic knowledge 
that is continuous between consecutive model components. Situational knowledge is 
continuous between consecutive interface interaction components.  
In the examination component, perceptual knowledge facilitates comprehension 
of visual input. Perceptual knowledge is linked to procedural and strategic knowledge 
for the selection of action, and subsequent transition to the interface interaction model 
component. Continuous perceptual, procedural, and strategic knowledge between 
these two components results in a highly efficient transition, integrating knowledge 
for both perception and action. 
Procedural and strategic knowledge in the interface interaction component 
facilitates planning and execution of action. The continuity of perceptual knowledge 
between examination and interface interaction assists in evaluating this action. Along 
with situational knowledge, perceptual knowledge facilitates the development of 
predictive inferences and expectations about the result of actions. These expectations 
are used to evaluate the effectiveness of interface interactions. Because validation and 
execution of interface interactions occurs simultaneously, an additional step of 
examination is not required to evaluate the effectiveness of the interface interaction. 
Simultaneous execution and validation of interface interactions allows an immediate 
transition to the second interface interaction if expectations are met. This is shown by 
the sequential arrangement of two interface interaction model components. 
Continuous situational knowledge between consecutive interface interaction 
components contributes a detailed understanding of typicality in a task domain. This 
helps the security screener to identify when and if expectations are violated. If 
expectations are not met, actions can be modified.  
The simultaneous execution and evaluation of action relates to the integrative 
view of perception and action. This view is based on the notion that perception and 
action share the same representational system. At this higher level of cognitive control, 
understanding of perception and action are integrated to form motor imagery. This 
facilitates the simulation of action, and a strong relationship between motor skill and 
an understanding of causality (Creem-Regehr & Kunz, 2010). Similar ideas have also 
been described in Altmann and Trafton’s (2002) goal activation model that suggests 
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that perceptual task cues stored in long term mental representations, such as procedural 
knowledge, assist the associative priming and activation of contrasting goals in an 
activity sequence. This assists in reducing interference between competing activities 
and facilitates efficient activity sequences. 
 
Figure 59. Relationships between examination and interface interaction components for expert 
security screeners 
In contrast to experts, the transition between examination and interface 
interaction model components for non-experts is characterised by limited knowledge 
continuity. Knowledge that is continuous between examination and interface 
interaction model components is comprised of procedural knowledge only. Both 
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strategic and perceptual knowledge are isolated within their respective model 
components (Figure 60).  
 
Figure 60. Relationship between examination and interface interaction components for non-
expert security screeners 
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In the first examination component (Figure 60), perceptual knowledge facilitates 
comprehension of stimuli, and is linked to the relevant procedural knowledge for the 
selection of action. The continuity of procedural knowledge in consecutive model 
components facilitates the transition from examination to interface interactions. In 
terms of task performance features, this results in a transition from selection of action 
to the execution of action. Execution of action is influenced by procedural knowledge 
and strategic knowledge.  
The absence of continuous perceptual knowledge in the transition between 
examination and interface interaction illustrates a shift in attention. The focus of 
interactions shifts from perception of the situation to the performance of an interface 
interaction. Without influence from perceptual knowledge in the interface interaction 
component, the execution of interface interactions is not immediately linked to 
expectations and evaluation, but needs to be performed as a separate step. In Figure 
60, this extra step is shown by the examination model component interleaved between 
the two interface interaction model components. Following the execution of interface 
interaction activity, examinations are performed in order to comprehend and evaluate 
the outcome of the interface interaction. This evaluation is then linked to procedural 
knowledge for the selection of the subsequent activity. As a result of continuous 
procedural knowledge, a transition to the second interface interaction component for 
the execution of action is facilitated. 
Isolated knowledge results in the interleaving of examinations during the 
performance of interface interaction sequences. Without the integration of perception 
and action, actions are coded in response to goals and perception. The performance of 
actions affects the environment, and influences sensory and motor feedback (Creem-
Regehr & Kunz, 2010). Attention is repeatedly shifted back to visual interactions to 
generate new knowledge about the problem situation in order to facilitate problem 
reconstruction and the generation of subsequent action. Cognitive effort is offloaded 
onto the environment, resulting in external look-up of information in order to plan 
actions in-situ. This process is slow, but is used to reduce the load on the cognition 
associated with planning action (Payne, et al., 2001). 
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10.5 Value and Implications of the Models 
The models presented in this chapter are built on a theoretical foundation that is 
influenced by a number of prominent information processing models and theories. 
Information processing models that describe interactions between perception and 
action have a particular influence. These include Norman’s (1988) seven stages of 
action, Anderson’s (1982, 1996) adaptive character thought theory (ACT-R), and the 
functional view of problem solving by Newell and Simon (1972). Some aspects of 
these models and theories have been discussed previously in this research (Sections 
3.4.1, 3.4.2, and 9.1.2). In this section, the existing models and theories are discussed 
directly in relation to the models developed in this research. This is done in order to 
demonstrate the consistencies between the models developed in this research and 
prominent information processing theories. This section concludes by highlighting the 
novelty and significance of the present models in the security screening context and 
other uncertain contexts. 
At a high level of abstraction, the models developed in this research describe the 
overall activity sequences performed by security screeners. This is achieved through 
adaptable configurations of model components (Section 10.4.1). Configurations of 
model components also illustrate the knowledge and relationships between knowledge 
underlying the various activity sequences. At this level, the models are consistent with 
Norman’s (1988) action cycle and the seven stages of action. According to Norman 
(1988, 1992), human action is comprised of two aspects: execution and evaluation. 
Execution involves the performance of action, and evaluation involves assessment of 
the result of action and perception of the state of the world. Within these two aspects, 
Norman (1988) outlines seven stages of action. Within the execution aspect, a person 
first develops a goal to be achieved. The goal is then expressed as an intention, and is 
translated to an action sequence that can be executed. At the point of execution, the 
actions become an external event. The evaluation aspect begins with the perception of 
an event or situation. What is perceived is then interpreted in accordance with 
expectations about the state of the world or the outcome of actions. The events or 
situations are then evaluated with respect to the intentions and goals of the person 
(Norman, 1988).   
Norman’s (1988) seven stages of action provide an approximation of the 
processes of action, which are applicable in a wide range of domains. Interaction 
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sequences illustrated by model configurations (Section 10.4.1) are generally consistent 
with the various stages of evaluation and action. For instance, relationships between 
perceptual and procedural knowledge within the examination component (Figure 59) 
are typical of perception, interpretation, and evaluation. At this stage, a goal is 
formulated, and this leads to an intention and the selection of the action. The transition 
to the interface interaction component (Figure 59) represents the point of execution. 
At this level of abstraction, the models are useful for providing some overall 
characteristics of action and what is involved in that action. However, interactions 
performed in an environment are inherently more complex than Norman’s seven stages 
of action suggests. Depending on the situation or a person’s experience, there will be 
some level of variation in the actions that people perform. Activities are often 
performed in complex sequences that involve a variety of goals and sub-goals that are 
engaged, forgotten, and discarded (Norman, 1988).  
To reflect the inherent complexity of human action, the models developed from 
this research convey the role of knowledge in relation to the interactions performed by 
security screeners. A key influence is the functional view of problem-solving outlined 
by Newell and Simon (Newell & Simon, 1972). According to Newell and Simon, the 
environment and a person’s goals play a substantial role in shaping knowledge, its 
retrieval, and its use. In a problem-solving situation, “a task statement enters via a 
perceptual component and is encoded in an initial representation” (Newell, 1982, p. 
88). This representation is the structure that holds the body of knowledge together, and 
makes the solution to the problem available. Encoding of the task statement starts a 
cycle of activity that involves recognition of the knowledge required, and the method 
suitable for solving the problem. The knowledge retrieved is responsive to the goals 
of the person and the problem-solving environment. If a person has knowledge that 
one of their actions will lead to one of their goals, then that action will be selected 
(Newell, 1982).  
In the models presented in this research, similar overall concepts of knowledge 
and action are expressed. However, where Newell and Simon (1972) describe the 
interaction of higher level cognitive concepts, the models from this research describe 
more specific interactions between knowledge and action. In each of the model 
components (Sections 10.2 and 10.3), as well as in the model configurations (Section 
10.4), relationships between specific types of knowledge utilised for comprehension 
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(perceptual and situational), and knowledge types used for the performance of action 
(procedural and strategic), are represented. 
Anderson’s (1982, 1996) adaptive character thought theory (ACT-R) offers a 
more specific representation of relationships between knowledge types. ACT-R 
presents a system for modelling higher order cognitive processes that relate to attention 
and action (Anderson, Matessa, & Lebiere, 1997), and is based on the interactions 
between declarative and procedural knowledge. The interactions between these 
knowledge types are described in relation to two stages: knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge deployment (Anderson, 1996; Anderson, et al., 1997). During knowledge 
acquisition, declarative knowledge becomes available through processes that involve 
access to perceptual knowledge. The perceptual system parses visual input into 
features that are combined into recognised objects. Processed visual input is then 
available as declarative knowledge, which is comprised of factual information that a 
person knows. Procedural knowledge specifies how the declarative knowledge is 
deployed for the purpose of solving problems (Anderson, et al., 1997). This is 
represented as production rules that link units of declarative and procedural knowledge 
in order to take some form of action, or to direct attention (Anderson, 1996; Anderson, 
et al., 1997).  
The models developed in this research convey relationships between knowledge 
types that are similar to those expressed in Anderson’s (Anderson, 1996) ACT-R 
theory. Both models describe the use of perceptual knowledge to process and make 
sense of input, and the use of procedural knowledge to facilitate the execution of 
action. Although this is a gross oversimplification of the ACT-R theory, it is 
nevertheless effective for defining the models’ common elements.  
The parallels that can be drawn between the models developed in this research 
and the ACT-R theory are similar to the parallels that can be drawn with Norman’s 
(1988) seven stages of action, and Newell and Simon’s (1972) functional view of 
problem solving.  Parallels are based on the strong consistencies between the higher 
level concepts being described, and the higher level functioning of the models. These 
consistencies have been intentionally illustrated for the purpose of validating the 
overall concepts expressed in the models developed in this research. According to 
Cowan (1988), although a model is not expected to exhaustively cover all faculties of 
cognition, it should be inclusive and represent processing capabilities. The conceptual 
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models developed in this research integrate key concepts described in well-established 
models and theories of information processing. The discussion of models in this 
section demonstrated their level of success. As well as exhibiting consistencies with 
established models, the conceptual models developed in this research also exhibit 
significant novelty. This novelty is predominantly seen in the varying levels of 
abstraction conveyed. The models demonstrate both high and low level concepts to 
provide a detailed representation of action, and the knowledge underlying actions.  
At a low level of abstraction, individual model components (Sections 10.2 and 
10.3) indicate the knowledge comprised within activity representations. This includes 
both knowledge type and the associated qualities of knowledge. Relationships between 
knowledge qualities are illustrated and associated with varying features of task 
performance specific to each activity. When configured in activity sequences (Section 
10.4), the low level descriptions of individual model components are contextualised as 
higher level descriptions of activity. Because the activity sequences are driven by 
underlying relationships between knowledge, nuances of interactions are able to be 
visualised for experts and non-experts (Section 10.4.1).  
In the security screening context, these model characteristics provide a novel and 
significant outcome. They offer considerable new knowledge in a research domain that 
has predominantly focused on visual knowledge and visual interactions. Advancing 
previous understanding, the models represent the integration of several key elements 
in the security screening context, including the full range of activities performed by 
security screeners, the sequences in which they are performed, and the relationships 
between knowledge underlying the performance of activities.  
Due to the transferability of the models, their significance extends to other 
uncertain domains. This transferability is facilitated in two ways. First, the models are 
comprised of universal concepts and features. Each model component, while 
representing the interactions performed by security screeners, is also descriptive of 
general interactions that are performed in a range of domains. For instance, search, 
examinations, interface interactions, and interactions with other people are common 
types of interactions. Similarly, the knowledge types, and the qualities underlying 
these interactions, are based on universal concepts of knowledge. This includes 
knowledge for understanding situations, performing actions, and solving problems. 
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Each knowledge type and quality identified in the models can be applied in a broad 
range of activities.  
Second, the models are consistent with prominent theories of information 
processing and action. Because of this consistency, they can be transferred to a variety 
of activities that involve human action. This transferability could have significant 
implications for research investigating intuitive expertise in domains where direct 
observation of activity is difficult, such as exceptional circumstances and safety-
critical domains. In these domains, the models could provide a lens with which to view 
and analyse retrospective accounts of interactions. Interactions and knowledge 
demonstrated could be mapped in order to identify areas that require attention and 
could benefit from improvement. This could facilitate deeper understanding in these 
domains, as well as provide useful information to support human decision making. 
The composition of concepts and features in the models enables them to 
represent a knowledge structure. The models convey identifiers and the scale of 
knowledge, as well as the relationships between knowledge and the activity context in 
which the knowledge is used (Gordon, 2000). Identifiers of knowledge are conveyed 
by the knowledge types contained in the individual model components. Identifiers of 
knowledge can be used to index actual knowledge, but do not specify the exact 
knowledge (Gordon, 2000). The qualities of knowledge provide an indicator of the 
scale of that knowledge. Relationships between knowledge qualities are represented 
as relationship groups, and the resulting features of task performance.  
As a structure of knowledge, the models can have significant impact on learning 
and training processes. Visualised indicators of knowledge can be used in training 
programs to help improve knowledge development and task efficiency. Knowledge 
limitations can be easily identified by viewing the models and comparing expert and 
non-expert models. By identifying knowledge limitations, the models can be used to 
identify specific areas that could benefit from additional training or an alternate 
training focus. Training outcomes might also address relationships between types of 
knowledge. It is possible to identify important relationships between knowledge types, 
and to engage training that facilitates the strengthening of these relationships. For 
example, strengthening the relationship between perceptual and procedural knowledge 
to improve problem solving using interface interactions. 
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The structure and relationships between knowledge types conveyed in the 
models can provide useful cues to aid the design of interfaces and systems. Model 
configurations can be used to identify activity transitions that could be better facilitated 
by improvements in interface and system design. An example of this can be taken from 
the comparison of Figure 59 and Figure 60 (Section 10.4.1). For experts, it is 
demonstrated that continuous perceptual and situational knowledge facilitates efficient 
sequencing of interface interactions. On the other hand, non-experts, lacking 
continuous perceptual knowledge, demonstrate task switching and less efficient 
interactions. The design of interfaces and systems that provide cues to encourage 
continuous knowledge could help improve the interactions performed by less 
experienced security screeners. This use case could also extend to the development of 
artificial intelligence systems and attention-aware interfaces that assist human decision 
making.  
The use of models for these applications is supported by the consistency of 
concepts conveyed in the model, and the functional components of an intelligent 
system. Although the models do not provide specific knowledge content, they do 
convey the relationships between knowledge and activity that are required for the 
functioning of perceptual, memory, processing, and motor systems. The knowledge 
structures contained in the models can be used as a framework to inform the 
requirements of a system, and the inclusion of appropriate knowledge during different 
stages of activity.  
10.6 Summary 
The models illustrating expert and non-expert interactions presented in this 
chapter were developed from the results discussed in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. These 
models account for the major similarities and differences between expert and non-
expert security screeners that were found in this research. The aim of each model 
component is to represent the type and quality of knowledge underlying the 
performance of screening activities. Model components represent the relationships 
between these types and qualities of knowledge, and illustrate the resulting features of 
task performance. When placed in sequences, model components can represent the 
activity sequences performed by security screeners, and the relationships between 
knowledge that is utilised in each sequence. 
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A key finding that has emerged from the conceptual performance models is the 
differences in knowledge continuity demonstrated by expert and non-expert security 
screeners. Continuity of knowledge is attributed to the performance of efficient and 
intuitive activity sequences. Continuous knowledge assists in efficient transitions 
between activities. The expert conceptual model shows a strong continuity of 
knowledge through the formation of problem-solving sequences comprised of 
examinations and interface interactions. This formation reflects the planning and 
execution of efficient and adaptable problem-solving that is typical of experts. In 
comparison, the non-expert conceptual model shows limited knowledge continuity in 
the formation of problem-solving sequences. The limited representation of perceptual 
knowledge in the interface interaction model component exemplifies the rule-based 
and deliberative nature of non-expert problem-solving activity. 
The final section of this chapter discussed several influential theories of human 
information processing and action. It demonstrated that the conceptual models 
developed from this research are consistent with the higher level concepts conveyed 
by prominent information processing theories. Some potential applications for the 
models were discussed, including training, interface design, and artificial intelligence 
systems. 
 The following chapter concludes this research report with an overview of the 
research contributions and outcomes. Research limitations and an overview of 
potential and planned future research are also presented. 
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Chapter 11:  Conclusions 
Experts perform effectively, and are able to circumvent many of the difficulties 
faced in dynamic and uncertain task domains (Salas, et al., 2009; Salthouse, 1991). A 
key aspect of experts’ skilled performance is access to extensive domain-specific 
experience, which facilitates intuitive decision making and interactions. Intuitions 
accessed by experts facilitate the immediate comprehension of patterns that occur in 
the environment. Knowledge is adapted to the specific needs of the context, and this 
enables task-relevant cues to be effortlessly matched to concepts stored in memory 
(Goldstone, 1998; Salas, et al., 2009).  
This type of skilled performance is particularly useful in complex task domains 
due to the low demand placed on cognitive resources. Expert intuitions also permit 
highly adaptable and reasoned problem solving in the form of metacognition. With 
this higher level of control over cognitive processes, experts are able to reflect and 
improve upon intuitions in order to protect against error and adapt to the changing 
problem context (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Klein & 
Hoffman, 1992).  
Inspired by the immense potential of expertise and intuitive decision making, 
this research investigated intuitive expertise and its role in the airport security 
screening context. Understanding and facilitating the development of intuitive 
expertise is particularly compelling in this context due to the inherent complexity of 
the task. Security screeners are subject to difficult image conditions, where they are 
required to detect threat objects from broad and indeterminate categories. Search for 
these items must be performed simultaneously, and under time pressure (McCarley, et 
al., 2004; Michel & Schwaninger, 2009; Schwaninger, 2004; Von Bastion, et al., 2008; 
Yi, et al., 2008). Moreover, decisions must be made with a level of certainty, under the 
pressure of knowing that a mistake in judgement has the potential to be catastrophic 
(Salter, 2007).  
A review of the airport security screening literature reveals a research focus on 
some aspects of expertise only. In previous research, task performance was measured 
in simulated screening tasks, and determined by the effectiveness and efficiency of 
threat detection (e.g. Ghylin, et al., 2008; Klock, 2005; Liu, et al., 2007; McCarley, et 
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al., 2004; Michel, et al., 2006; Schwaninger, 2004). While the importance of detecting 
threats is not doubted, much of this past research did not accurately represent the 
complexity faced by security screeners.  
Simulated screening tasks only represent some of the activities performed by 
security, and place a strong emphasis on visual knowledge; the activities analysed are 
removed from context and lack the variety of decision options and interactions 
available to security screeners. This is problematic as it can marginalise many 
important interactions and the associated knowledge that is essential for task 
performance under normal task conditions. Understanding the mechanisms underlying 
security screeners’ task performance can help reduce the complexities they face, and 
support the development of skilled performance. This, in turn, has the potential to have 
broad-reaching positive implications for similar contexts characterised by complexity 
and uncertainty.  
Responding to the gap in the literature, this research investigated the question: 
How does intuitive expertise facilitate technology-mediated visual tasks in uncertain 
contexts? Three objectives that focused on understanding the knowledge and 
processing styles utilised by security screeners were outlined. A methodology that 
enabled accurate elicitation of their knowledge and processing styles in the field under 
normal task conditions was developed. This method comprised field observations and 
semi-structured interviews. During field observations, eye-tracking technology and 
concurrent verbal protocols were used to elicit and analyse the types of knowledge and 
processing styles underlying expert and non-expert security screener interactions. 
Following the field observations, semi-structured interviews were conducted to clarify 
aspects of process, and to elicit further detail about the quality and structure of security 
screener knowledge. 
The coding of data from these two stages of data collection facilitated the use of 
a number of different analysis methods and tools. The first stage of analysis focused 
on identifying and comparing the types of knowledge and processing styles used by 
security screeners (Chapter 6). This stage enabled a detailed understanding of the 
knowledge composition and processing styles utilised in each screening activity.  
Key differences in the knowledge used by experts and non-experts were further 
explored in Chapter 7. Lag sequential analyses were used to illustrate how the different 
knowledge types accessed by experts and non-experts affect the activity sequences 
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formed during task performance. The final data analysis stage investigated the 
relationships between the quality of the knowledge accessed by security screeners and 
the resulting activity representations formed (Chapter 8). Findings illustrated the 
varying structure of knowledge accessed by each experience group, and enabled 
inferences to be made about knowledge development and its effect on task 
performance.  
This research pioneers the study of intuitive expertise in the airport security 
screening domain, and advances the understanding of intuitive expertise in uncertain 
tasks. These contributions and outcomes are significant not only to the airport security 
screening domain, but also more generally to the study of intuitive expertise. In the 
first section of this chapter, an overview of the significant contributions and outcomes 
of this research is presented. The chapter concludes by outlining the limitations of the 
research, and providing an overview of potential future research directions. 
11.1 Contributions to Knowledge 
This research has provided a number of significant contributions to knowledge. 
New knowledge and insights that contribute directly to the airport security screening 
context have been generated. By association, this knowledge and these insights also 
make a significant contribution to the broader study of expertise and the understanding 
of intuitive expertise in uncertain domains. Four original contributions to knowledge 
are outlined in this section: (i) a methodology for investigating intuitive expertise in 
uncertain contexts; (ii) advanced understanding of airport security screening; (iii) 
implications and recommendations for design; and (iv) the role of intuitive expertise 
in uncertain contexts. 
i. Methodology for Investigating Intuitive Expertise in Uncertain Contexts 
This research has contributed a robust research approach suitable for the study 
of intuitive expertise in uncertain contexts. The multi-method approach, consisting of 
portable eye tracking, concurrent verbal protocols, and retrospective interviews has 
proven to be highly successful in capturing the complexity of human action and 
decision making. The unobtrusive nature of the Tobii eye-tracking glasses facilitated 
their seamless integration into current airport security operations, causing minimal 
interference to the cognitive processes of security screeners. This ensured that the 
knowledge and processing styles elicited during observations were analogous to the 
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knowledge and processing styles utilised for task performance in the field. Performing 
this research in the field ensured that the full range of security screener activity was 
represented in the results. Furthermore, the deployment of field research methods 
marks a significant divergence from the practice of using simulated screening tasks 
that has been the pervasive approach in previous airport security screening research.  
The two coding schemes developed in this research enabled details of the 
activities performed by security screeners to be recorded, while also identifying the 
knowledge and processing styles underlying task performance. The coding of raw data 
facilitated the use of a number of analysis methods. These, in turn, allowed for analysis 
of the knowledge and processing styles utilised, the activity sequences associated with 
particular knowledge types, and the relationships between quality of knowledge and 
activity representations. These analyses enabled a multifaceted understanding of 
intuitive expertise in the uncertain task of airport security screening. Due to their 
effectiveness in the security screening context, it is expected that the methods used in 
this research can be transferred to other complex activity domains for the investigation 
of intuitive expertise. 
ii. Advanced Understanding of Airport Security Screening 
Investigating the full range of activities performed by security screeners, and 
analysing the knowledge and processing styles underlying task performance, has 
progressed knowledge in the security screening context. From the analysis of data, 
four primary screening activities were identified: search, examination, interface 
interaction, and screener interactions.  
These activities were found to be performed in two distinct activity phases. The 
first of these is the search phase, comprised predominantly of continuous search 
activity, with examinations occasionally performed. The second phase is the problem-
solving phase, comprised of transitions between examinations, interface interactions, 
and screener interactions. Interface interactions and screener interactions performed 
during problem-solving phases were found to be essential for overcoming problems 
caused by difficult image conditions, and for supporting security screeners’ visual 
processes. Moreover, the greatest differences between expert and non-expert security 
screeners were found in the knowledge underlying the performance of activities during 
the problem-solving phase (Chapters 6 and 7).  
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Identifying the importance of knowledge utilised during problem-solving phases 
is significant, as previous research focused predominantly on the activities performed 
during the search phase. To date, the little research that has investigated activity in 
problem-solving phases has done so under simulated conditions only. Under these 
conditions, much of the complexity and range of actions available to security screeners 
is not represented. In particular, the interactions performed during screener interactions 
do not appear to have been investigated in any previous studies.  
iii. Implications and Recommendations for Design 
The findings of this research have implications for design in three areas: visual 
attention, skill development, and future screening processes and technology. While 
implications are directly relevant to the airport security screening context, they are also 
applicable to complex tasks that are mediated by technology. To address these 
implications, a number of recommendations are made.  
First, it is critical to support and prioritise visual interactions performed during 
complex visual tasks. In technology-mediated tasks such as security screening, 
attentional shifts between visual and physical interactions have the potential to distract 
from critical visual interactions. This can result in reduced efficiency and errors in 
judgement. The design of physical and visual interactions that focus on simplicity will 
help lessen the load on cognitive resources and facilitate more efficient and effective 
interactions.  
Second, it is desirable to improve skill development in complex visual tasks, and 
to facilitate the transition from non-expert to expert. Development of skill is 
particularly important in critical tasks, such as security screening, where errors in 
judgement have potentially disastrous outcomes. Through improving human factors, 
it is possible to encourage experience-based learning and the development of problem-
solving schemata. The use of attention-aware interfaces is presented as a possible 
method to encourage this development.  
Third, with the ongoing development of new technology and new screening 
processes, it is important to consider the changing role of the security screener. 
Automated features and remote screening locations have been identified as having 
considerable implications for how tasks are performed, and for the development of 
intuitive expertise. It is important that technology and process changes are considerate 
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of traditional methods of skill development, while also facilitating the new 
opportunities afforded by technology advancements. 
These recommendations are significant as they approach the research 
implications from multiple perspectives. They are responsive to both the requirements 
of inexperienced and experienced individuals. They support the available knowledge 
and processes, while also encouraging the development of new knowledge; this is 
imperative for facilitating effective interactions. As well as providing significant 
benefit to the security screening domain, it is envisaged that these recommendations 
can be applied to other complex and uncertain task domains. Finally, recommendations 
are particularly relevant to visual tasks that use interactive technology to assist visual 
interactions; for example, medical imaging and air traffic control.  
iv. The Role of Intuitive Expertise in Uncertain Contexts 
The primary contribution to knowledge of this research is a new understanding 
of the role of intuitive expertise in airport security screening. The research has 
pioneered the study of intuitive expertise in this context, and has thus strengthened the 
theory of intuitive expertise in uncertain contexts. Results show that experience has a 
strong effect on security screeners’ intuitiveness. However, despite overall 
improvements in intuitiveness, the research identified that the majority of knowledge 
types underlying the performance of screening activities did not differ between experts 
and non-experts. The most notable differences identified were experts’ access to 
situational and strategic knowledge during interface interactions and screener 
interactions. It is in these problem-solving activities, and in the development of 
strategic and situational knowledge, that the role of intuitive expertise is situated.  
Situational and strategic knowledge have been linked to an integrated knowledge 
base, and share a strong relationship with the development of superior quality 
procedural knowledge. With access to this knowledge, experts clearly articulate 
problem states, and demonstrate higher order cognitive control over problem-solving 
interactions. The integration of knowledge has been shown to result in continuous 
knowledge during interaction sequences (Chapter 10). Continuous knowledge results 
in strong links between perception and action; this, in turn, results in efficient and 
adaptable problem-solving sequences.  
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These findings provide new understanding of the knowledge underlying the 
interactions performed in the security screening context. Understanding the cognitive 
processes underlying task performance has the potential to support and improve the 
interactions performed in these domains. This can be achieved by applying new 
knowledge in the design of optimal procedures, decision support systems, and training 
programs. Such outcomes are highly desirable in complex and uncertain tasks, where 
poor decision making can have wide-ranging and potentially severe consequences. 
11.2 Research Outcome 
Findings from this research have been consolidated in the development of 
conceptual models that illustrate expert and non-expert interactions in complex visual 
tasks (Chapter 10). The arrangement of the models and their components graphically 
illustrates two important aspects of the interactions performed by expert and non-
expert security screeners. First, individual model components represent the types and 
qualities of knowledge accessed during physical and visual interactions. Relationships 
between the different qualities of knowledge illustrate key features of the interactions 
performed by experts and non-experts. Model components allow a number of concepts 
discussed in this research to be presented concurrently, while also facilitating the 
comparison of non-experts and experts.  
Second, model components can be configured to represent the transitions 
between activities and the relationships between knowledge during transitions. This is 
a significant outcome as it not only conceptualises the performance of sequential 
activities, but also illustrates the effect that knowledge has on sequential interactions. 
In Section 10.4, model components have been configured to express key findings and 
concepts that emerged from Chapters 6, 7, and 8. In particular, the model configuration 
in Figure 59 illustrates the integration of knowledge that is typical of extensive 
domain-specific knowledge and experience. When viewed within sequential activities, 
the highly integrated knowledge of experts has been expressed as the continuity of 
knowledge that links consecutive interactions.  
The models represent security screeners’ knowledge structure and show how it 
relates to the full range of interactions performed. This capability provides a significant 
outcome in the security screening context, where research has typically focused on 
visual interactions. Models can be applied in the airport security screening domain for 
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the purpose of training and design. Knowledge that requires attention can be easily 
identified by comparing expert and non-expert models. This comparison can assist the 
design of specific training programs to facilitate transition from non-expert to expert. 
As well as training applications, identification of knowledge limitations and key 
relationships between knowledge can offer cues for improvements to interface design.  
The applicability of the models is not limited to the airport security screening 
context. Because the model is comprised of activities and knowledge that are 
generalisable across different domains, its components can be easily transferred and 
used in other domains. This transfer capability provides a significant contribution in 
uncertain domains. Models can be used to analyse retrospective accounts of task 
performance in critical task situations where task performance might be difficult to 
observe (e.g., in military and emergency response contexts). The consistency between 
the developed models and key theories of information processing also makes them 
highly suitable for application in the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics.  
11.3 Research Limitations 
The first limitation of this research is that data collection was restricted to one 
airport. It is possible that broadening data collection to other Australian airports could 
have increased the scope of the research findings. However, it is unlikely that input 
from other airports would have significantly altered the substantive outcomes of the 
research. All Australian airports are subject to the requirements of passenger screening 
outlined in the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Australian Government, 2004). 
They are also subject to the targets and measures of screening processes outlined in 
the Review of Aviation Security Screening (Australian Government, 2009a). Although 
the technology used and the environments in which security screening is performed 
differ between airports, the policies that govern security screening processes are 
consistent. The airport where this research was conducted contracts security screening 
services from a provider that is used in a number of other airports in Australia and 
overseas. Personnel within these organisations are likely to be subject to similar 
working conditions and receive a consistent level of training.  
The second limitation of this study is the subjectivity associated with coding 
qualitative data. It is possible that the coding of concepts in the data could be 
influenced by researcher bias. In order to reduce this effect, three actions were 
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performed. First, a detailed set of coding heuristics were developed for both 
observation (Appendix D, pp. 269-277) and interview (Appendix E, pp. 278-280) 
coding schemes. Second, triangulated methods were used to reduce the biases 
associated with each method (Section 4.3). Third, 20% of coding was cross-coded 
using a ‘blind’ researcher resulting in an inter-rater reliability value of Kappa = 0.69 
(p<0.01) (Section 5.3.4).  
The third limitation of this study was the participants’ awareness of being 
observed. It is possible that security screeners’ natural behaviours might have been 
compromised due to the knowledge that they were being scrutinised. In order to 
mitigate this possibility, it was made clear to each participant that their involvement 
was anonymous, that all data were confidential, and that access to data was restricted 
to researchers only. Some participants noted that they experienced eye strain while 
wearing the eye-tracking glasses. These complaints were typically associated with 
observation sessions lasting 20 minutes. To address this, observations were planned as 
three x 10 minute sessions to achieve a 30-minute duration. In some cases, this was 
not possible due to staffing restrictions or particularly busy periods. In these cases, the 
eye-tracking glasses were removed during the observation if any discomfort was 
experienced. 
The fourth limitation of this study was participant recruitment restrictions. 
Participants were limited to current employees working at the international departures’ 
security checkpoint. From this available participant pool, there was a greater 
percentage of male than female employees. It is policy for a female security screener 
to be free at all times within the screening lane in order to conduct hand searches of 
female passengers when required. This is so that ‘pat down’ searches are performed 
by a member of the corresponding gender. For this reason, it was often difficult to 
coordinate female participants, as they were required to be flexible between roles. 
Adding to these difficulties, many of the female security screeners within the 
participant pool required the use of spectacles to perform screening tasks. These 
participants could not be selected, as spectacles could interfere with the accuracy of 
the eye-tracking glasses. 
The fifth limitation of this study arose from the field study approach used to 
observe security screeners’ visual and physical interactions. While the benefits of this 
approach are numerous, it also has a number of drawbacks. The most notable of these 
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is the variability of the stimuli experienced by security screeners. As experiments were 
conducted under normal task conditions using actual passengers’ luggage as stimuli, 
it was not possible for each participant to receive the same stimuli during observations. 
To mitigate the variability associated with the field study approach, strict procedures 
were put in place. All observations were conducted between 8am and 12pm on 
weekdays. This choice of time was based on the knowledge that similar flight and 
staffing schedules were in operation during these periods. Observations were 
conducted within standard staff rotations to ensure adequate rest periods, and to reduce 
fatigue and eye strain. It is believed that the positives of the approach used outweighed 
the negatives. Screening officers were encouraged to perform their natural processes, 
and were not influenced by any instructions. This was instrumental in the accurate 
elicitation of the knowledge and processes underlying task performance. 
11.4 Future Research 
Within the airport security screening domain, a number of compelling areas of 
research are identified. To broaden the scope of the research, future research could 
investigate the role of intuitive expertise in other activities performed within the airport 
security context, and in a greater number of airports. Activities to investigate could 
include walkthrough metal detection, full body scanning, explosives trace detection, 
and manual searches of passengers’ belongings. Research could consider each 
individual activity, as well as the relationships between activities and the impact they 
have on the overall security screening process.  
The methods used in this research can also be applied to investigate the transfer 
of skill to future security screening processes. For example, using IATA and ACI’s 
Smart Security, security screener interactions could be investigated during the 
performance of remotely checked luggage screening. A comparison of the findings of 
each security screening process could prove useful in evaluating and improving future 
developments in the airport security screening domain. 
In the current study, a relative approach to investigating expertise was utilised to 
directly compare expert and non-expert performance. Future research could facilitate 
further understanding of intuitive expertise in the airport security screening context by 
utilising longitudinal studies. These studies could aim to develop understanding of 
knowledge acquisition in the security screening context. In the current study, inquiry 
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focused predominantly on the knowledge that is used by security screeners. Supporting 
these findings with an understanding of knowledge acquisition would be highly 
complementary. It would be beneficial in developing new training methods and 
programs to assist expertise development in uncertain activity contexts. Longitudinal 
studies could also facilitate understanding of other aspects of expertise development. 
For instance, the impact of expert attrition in the airport security screening context 
could be investigated.  
The methods used in this research could be applied to investigate intuitive 
expertise in other uncertain task domains beyond the airport security screening context. 
A desirable outcome of future research would be the development of a general model 
of intuitive expertise that can be applied universally in uncertain contexts. It is 
envisaged that generalisable features of the model could assist the design of products 
and systems used in complex and dynamic task domains. This has potentially wide-
ranging implications for product development and evaluation in these domains.  
11.5 Conclusion 
This research investigated the role of intuitive expertise in the uncertain context 
of airport security screening. The novel approach utilised facilitated the accurate 
elicitation of the knowledge and processing styles that are used for the performance of 
screening activities under real circumstances. New knowledge resulting from the 
research provides a significant contribution to the domain of airport security screening. 
Of particular importance was the investigation of the full range of activities performed 
during screening tasks, and the knowledge underlying the performance of these 
activities. Comparing results for expert and non-expert security screeners allowed 
inferences to be made about the role and development of knowledge in complex 
activity domains. This includes the notable role of intuitive expertise, and the 
associated importance of strategic and situational knowledge for problem solving.  
Research findings have culminated in the development of conceptual models for 
expert and non-expert interactions and activity sequences. These models provide a 
detailed representation of the knowledge and processes underlying the interactions 
performed by security screeners. Because the models are comprised of generalisable 
activities and knowledge, they are transferrable to other uncertain domains. Illustration 
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of the relationships among knowledge and the relationships between activities 
facilitates a deep understanding of skilled performance in these domains.  
The new knowledge generated by this research has implications for the security 
screening task and a broad range of complex visual tasks. In particular, 
recommendations from this research are directed at informing the design of interfaces 
that assist in improving the visual and physical interactions performed during such 
tasks. These recommendations aim to improve human factors, and to support the 
development of underlying cognitive mechanisms responsible for skilled performance. 
Pioneering the study of intuitive expertise in the airport security screening 
context, this research contributes a broad and novel perspective on the interactions 
performed in uncertain contexts. It is hoped that the new knowledge developed will 
stimulate new discourse in diverse activity domains characterised by complexity and 
uncertainty. These aspirations are highly relevant for the study of expertise, where a 
number of interrelated cognitive factors are responsible for task performance. It is 
essential for the range of underlying factors to be understood in order to improve the 
mechanisms responsible for skilled interactions and decision making.  
It is believed that this research has consolidated many of the factors responsible 
for the performance of complex tasks. In so doing, it has provided a significant 
contribution to the study of expertise, and advanced the understanding of intuitive 
expertise in uncertain contexts. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Participant Information 
Participant  Age Gender Experience (Months) Classification 
1 31 Female 108 Expert 
2 25 Male 6 Non-Expert 
3 25 Male 7 Non-Expert 
4 47 Male 12 Non-Expert 
5 54 Male 96 Expert 
6 21 Male 12 Non-Expert 
7 21 Male 36 Expert 
8 44 Female 19 Non-Expert 
9 23 Male 11 Non-Expert 
10 36 Female 7 Non-Expert 
11 33 Male 54 Expert 
12 36 Male 59 Expert 
13 48 Male 66 Expert 
14 20 Male 7 Non-Expert 
15 30 Female 60 Expert 
16 30 Male 54 Expert 
17 29 Male 7 Non-Expert 
18 35 Male 1 Non-Expert 
19 20 Male 5 Non-Expert 
20 41 Male 1 Non-Expert 
21 37 Male 24 Non-Expert 
22 26 Male 11 Non-Expert 
23 21 Male 24 Non-Expert 
24 32 Male 94 Expert 
25 24 Male 12 Non-Expert 
26 35 Female 39 Non-Expert 
27 26 Male 7 Non-Expert 
28 41 Male 8 Non-Expert 
29 22 Male 16 Non-Expert 
30 24 Male 54 Expert 
31 25 Male 78 Expert 
32 30 Female 60 Expert 
33 43 Female 36 Expert 
34 34 Male 70 Expert 
35 24 Male 10 Non-Expert 
36 18 Male 4 Non-Expert 
37 52 Male 72 Expert 
38 22 Male 16 Non-Expert 
39 24 Male 12 Non-Expert 
40 25 Male 15 Non-Expert 
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Appendix B: Recruitment and Consent Material 




Information for Prospective 
Participants 
The following research activity has been reviewed via QUT arrangements for the conduct of research involving human 
participation. 
If you choose to participate, you will be provided with more detailed participant information, including who you can 
contact if you have any concerns. 
The role of intuitive expertise in unpredictable contexts 
Research Team Contacts 
Principal Researcher: Levi Swann, PHD Student, QUT Phone:   0426 980 421  
Email:   levi.swann@qut.edu.au  
Associate Researcher: Professor Vesna Popovic,   Dr Thea Blackler   and   Dr Ben Kraal, QUT 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The purpose of this research is to investigate how security screeners analyse x-ray images of 
passenger baggage. This study will look at what types of knowledge that security screeners use, and 
how they make decisions during this task. 
Are you looking for people like me? 
The research team is looking for current x-ray security screener trainees and employees. We are 
looking for people of all levels of experience in security screening, both male and female and of any 
age.  
Participants will be required to wear Tobii Eyetracking Glasses during this research. If you normally 
use glasses/spectacles, you will not be able to participate in this research as they will interfere with 
the eye-tracking capabilities of the Tobii system. If you use contact lenses, you can take part in this 
research.  
What will you ask me to do? 
Your participation will involve wearing Tobii Eyetracking Glasses while you perform x-ray baggage 
threat detection tasks at the departures security checkpoint. You will be observed during these 
activities for a total duration of 60 minutes.  
Tobii eye-tracking glasses will record on video what you look at and what your eyes focus on while 
you perform these tasks. The eye-tracking glasses are similar to normal spectacles. They are 
attached via a cable to a small recording device that can be clipped to clothing or stored in a pocket. 
As well as recording your visual data, we will ask you to verbally express your mental process, or to 
‘think aloud’ while you interpret the x-ray images. These verbal comments will be audio recorded 
by the inbuilt microphone on the Tobii Eyetracking glasses. 
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Following these observations, a researcher will conduct a 10-40 minute interview with you to 
conclude your participation. This interview will be audio recorded. Visual and audio recorded data 
will not be viewed or heard by anyone outside of the research team, without your written 
permission. 
Are there any risks for me in taking part? 
The research team does not believe there are any risks beyond normal day-to-day living and normal 
on-the-job conditions associated with your participation in this research. Tobii Eyetracking Glasses 
are an unobtrusive system. Wearing them while you are x-ray screening passenger baggage will not 
impede your vision or affect your ability to perform your work duties. They will not cause any 
additional risk to you. 
The purpose of this study is not to assess your performance in any way. Data obtained from this 
study will be accessible only to those in the research team mentioned in this document. Your 
decision to participate, or not to participate, will in no way impact upon your current or future 
relationship with QUT, or with your current and future relationships with Brisbane Airport Corporation 
and/or the security provider you are employed with ( for example, ISS). 
If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw from participation at any time during the project 
without comment or penalty.  
Are there any benefits for me in taking part? 
It is not expected that this project will benefit you directly.  However, it might benefit you indirectly 
because this research might be used to develop recommendations and potential design solutions 
to improve airport security systems and training. 
You will be invited to receive any publications or information that is generated by this project. 
Will I be compensated for my time? 
We would very much appreciate your participation in this research. Although it is unlikely this 
project will benefit you directly, it might lead to improved airport security and trainingIf you are 
interested, we can send you copies of any publications or information that are generated by this 
project.  
Who is funding this research?  
This project is funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC). The funding body will not have 
access to personally identifying information about you that might be obtained during the project. 
The research project is undertaken in partnership with the Brisbane Airport Corporation and 
security providers for Brisbane Airport Corporation (for example, ISS). 
I am interested – what should I do next? 
If you have any questions or would like to participate in this study, please contact:  
Ben Powell – email ben.powell@ua.issworld.com or phone 07 3406 3272 or mobile 0419 027 063 
Levi Swann – email levi.swann@qut.edu.au or mobile 0426 980 421 
You will be provided with further information to ensure that your decision and consent to participate 
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B.2 Participant Information Form 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Interview and Experiment – 
The role of intuitive expertise in unpredictable contexts 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1200000084 
RESEARCH TEAM  
Principal 
Researcher: 
Levi Swann, PhD Student, Queensland University of Technology (QUT) 
Associate 
Researcher: 
Professor Vesna Popovic,    Dr Thea Blackler    and    Dr Ben Kraal, QUT 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken by Levi Swann for a PhD thesis at QUT. The purpose of this 
research is to investigate how security screeners analyse x-ray images of passenger baggage. 
This study will look at what types of knowledge screener’s use, and how they make decisions 
during this task. 
The outcomes of this study will identify how intuitive decision making and intuitive 
interactions contribute to the screener’s analysis of x-ray images. By looking at screeners of 
different levels of expertise, this research will also describe differences between novice and 
expert x-ray screening screeners. These findings will provide the basis for recommendations 
and improvements to the systems and procedures used in aviation security x-ray screening. 
You are invited to participate in this project because you are an aviation security officer and 
can help contribute to future improvements in your profession. 
PARTICIPATION 
If you choose to participate, your participation will involve: 
i. An observation in which you will wear Tobii Eyetracking Glasses while you perform 
the task of passenger baggage x-ray screening. Tobii Eyetracking Glasses will record 
on video what you look at and what your eyes focus on while you perform these 
tasks. Video recorded data will be only that taken from the Tobii Glasses. You will not 
be video recorded by any stationary devices, or devices operated by the researcher. 
The eye-tracking glasses are similar to normal spectacles, and are attached via a cable 
to a small recording device that can be clipped to clothing or stored in a pocket. This 
unobtrusive system will not impede your vision or affect your ability to perform the 
task of passenger baggage x-ray screening. As the wearing Tobii Eyetracking Glasses 
are a requirement of this research, you will only be eligible to participate in this 
research if you do not require the aid of glasses/spectacles to perform the task of 
passenger baggage x-ray security screening. Participants with corrected vision by aid 
of contact lenses are eligible. As well as recording your visual data, we will ask you to 
verbally express your cognitive process, or to ‘think aloud’ while you interpret the x-
ray images. These verbal comments will be audio recorded by the inbuilt microphone 
on the Tobii Eyetracking glasses. 
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Observations will take place at the Brisbane International Airport departures security 
check point under normal task conditions. The accumulated duration of video and 
audio recorded observation will be 30 minutes, comprised of 10 or 20 minute 
sessions which will be determined by rotation durations during normal operations.  
ii. An audio recorded interview following the observation which will take between 10 
and 40 minutes. This interview will take place immediately after the observation. To 
ensure your privacy, interviews will be conducted one-to-one in a private location.  
 Questions will focus on your task awareness and process. Questions will include: 
- What do you look for when analysing the images?  
- What threats are you looking for? 
- Can you tell me about an instance where you detected a threat? 
- How do you determine when no threat is present? 
- What are some objects that you encounter frequently? 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from the project without comment or penalty. If you withdraw, on request any 
identifiable information already obtained from you will be destroyed. Your decision to 
participate, or not to participate, will in no way impact upon your current or future 
relationship with QUT, or with your current and future relationships with Brisbane Airport 
Corporation and/or the security provider you are employed with ( for example, ISS). In no 
way will the results of this research or your participation be used to assess your performance 
in the task of passenger baggage x-ray screening. 
 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
Although it is unlikely this project will benefit you directly, it might benefit you indirectly 
through the projected outcomes and contributions. Findings from this research might 
contribute to recommendations and design solutions to improve airport security systems and 
training. If you advise me that you are interested, I will send you copies of any publications 
or information that is generated by this project.  
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living and on-the-job conditions associated with 
your participation in this project.  
As a participant of this research, the tasks you will engage in will be those of which you 
conduct as part of your job/training, in the same environment that these tasks are usually 
performed. The Tobii Eyetracking Glasses are an unobtrusive system consisting of a pair of 
glasses similar in shape and size to regular reading glasses and are attached via a cable to a 
small recording device that can be clipped to clothing or stored in a pocket. Wearing Tobii 
Eyetracking Glasses during the task of passenger baggage x-ray screening will not impede 
your vision or ability to perform the task as normal, nor will they expose you to any additional 
risk. It should be noted that if you do agree to participate, you can withdraw from 
participation at any time during the project without comment or penalty. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially. All video and audio recordings will 
be kept safely in a secure laboratory at QUT and held on a password protected computer. 
Only members of the project team (specified above) will have access to the video and audio 
recordings. The video footage might be used in discussion of the results at academic or 
industry talks, or in academic journals. We will only use your images with your express 
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written permission. 
It is not possible to participate in the experiment without being audio/video recorded. You 
will have the opportunity to verify your comments and responses prior to their final inclusion. 
The names of individual persons are not required in any of the responses. 
Please note that non-identifiable data collected in this project might be used as comparative 
data in future projects. Those who will have access to the video recording are only those 
identified in the research team identified at the beginning of this document. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your 
agreement to participate. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If you have any questions or require any further information about the project please contact 
one of the research team members below. 
School of Design –  Faculty of Creative Industries –  QUT 
Levi Swann – PhD Candidate 
Professor Vesna Popovic – Principal 
Supervisor 
levi.swann@qut.edu.au 0426 980 480 v.popovic@qut.edu.au 
  
Dr Thea Blackler – Associate Supervisor Dr Ben Kraal – Associate Supervisor 
a.blackler@qut.edu.au b.kraal@qut.edu.au 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project 
you might contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research 
project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information. 
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B.3 Participant Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR QUT RESEARCH 
PROJECT 
– Interview and Experiment – 
The role of expertise and intuitive interaction in 
unpredictable contexts 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1200000084 
RESEARCH TEAM CONTACTS 
School of Design –  Faculty of Creative Industries –  QUT 
Levi Swann – PhD Candidate 
Professor Vesna Popovic – Principal 
Supervisor 
levi.swann@qut.edu.au 0426 980 480 v.popovic@qut.edu.au 
  
Dr Thea Blackler – Associate Supervisor Dr Ben Kraal – Associate Supervisor 
a.blackler@qut.edu.au b.kraal@qut.edu.au 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT 
By signing below, you are indicating that you: 
 Have read and understood the information document regarding this project. 
 Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction. 
 Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research 
team. 
 Understand that you are free to withdraw at any time, without comment or penalty. 
 Understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the 
project. 
 Understand that the project will include audio and video recording. 
 Understand that non-identifiable data collected in this project might be used as 
comparative data in future projects. 
 Agree to participate in the project. 
Name  
Signature  
Date   
MEDIA RELEASE PROMOTIONS 
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From time to time, we might like to promote our research to the general public through, for 
example, newspaper articles.  Would you be willing to be contacted by QUT Media and 
Communications for possible inclusion in such stories?  By ticking this box, it only means you 
are choosing to be contacted – you can still decide at the time not to be involved in any 
promotions. 
 Yes, you might contact me about inclusion in promotions 
 No, I do not wish to be contacted about inclusion in promotions 
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Appendix C: Interview and Likert Questions 
C.1 Interview Questions with Prompts 
1. What do you look for when analysing the image? 
a. What threats do you look for? 
b. Can you tell me about your typical process?  
 
2. What are some objects (both threat and non-threat) that you encounter 
frequently? 
 
3. Can you tell me about an instance where you detected a threat object?  
a. What factors contributed to your decision making process? 
b. How does this experience contribute to your current practice? 
 
4. How do you decide when no threat object is present?  
a. What factors influence this decision? 
b. Can you tell me about your process? 
 
5. What are some situations that are not typical, or rarely experienced? 
a. Can you tell me about a specific situation? 
 
6. Can you describe the image characteristics that make your job most effortful? 
a. What are the image contents that take the longest to clear? 
b. Can you tell me about the situations that decisions are hardest to make in? 
 
7. Can you describe image characteristics that make your job least effortful? 
a. What are the image contents that are the quickest to clear? 
b. Can you tell me about the situations that decisions are easiest to make in? 
 
8. [present image of x-ray machine interface] What features of the x-ray 
machine interface do you use? 
a.  How do you use this feature? Can you give an example? 
b. What situations do you use this feature in? Why? 
c. How does that feature assist your decision making? 
 
9. Can you reflect on how your knowledge and abilities have developed as you 
have gained experience? 
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C.2 Likert Questions 
1. Difficulty of Task 









a. How would you rate your overall knowledge of threat objects? 
1 
Poor 
2 3 4 5 6 
Excellent 
 
b. How would you rate your overall knowledge of everyday objects? 
1 
Poor 
2 3 4 5 6 
Excellent 
 
3. Difficulty of processing ‘baggage scenes’: 
c. How would you rate the difficulty of processing Baggage Scenes with a high 
number of familiar objects 
1 
Very easy to 
process 





d. How would you rate the difficulty of processing Baggage Scenes with a low number 
of familiar objects 
1 
Very easy to 
process 





4. Difficulty of identifying objects: 
a. How would you rate the difficulty of identifying Everyday Objects 
1 
Very easy to 
process 
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b. How would you rate the difficulty of identifying Threat Objects (General) 
1 
Very easy to 
process 





Specific Categories of threat objects: How would you rate the difficulty of identifying: 
c. (Threat Category) Blunt Instruments Capable of Harm  
1 
Very easy to 
process 





d. (Threat Category) Guns, Firearms 
1 
Very easy to 
process 





e. (Threat Category) Explosives, Incendiaries, IED 
1 
Very easy to 
process 





f. (Threat Category) Sharp Objects, Knives 
1 
Very easy to 
process 





g. (Threat Category) LAGS 
1 
Very easy to 
process 
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Appendix D: Observation Coding Scheme 
D.1 Search Sub-Codes and Heuristics 
Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Code Example Heuristics 
Intuitiveness 
 
Intuitive - Low fixation to saccade ratio, indicated by short fixation 
periods between saccades (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999) 
- Non-verbal process (Bastick, 1982, 2003; Blackler, et al., 
2010) 
- Guidance of attention to task-relevant features (Liu & Gale, 
2011; Liu, et al., 2007; Wolfe, 1994; Wolfe, 2010) 
- Efficient scanpath (selective attention) (Goldberg & Kotval, 
1999; Mruczek & Sheinberg, 2005; Poole & Ball, 2006) 
Partially-Intuitive - Limited verbalisations (during and following actions) 
(Bastick, 1982, 2003) 
- Variable scanpath, some regressive saccades (Poole & Ball, 
2006) 
- Switching between intuitive and non-intuitive (some 
automation, but higher level processes requiring attentive 
control (Baylor, 2001) 
Non-Intuitive - High fixation to saccade ratio, indicated by lengthy dwell 
fixations (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999) 
- Verbalisations of process and visual attention (Bastick, 
1982, 2003) 
- Exhaustive attention to visual features (Liu & Gale, 2011) 
- Inefficient scanpath (non-selective attention) (Goldberg & 
Kotval, 1999) 
- Backtracking/regressive Saccades (Goldberg & Kotval, 
1999; Poole & Ball, 2006) 
Knowledge Perceptual - Un-proceduralised search relying on the explicit retrieval of 
knowledge for the identification of objects and associating 
meaning to objects (Eraut, 1990, p. 27) 
- Search suggesting frequent instances of knowledge 
retrieval. For example, attending frequently to different 
objects in the image 
- Individualised visual interactions 
Procedural - Knowledge applied as the performance of search process, 
evidenced by connected sequences of action and 
manipulations (Phye & Sanders, 1992) 
- Integration of motor and cognitive skill (Goldberg & 
Kotval, 1999) manifest as subsumed visual interactions 
(encoded skill) 
- Connected visual interactions 
Strategic - Goal directed, structured and organised search activity 
incorporated into problem-solving (de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996; Schraw, 1998). For example, clear statement 
of goal and fluid proceeding actions. For example, Guided 
search in relation to an identified contextual feature;, highly 
efficient scanpath with limited saccades 
Situational - Identifying relationships between concepts and adapting 
problem-solving to specific and changing situational 
conditions (Alexander & Judy, 1988; de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996; Klein & Hoffman, 1992). For example, 
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Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Code Example Heuristics 
performing search activity in response to a visual feature or 
object that might suggest a the presence of a possible 
associated threat object 
Insufficient - Inability to perform search activity 
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D.2 Examination Sub-Codes and Heuristics 
Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Codes Example Heuristics 
Intuitiveness 
 
Intuitive - Non-verbal process (Bastick, 1982, 2003; Blackler, et al., 
2010) 
- Immediate recognition of objects (Gauthier, 2010) 
- Short highly focused fixations (Poole & Ball, 2006) 
- Small latency between fixation and 
determination/transition 
Partially-Intuitive - Limited verbalisations (during and following actions) 
(Bastick, 1982, 2003) 
- Variable scanpath, some regressive saccades (Poole & 
Ball, 2006) 
- Switching between intuitive and non-intuitive (some 
automation, but higher level processes requiring attentive 
control (Baylor, 2001) 
Non-Intuitive - Verbalisations indicating effortful deliberation (e.g., ‘um, 
ah’, ‘what is that?’) (Bastick, 2003; Blackler, Popovic, & 
Mahar, 2003) 
- Exhaustive attention to visual features (Liu & Gale, 2011) 
- Lengthy dwell fixation (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999; 
McCarley, et al., 2004; Poole & Ball, 2006) 
- Repeat fixations/backtrack (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999; 
Poole & Ball, 2006) 
Knowledge Perceptual - Retrieval of knowledge for the identification of objects 
and associating meaning to objects (Eraut, 1990, p. 27) 
- Fixations with clear visual focus in the context of 
identification 
- Focused fixation spatial density (Goldberg & Kotval, 
1999) with noticeable transition from prior activity. For 
example transition from search to a focused examination 
- Declarative understanding of objects and their features 
(Gauthier, 2010; Goldstein, 2010) 
Procedural - Connected fixations. For example, observing multiple 
areas of a single object (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999; Poole & 
Ball, 2006) 
- Fixations integrated within parallel activity (Goldberg & 
Kotval, 1999). For example, examinations closely linked 
with search or interface interactions 
- Strong links to associated actions, examinations subsumed 
into screening processes (Anderson, 1986) 
Strategic - Examinations integrated in complimentary sequences of 
problem-solving action. Highly specific action in response 
to situation and goal (Schraw, 1998). For example, clear 
statement of goal and fluid proceeding actions. For 
example, ‘I’m going to look deeper into this as there are 
often things hiding’ 
- Identifying and facilitating learning situations (Ertmer & 
Newby, 1996). For example, reviewing previous images 
when time permits 
Situational - Identifying relationships between concepts and adapting 
problem-solving to specific and changing situational 
conditions (Alexander & Judy, 1988; de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996; Klein & Hoffman, 1992).  For example, 
identifying a non-threat object but having closer 
examination due to potential threat objects associated with 
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Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Codes Example Heuristics 
that object 
- Demonstrating expectation and predictive inferences about 
visual stimuli (Kirschner & Van Vilsteren, 1997; Salas, et 
al., 2009) 
Insufficient - Verbalisations indicating uncertainty over the identity of 
an object (‘Um’, ‘What is that?’, ‘I’m not sure what that 
is?’) 
- Inefficient transition matrix with repeat fixations (Ehmke 
& Wilson, 2007) 
- Lengthy dwell fixations (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999; Poole 
& Ball, 2006) 
Context Clutter Focus of examination comprised of a high density area of 
objects, complex objects and superimposition of objects 
Opaque Focus of examination dense/opaque object/s that cannot be 
penetrated or are indistinguishable 
Isolated Object Focus of examination comprised of an isolated object 
unaffected by high opacity, clutter or other type of 
occlusion 
Organic Focus of examination comprised of an organic object or 
area of interest 
Threat (real/TIP) Focus of examination comprised of a threat object or 
fictional threat object (TIP) 
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D.3 Interface Interaction Sub-Codes and Heuristics 
Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Code Example Heuristics 
Intuitiveness 
 
Intuitive - Non-verbal process (Bastick, 1982, 2003; Blackler, et al., 
2010) 
- Small latency period between antecedent action and 
interface interaction (Blackler, 2008) 
- Interactions subsumed into problem-solving process 
- Limited visual interactions with interface components 
during use (focal attention, operating through the interface) 
(Bodker, 1991; Popovic & Kraal, 2008) 
Partially-Intuitive - Limited verbalisations (during and following actions) 
(Bastick, 1982, 2003) 
- Switching between intuitive and non-intuitive (some 
automation, but higher level processes requiring attentive 
control (Baylor, 2001). For example, some attention 
dependent interaction/application while other performed 
independent of attention 
Non-Intuitive - Verbalisations and evidence of deliberation and reasoning 
(Bastick, 1982, 2003; Blackler, et al., 2010) (e.g., ‘that’s a 
bit dark so I’ll just go black and white’, ‘I’m not sure what 
that is so I’ll just use the TIP button to make sure) 
- Large latency periods between antecedent action and 
interface interaction (Blackler, 2008) (delayed, deliberative 
decision making). 
- Visual attention focused on interface components (focus 
shifts from problem solving) (Bodker, 1991; Popovic & 
Kraal, 2008) 
Knowledge Perceptual - Demonstration of conceptual knowledge about visual 
concepts and their meanings (Patterson, et al., 2007, p. 1). 
For example recalling meaning of objects and visual 
concepts in relation to interface interactions. 
Procedural - Knowledge of how and when to perform an action (de Jong 
& Ferguson-Hessler, 1996) 
- Conditional reasoning/simple production rules, statement 
of if – then rules (Anderson, 1982; Roda, 2011a) 
- Application of general procedures. For example, applying 
various IEFs. 
Strategic - Integrated sequences of action (Schraw, 1998) 
- Identifying and facilitating learning situations (Ertmer & 
Newby, 1996). E.g., reviewing previous images when time 
permits 
- goal directed, structured and organised interface 
interactions (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). For 
example, clear statement of goal and fluid proceeding 
actions 
- Identifying and executing the optimal solution (Gruber, 
1989), evidence by high success rate and absence of trial and 
error 
- Adaptable actions and problem-solving process (Phye & 
Sanders, 1992). For example, formulation of problem-
solving method in unfamiliar situation to overcome 
insufficient knowledge.  
Situational - Rich mental representation/schema and understanding of 
situation (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996) 
- Predictive inferences about how an object appears and 
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Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Code Example Heuristics 
related actions (Kirschner & Van Vilsteren, 1997; Salas, et 
al., 2009) 
- Identifying relationships between concepts and adapting 
problem-solving to specific and changing situational 
conditions (Alexander & Judy, 1988; de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996; Klein & Hoffman, 1992). For example, 
changing perspective or adapting strategy to suit situational 
requirements. 
Insufficient - Trial and error application of IEFs 
- Hesitation and indecision before and during decision 
making (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997)  
- Propelled action followed by poor problem description 
(Hall, 2002) 
Action Primary Function Interaction with the interface in order to apply a primary 
IEF. Primary IEFs alter the colour configurations of the 
display. Primary IEFs include: 
Black and White: Image filter that reduces all colours to 
black and white, removing material information from the 
image (Ghylin, et al., 2008). 
Pseudo Colour: A false colour representation using colour 
codes that correspond to grayscale values rather than 
material (Michel, Mendes, de Ruiter, Koomen, & 
Schwaninger, 2014). 
Inorganic: Image filter that shows only inorganic material 
(Ghylin, et al., 2008; Michel, et al., 2014). 
Organic: Image filter that shows only organic material 
(Ghylin, et al., 2008; Michel, et al., 2014). 
Secondary Function Interaction with the interface in order to apply a secondary 
IEF. Secondary IEFs alter the luminance and contrast values 
of the display. Secondary IEFs include: 
Negative: Image filter that inverts the luminance of the 
image while material values remain the same (Ghylin, et al., 
2008).  
High/Low Penetration: Adjusts the luminance of the image 
allowing greater visibility of details in dark and light areas 
(Michel, et al., 2006). 
Edge Enhance: Adjusts the contrast of the image making it 
easier to differentiate between the edges of objects and 
materials (Michel, et al., 2006). 
Density Toggle: Adjusts the contrast of the image to assist. 
Fade: Manual control over image contrast to assist 
penetration and depth of opaque objects. 
Zoom Function Interaction with the interface in order to apply a zoom IEF. 
Zoom functions adjust the size of the image. Zoom IEFs 
include: 2x Zoom, 4x Zoom, 8x Zoom and 16x Zoom. 
Standard Function Interaction with the interface to apply the standard tri-colour 
image function with blue representing metallic objects, 
green representing composite materials and orange 
representing organic materials. 
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Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Code Example Heuristics 
TIP True Positive Interaction with TIP function resulting in the correct 
identification of a fictional threat object (TIP) 
TIP False Positive Interaction with Threat Image Projection function resulting 
in the false identification of a fictional threat object (TIP) 
TIP Strategy Interaction with Threat Image Projection function as a 
precaution when uncertain about the presence of a fictional 
threat object. For example using the TIP button in a heavily 
cluttered bag to check whether a fictional threat object is 
present 
TIP Missed Failure to identify a fictional threat object (TIP) that is 
present in the image 
Context Clutter Focus of interface interaction comprised of a high density of 
objects, complex objects and superimposition of objects 
Opaque Focus of interface interaction comprised of dense/opaque 
object/s that cannot be penetrated or are indistinguishable 
Isolated Object Focus on interface interaction comprised of an isolated 
object unaffected by high opacity, clutter or other type of 
occlusion 
Organic Focus of interface interaction comprised of an organic object 
or area of interest 
Threat (real/TIP) Focus of interface interaction on a threat object or fictional 
threat object (TIP) 
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D.4 Screener Interaction Sub-Codes and Heuristics 
Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Code Example Heuristics 
Knowledge Perceptual - Demonstration of conceptual knowledge about visual 
concepts and their meanings (Patterson, et al., 2007, p. 1). 
For example recalling meaning of objects and visual 
concepts in relation to interface interactions. 
Procedural - Knowledge of how and when to perform an action (de Jong 
& Ferguson-Hessler, 1996) 
- Conditional reasoning/simple production rules, statement of 
if – then rules (Anderson, 1982; Roda, 2011a) 
- Application of general procedures 
Strategic - Integrated sequences of action (Schraw, 1998) 
- Identifying and facilitating learning situations (Ertmer & 
Newby, 1996). For example, reviewing unfamiliar objects 
- Identifying and executing the optimal solution (Gruber, 
1989), evidence by high success rate and absence of trial and 
error 
- Adaptable actions and problem-solving process (Phye & 
Sanders, 1992). For example, formulation of problem-
solving method in unfamiliar situation to overcome 
insufficient knowledge. 
Situational - Rich mental representation/schema and understanding of 
situation (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996) 
- Predictive inferences about how an object appears and 
related actions (Kirschner & Van Vilsteren, 1997; Salas, et 
al., 2009) 
- Identifying relationships between concepts and adapting 
problem-solving to specific and changing situational 
conditions (Alexander & Judy, 1988; de Jong & Ferguson-
Hessler, 1996; Klein & Hoffman, 1992). For example, 
changing perspective or adapting strategy to suit situational 
requirements. 
Insufficient - Poor articulation of problem 
- Verbalisations indicating uncertainty (‘um, ah’, ‘what is 
that?’) 
- Hesitation and indecision before and during decision 
making (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) 
- Propelled action followed by poor problem description 
(Hall, 2002) 
Action Re-Run Interaction with another security screener for the purpose of 
requesting a bag be re-run. Instructions include: requesting 
items be separated in order to declutter the image; requesting 
the bag to be shaken  to change the configuration of objects; 
requesting the bag at a different angle in order to clarify the 
image of a particular object or area in the bag. 
Discussion Interaction with another security screener for the purpose of 
discussing an object or area of the image. Discussions 
include: asking for help such as clarifying policy relating to 
an object or asking for the opinion about an objects identity; 
mutual problem-solving such as suggesting an objects 
identity and receiving a second opinion or planning problem-
solving activity specific to the object/area in question. 
Manual Search Interaction with another security screener for the purpose of 
requesting that a bag be manually searched in order to find 
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Sub-Code 
Category 
Sub-Code Example Heuristics 
an object and obtain its identity. For example, in the case of 
an object that’s identity cannot be resolved a security 
screener asks for the object to be removed and identified. 
Object Removal Interaction with another security screener for the purpose of 
getting a prohibited object removed. For instance requesting 
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Appendix E: Interview Coding Scheme 
E.1 Activity Codes and Descriptions 
Category Code Description Example 
Search 
Guided Descriptions of unconscious or 
automatic search process. 
“I yeah, yeah I usually my 
eyes get drawn straight to 
the dense stuff first” 
Structured Describing search process that is 
structured, using a generalised 
method. 
“I sort of scan up and 
down as the image comes 
across” 
Serial Describing sequential search 
process that is targeted toward 
individual object categories. 
“I first look for anything 
like knives and that. Then 
I look for bombs and that 
then I look for LAGs” 
Examination 
Effortful Visual processing of an object or 
image area associated with effort, 
difficulty or an involved decision 
making and information processing. 
Expressing difficulty 
Visual examination using 
a problem-solving method, 
for example, an interface 
function. 
Effortless Visual processing for identification 
that is immediate or with no 
perceived effort 
“we get a lot of knives 
through that are pretty 
easy because it’s just a 




 Describing or mentioning interface 
functions, their purpose and how 
they are used to assist decision 
making 
Zoom x2, Zoom x4, Zoom 
x8, Zoom x16, Normal 
Colour, Inorganic, 
Organic, Pseudo Colour, 
Black and White, 
High/Low Penetration, 
Density Toggle, Edge 




Re-Run Describing or mentioning an 
interaction with another security 
screener for the purpose of 
requesting a bag re-run 
Separation, shake, re-run 
Assistance Describing or mentioning an 
interaction with another security 
screener for the purpose of 
receiving assistance in decision 
making, problem-solving or 
identification 
Ask for help identifying an 
object, requesting an 
object be removed for the 
purpose of identification 
Removal Describing or mentioning an 
interaction with another security 
screener for the purpose of 
removing an identified threat object 
Requesting a prohibited 
object to be removed 
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E.2 Knowledge Codes and Descriptions 




Knowledge of object categories and 
basic features of objects based on 
episodic memory allowing a specific 
application of knowledge. 
Statement of threat 
categories and description 




Knowledge of objects, related visual 
concepts, meanings and associations. 
Based on semantic memory enabling 
a wider application of knowledge 
(Patterson, et al., 2007).  
Detailed descriptions of 




Knowledge of how to perform 
actions and procedures based on 
declarative knowledge and 
propositions.  
Statement or episodic 




Principled procedural knowledge 
integrated with problem-solving and 
situational understanding (Nickols, 
2000). Compiled or subsumed 
procedural knowledge stored as 
schema to facilitate highly specific 
problem-solving actions. 
Description of fluid and 




Conditional knowledge based on an 
understanding of task states 
propositions, rules and formulas. 
Analytic situational knowledge can 
be easily described to demonstrate an 
understanding of task states and 
causal factors. Ability to describe and 
make predictions about situations, 
how to allocate time and attention 
(Schraw, 1998). Selective perception 
and filtering that allows recognition 
of typicality and exceptions (de Jong 
& Ferguson-Hessler, 1996). 
Detailed understanding of 





Large pattern perception and rich 
visual representation of task states 
and causal relationships. Adaptation 
of processes to task. Adaptation to 
situational conditions (Alexander & 
Judy, 1988) 
Immediate comprehension 




Knowledge utilised for the purpose 
of monitoring actions for learning. 
Descriptions of learning 
opportunities and methods 
Strategic 
Structured 
Highly structured knowledge 
enabling formulation of goals, self-
awareness and monitoring/reflections 
of actions and outcomes. 
Continuously engaged to monitor and 
adapt processes (Phye & Sanders, 
1992) 
Detailed simulations of 
situations, actions and 
outcomes, integrated 
sequence of actions 
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E.3 Focus of Attention Codes and Descriptions 





Explicit mention of objects that 
comprise improvised explosive 
devices 







Explicit mention of objects classified 
as prohibited liquids, aerosols and 
gels 
Liquids over 100ml, 
liquids, deodorant, lipstick, 
cosmetics, aerosols 
Firearms Explicit mention of objects 
categorised as firearms 
Guns, projectiles, bullets, 
rifle, assault rifle 
Sharps Explicit mention of objects 
categorised as sharp 




Explicit mention of general threats prohibited objects, things 
that aren’t allowed 
TIP Explicit mention of threat objects 
categorised as TIPs 
Threat images, TIPs, 
fictional threat image. 
Everyday 
Item 
Explicit mention of objects 
categorised as everyday items 
Electronics, cables, phone, 
belt, laptop, iPad, tablet, 
camera, lenses, clothes, 




Identification or description of 
individual features or components of 
an object that assists in identification 
Handle of a knife, gun 
spring, firing pin, detonator 
Angle Identification or description of 
objects at different angles and its 
effect on identification 
Difficult view of an object, 
a knife from the top just 
looks like a dark line 
Clutter Identification or description of 
situations categories as clutter 




Identification or description of object 
colours and material 




Identification or description of 
concepts relating to opacity 
Dark, dense, heavy, black 
Typicality/ 
Familiarity 
Identification or description of 
concepts relating to typicality and 
familiarity 
Normal, typical, familiar 
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Appendix F: Observation Analysis Results Tables 
F.1 Data Tables for Section 6.2 
Data for Figure 9. State lag sequential analysis results showing activity transitions for security 
screeners of all experience levels 







Search 0.37 0.32 0.05 0.12 0.15 
Examination 0.29 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.37 
Screener 
Interaction 
0.69 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.14 
Object 
Interaction 
0.42 0.38 0.14 0.00 0.02 
Interface 
Interaction 
0.20 0.60 0.04 0.01 0.15 
 
Analysis results for Figure 8. Mean, standard deviation and standard error for activities 
performed, and average percentage of overall time taken by expert and non-expert security 
screeners 
Experience Activity Mean (%) StdDev (%) StdErr (%) 
Non-expert 
Search 61.1873 9.2255 1.8832 
Examination 17.5994 5.8989 1.2041 
Screener Interaction 12.3833 3.7767 0.7709 
Object Interaction 2.8458 2.1148 0.4317 
Interface Interaction 5.9841 3.4217 0.6985 
Expert 
Search 58.9745 6.6461 1.6615 
Examination 17.3777 5.3490 1.3373 
Screener Interaction 13.3723 6.2912 1.5728 
Object Interaction 3.4388 1.5432 0.3858 
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Analysis results for Figure 10. Mean, standard deviation and standard error for context of 
security screeners’ examinations during search phases 
Context Mean (%) StdDev (%) StdErr (%) 
Threat 5.1020 5.5368 0.8755 
Organic 16.1278 12.4636 1.9707 
Opaque 13.5366 11.0156 1.7417 
Clutter 32.9564 13.6744 2.1621 
Isolated object 32.2772 14.9868 2.3696 
 
Analysis results for Figure 11. Mean, standard deviation and standard error for context of 
security screeners’ examinations during problem-solving phases 
Context Mean (%) StdDev (%) StdErr (%) 
Threat 0.1860 0.8008 0.1299 
Organic 3.1000 8.4030 1.3631 
Opaque 47.5025 28.0817 4.5555 
Clutter 35.6589 29.1092 4.7221 
Isolated object 13.5526 17.7387 2.8776 
 
Analysis results for Figure 12. Mean, standard deviation and standard error for image 
enhancement functions used during problem-solving phases 
IEF category IEF type Mean (%) StdDev (%) StdErr (%) 
Primary 
Pseudo colour 0.0229 0.1414 0.0229 
Black and white 40.5790 11.1110 1.8024 
Secondary 
Fade 37.3893 9.6933 1.5725 
Edge enhance 1.1716 3.4647 0.5620 
Density toggle 0.0960 0.5915 0.0960 
High/low penetration 1.3893 5.2364 0.8495 
Negative 4.4449 8.4545 1.3715 
Zoom 
Zoom x4 0.3003 1.0825 0.1756 
Zoom x2 14.6068 15.0556 2.4423 
 
Analysis results for Figure 13. Mean, standard deviation and standard error for types of actions 
performed during security screener interactions 
Context Mean (%) StdDev (%) StdErr (%) 
Problem-solving discussion 23.1152 25.9446 4.1022 
Manual search 30.3374 28.2911 4.4732 
Visual assistance 11.5333 26.6837 4.2191 
Re-run 35.0142 31.7361 5.0179 
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F.2 Data Tables for Section 6.3 
Analysis Results for Figure 14 and Figure 15. Slope estimates, correlation coefficients, R-square 
and P-values between security screener experience and intuitiveness of search. Slope estimates 
with different letters are significantly different at a 5% significance level 
Modifier Slope Correlation R-Square P-Value Grouping 
Search Intuitive 0.3068 0.4834 0.2337 0.0016 A  
Search Non-Intuitive -0.1073 -0.3079 0.0948 0.0533   B 
 
 
Analysis Results for Figure 16 and Figure 17. Slope estimates, correlation coefficients, R-square 
and P-values between security screener experience and intuitiveness of examination. Slope 
estimates with different letters are significantly different at a 5% significance level 
Modifier Slope Correlation R-Square P-Value Grouping 
Examination Intuitive 0.0887 0.3774 0.1425 0.0164 A   
Examination Non-Intuitive -0.2087 -0.3464 0.1200 0.0286   B   
 
 
Analysis Results for Figure 18 and Figure 19. Slope estimates, correlation coefficients, R-square 
and P-values between security screener experience and intuitiveness of interface interaction. 
Slope estimates with different letters are significantly different at a 5% significance level 
Modifier Slope Correlation R-Square P-Value Grouping 
Interface Intuitive 0.2506 0.4186 0.1752 0.0072 A   
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F.3 Data Tables for Section 6.4 
Analysis results for Figure 21. Estimates and summary of differences between experience 
groups and knowledge categories utilised during search 
Conservative Tukey-Kramer Grouping for modifier*experience Least Squares Means (Alpha=0.05) 
LS-means with the same letter are not significantly different. 
modifier experience Estimate  
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Expert 57.7514  A  
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex 41.3504 B A  
Perceptual 
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex 11.0952  C  
Perceptual 
Non-Intuitive 
Expert 4.8909 D C E 
Procedural  
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex 3.7451 D  E 
Perceptual 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex 2.4250  F E 
Perceptual 
Intuitive 
Expert 0.5422  F E 
Procedural  
Non-Intuitive 
Expert 0.04534  F  
 
Analysis Results for Figure 21 and Section 6.4.3. Comparison between each knowledge category 
utilised by expert security screeners during search 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 






























Expert 57.7060 4.1355 13.95 <.0001 <.0001 
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Analysis Results for Figure 21 and Section 6.4.3. Comparison between each knowledge category 
utilised by non-expert security screeners during search 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 






















































37.6053 4.2083 8.94 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Analysis Results for Figure 21 and Section 6.4.4. Comparison of expert and non-expert security 
screeners’ utilisation of knowledge categories during search 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
































-3.6998 0.9865 -3.75 0.0002 0.0097 
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Analysis Results for Figure 22. Estimates and summary of differences between experience 
groups and knowledge categories utilised during examination 
Conservative Tukey-Kramer Grouping for modifier*experience Least Squares Means (Alpha=0.05) 
LS-means with the same letter are not significantly different. 
modifier experience Estimate  
Perceptual 
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex 47.1565   A  
Perceptual 
Non-Intuitive 
Expert 42.2461 B  A  
Insufficient Non-Ex 12.8404 D  C  
Insufficient Expert 7.9901 D F C E 
Strategic Expert 5.7261 D F  E 
Procedural  
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex 4.4577 D F  E 
Perceptual 
Intuitive 
Expert 3.9154  F  E 
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Expert 3.4911  F   
Procedural  
Non-Intuitive 
Expert 3.2884  F   
Perceptual 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex 2.2496  F   
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex 1.8457  F   
Strategic Non-Ex 1.7128  F   
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Analysis Results for Figure 22 and Section 6.4.5. Comparison between each knowledge category 
utilised by expert security screeners during examination 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 
insufficient Expert Perceptual 
Intuitive 
Expert 4.0748 3.0981 1.32 0.1884 0.9954 
insufficient Expert Perceptual 
Non-Intuitive 
Expert -34.2560 6.0460 -5.67 <.0001 <.0001 
insufficient Expert Procedural 
Intuitive 
Expert 4.4991 2.6059 1.73 0.0843 0.9402 
insufficient Expert Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Expert 4.7017 2.6412 1.78 0.0751 0.9237 















Expert 0.6270 1.6866 0.37 0.7101 1.0000 
Perceptual 
Intuitive 










Expert 38.9577 5.6309 6.92 <.0001 <.0001 
Perceptual 
Non-Intuitive 





Expert 0.2027 1.9857 0.10 0.9187 1.0000 
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Expert Strategic Expert -2.2350 1.9208 -1.16 0.2446 0.9988 
Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Expert Strategic Expert -2.4377 2.3241 -1.05 0.2942 0.9997 
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Analysis Results for Figure 22 and Section 6.4.5. Comparison between each knowledge category 
utilised by non-expert security screeners during examination 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 
insufficient Non-Ex Perceptual 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex 10.5908 2.2963 4.61 <.0001 0.0004 
insufficient Non-Ex Perceptual 
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex -34.3161 5.6973 -6.02 <.0001 <.0001 
insufficient Non-Ex Procedural 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex 10.9946 2.4476 4.49 <.0001 0.0008 
insufficient Non-Ex Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex 8.3827 2.8211 2.97 0.0030 0.1810 















Non-Ex -2.2081 1.6331 -1.35 0.1763 0.9939 
Perceptual 
Intuitive 










Non-Ex 42.6988 5.8897 7.25 <.0001 <.0001 
Perceptual 
Non-Intuitive 





Non-Ex -2.6120 1.7974 -1.45 0.1462 0.9873 
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex Strategic Non-Ex 0.1330 1.2309 0.11 0.9140 1.0000 
Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex Strategic Non-Ex 2.7449 2.0547 1.34 0.1816 0.9946 
 
Analysis Results for Figure 22 and Section 6.4.6. Comparison of expert and non-expert security 
screeners’ utilisation of knowledge categories during examinations 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 





















Expert Procedural  
Non-
Intuitive 
Non-Ex -1.1693 2.1711 -0.54 0.5902 1.0000 
Strategic Expert Strategic Non-Ex 4.0133 1.8424 2.18 0.0294 0.7128 
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Analysis Results for Figure 23. Estimates and summary of differences between experience 
groups and knowledge categories utilised during interface interactions 
Conservative Tukey-Kramer Grouping for modifier*experience Least Squares Means (Alpha=0.05) 
LS-means with the same letter are not significantly different. 
modifier Experience Estimate  
Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex 57.8427  A 
Strategic Expert 33.0218 B A 
Procedural  
Non-Intuitive 
Expert 32.8010 B A 
Insufficient Non-Ex 7.2159 B C 
Procedural  
Intuitive 
Expert 6.3240 B C 
Strategic Non-Ex 5.4735 B C 
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex 3.2065  C 
 
Analysis Results for Figure 23 and Section 6.4.7. Comparison between each knowledge category 
utilised by expert security screeners during interface interaction 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 
Insufficient Expert Procedural 
Intuitive 
Expert -5.8434 2.8285 -2.07 0.0388 0.5519 
Insufficient Expert Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Expert -32.3204 7.8946 -4.09 <.0001 0.0017 





Expert -26.4770 8.6955 -3.04 0.0023 0.0708 
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Expert Strategic Expert -26.6978 7.9182 -3.37 0.0007 0.0259 
Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Expert Strategic Expert -0.2208 14.5395 -0.02 0.9879 1.0000 
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Analysis Results for Figure 23 and Section 6.4.7. Estimates and summary of differences between 
experience groups and knowledge categories utilised during interface interactions 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 
Insufficient Non-Ex Procedural 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex 4.0094 4.3022 0.93 0.3514 0.9955 
Insufficient Non-Ex Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex -50.6268 9.6094 -5.27 <.0001 <.0001 





Non-Ex -54.6362 6.8731 -7.95 <.0001 <.0001 
Procedural 
Intuitive 
Non-Ex Strategic Non-Ex -2.2670 3.5637 -0.64 0.5247 0.9998 
Procedural 
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex Strategic Non-Ex 52.3692 8.5297 6.14 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Analysis Results for Figure 23 and Section 6.4.8. Comparison of expert and non-expert security 
screeners’ utilisation of knowledge categories during interface interactions 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 





Non-Ex 3.1175 2.3686 1.32 0.1881 0.9503 
Procedural  
Non-Intuitive 
Expert Procedural  
Non-Intuitive 
Non-Ex -25.0417 10.7684 -2.33 0.0200 0.3722 
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Analysis Results for Figure 24. Estimates and summary of differences between experience 
groups and knowledge categories utilised during screener interactions 
Tukey-Kramer Grouping for modifier*experience Least Squares Means (Alpha=0.05) 
LS-means with the same letter are not significantly different. 
modifier experience Estimate  
Procedural 
Removal 
Expert 44.8208  A 
Procedural 
Removal 
Non-Ex 36.2005 B A 
Insufficient Non-Ex 36.0490 B A 
Procedural  
Problem Solving 
Expert 27.5534 B A 
Situational Expert 26.5759 B A 
Procedural  
Problem Solving 
Non-Ex 23.4719 B  
Situational Non-Ex 4.2786  C 
Insufficient Expert 1.0499  C 
 
Analysis Results for Figure 24 and Section 6.4.9. Comparison between each knowledge category 
utilised by expert security screeners during screener interaction 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 
Insufficient Expert Procedural 
Problem 
Solving 
Expert -26.5035 8.0071 -3.31 0.0009 0.0210 
Insufficient Expert Object 
Removal 
Expert -43.7709 5.9093 -7.41 <.0001 <.0001 










Expert Situational Expert 0.9775 9.7914 0.10 0.9205 1.0000 
Object 
Removal 
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Analysis Results for Figure 24 and Section 6.4.9. Comparison between each knowledge category 
utilised by non-expert security screeners during screener interaction 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
modifier experience modifier experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 
Insufficient Non-Ex Procedural 
Problem 
Solving 
Non-Ex 12.5771 9.5553 1.32 0.1881 0.8930 
Insufficient Non-Ex Object 
Removal 
Non-Ex -0.1516 10.2699 -0.01 0.9882 1.0000 










Non-Ex Situational Non-Ex 19.1932 5.6922 3.37 0.0007 0.0171 
Object 
Removal 
Non-Ex Situational Non-Ex 31.9219 6.4783 4.93 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Analysis Results for Figure 24 and Section 6.4.10. Comparison of expert and non-expert security 
screeners’ utilisation of knowledge categories during screener interactions 
Differences of modifier*experience Least Squares Means 
Adjustment for Multiple Comparisons: Tukey-Kramer 
Modifier Experience Modifier Experience Estimate 
Std. 
Error z Value 
Pr > 
|z| Adj P 




Expert Procedural  
Problem 
Solving 





Non-Ex 8.6203 7.0410 1.22 0.2208 0.9250 
Situational Expert Situational Non-Ex 22.2973 5.7840 3.85 0.0001 0.0029 
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Appendix G: Lag Sequential Analysis Data 
G.1 Data Tables for Section 7.2 
Analysis results for Figure 27. Mean, standard deviation and standard error for image 
enhancement function types used during interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge 
IEF category IEF type Mean (%) StdDev (%) StdErr (%) 
Primary Black and white 42.8195 22.0622 5.6964 
Secondary 
Negative 18.4892 18.9254 4.8865 
High/low penetration 2.5231 6.6601 1.7196 
Face 0.7248 1.9786 0.5109 
Edge enhance 1.3810 4.0845 1.0546 
Zoom Zoom x2 34.0625 24.2450 6.2600 
 
Lag Sequential Analysis Results for Figure 28. Activity probability and knowledge categories 
utilised before interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge 
Target 
Activity 
Antecedent Activity and 
Probability of 
Performance 





































Intuitive Perceptual 2.88% 




Intuitive Procedural 59.62% 






Intuitive Perceptual 13.04% 




Intuitive Procedural 10.87% 








Intuitive Procedural 2.00% 
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Lag Sequential Analysis Results for Figure 28. Activity probability and knowledge categories 
utilised after interface interactions utilising strategic knowledge 
Target 
Activity 
Subsequent Activity and 
Probability of 
Performance 





































Intuitive Perceptual 12.20% 




Intuitive Procedural 19.51% 






Intuitive Perceptual 5.97% 




Intuitive Procedural 7.46% 








Intuitive Procedural 0.99% 
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G.2 Data Tables for Section 7.3 
Analysis results for Figure 30. Mean, standard deviation and standard error for screener 
interaction types during screener interactions utilising situational knowledge 
Context Mean (%) StdDev (%) StdErr (%) 
Problem-solving discussion 41.7461 44.6273 10.5187 
Manual search 16.0174 29.5362 6.9618 
Visual assistance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Re-run 42.2366 44.7533 10.5485 
 
Lag Sequential Analysis Results for Figure 31. Activity probability and knowledge categories 
utilised before screener interactions utilising situational knowledge 
Target 
Activity 
Antecedent Activity and 
Probability of 
Performance 







































Intuitive Perceptual 3.57% 




Intuitive Procedural 67.86% 






Intuitive Perceptual 10.71% 




Intuitive Procedural 10.71% 








Intuitive Procedural 10.00% 
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Lag Sequential Analysis Results for Figure 31. Activity probability and knowledge categories 
utilised after screener interactions utilising situational knowledge 
Target 
Activity 
Subsequent Activity and 
Probability of 
Performance 







































Intuitive Perceptual 0.00% 




Intuitive Procedural 76.19% 






Intuitive Perceptual 0.00% 




Intuitive Procedural 0.00% 








Intuitive Procedural 0.00% 
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G.3 Data Tables for Section 7.4 
Analysis results for Figure 33. Mean, standard deviation and standard error for screener 
interaction types during screener interactions utilising insufficient knowledge 
Context Mean (%) StdDev (%) StdErr (%) 
Problem-solving discussion 8.3872 19.0909 4.0702 
Manual search 41.3474 42.3438 9.0277 
Visual assistance 42.7648 46.5225 9.9186 
Re-run 7.5006 17.0640 3.6381 
 
Lag Sequential Analysis Results for Figure 34. Activity probability and knowledge categories 
utilised before screener interactions demonstrating insufficient knowledge 
Target 
Activity 
Antecedent Activity and 
Probability of 
Performance 










































Intuitive Perceptual 0.00% 




Intuitive Procedural 46.43% 






Intuitive Perceptual 9.09% 




Intuitive Procedural 2.27% 








Intuitive Procedural 0.00% 
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Lag Sequential Analysis Results for Figure 34. Activity probability and knowledge categories 
utilised after screener interactions demonstrating insufficient knowledge 
Target 
Activity 
Subsequent Activity and 
Probability of 
Performance 












































Intuitive Perceptual 0.00% 




Intuitive Procedural 33.33% 






Intuitive Perceptual 0.00% 




Intuitive Procedural 0.00% 








Intuitive Procedural 0.00% 


















 Appendices 299 
Appendix H: Coded Interview Transcript 
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Appendix I: Interview Co-Occurrence Matrices 
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I.2 Data Matrices for Section 8.3  
Data Matrix for Figure 39. Summary of co-occurrences between search and knowledge 
representations for expert security screeners 
 Se Guided Se Serial Se Structured 
Perceptual [Abstract] 0.09 0.00 0.03 
Perceptual [Superficial] 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Procedural [Descriptive] 0.05 0.09 0.08 
Procedural [Compiled] 0.29 0.01 0.05 
Situational [Analytic] 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Situational [Rich] 0.16 0.00 0.00 
Strategic [Reflective] 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Strategic [Structured] 0.05 0.00 0.01 
 
Data Matrix for Figure 40. Summary of co-occurrences between search and knowledge 
representations for non-expert security screeners 
 Se Guided Se Serial Se Structured 
Perceptual [Abstract] 0.07 0.03 0.02 
Perceptual [Superficial] 0.00 0.05 0.02 
Procedural [Descriptive] 0.08 0.25 0.17 
Procedural [Compiled] 0.15 0.02 0.03 
Situational [Analytic] 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Situational [Rich] 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Strategic [Reflective] 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Strategic [Structured] 0.02 0.00 0.03 
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Data Matrix for Figure 42. Summary of co-occurrences between examination and knowledge 
representations for expert security screeners 
 Ex Effortful Ex Effortless 
Perceptual [Abstract] 0.07 0.10 
Perceptual [Superficial] 0.02 0.05 
Procedural [Descriptive] 0.31 0.08 
Procedural [Compiled] 0.14 0.07 
Situational [Analytic] 0.02 0.00 
Situational [Rich] 0.01 0.03 
Strategic [Reflective] 0.00 0.00 
Strategic [Structured] 0.07 0.02 
 
Data Matrix for Figure 43. Summary of co-occurrences between examination and knowledge 
representations for non-expert security screeners 
 Ex Effortful Ex Effortless 
Perceptual [Abstract] 0.07 0.06 
Perceptual [Superficial] 0.09 0.07 
Procedural [Descriptive] 0.45 0.10 
Procedural [Compiled] 0.04 0.04 
Situational [Analytic] 0.00 0.00 
Situational [Rich] 0.00 0.01 
Strategic [Reflective] 0.02 0.01 
Strategic [Structured] 0.01 0.01 
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Data Matrix for Figure 44. Summary of co-occurrences between interface interaction and 
knowledge representations for expert security screeners 
 Interface Interaction 
Perceptual [Abstract] 0.08 
Perceptual [Superficial] 0.02 
Procedural [Descriptive] 0.30 
Procedural [Compiled] 0.31 
Situational [Analytic] 0.08 
Situational [Rich] 0.03 
Strategic [Reflective] 0.00 
Strategic [Structured] 0.18 
 
Data Matrix for Figure 45. Summary of co-occurrences between interface interaction and 
knowledge representations for non-expert security screeners 
 Interface Interaction 
Perceptual [Abstract] 0.01 
Perceptual [Superficial] 0.02 
Procedural [Descriptive] 0.73 
Procedural [Compiled] 0.13 
Situational [Analytic] 0.01 
Situational [Rich] 0.00 
Strategic [Reflective] 0.04 
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Data Matrix for Figure 47. Summary of co-occurrences between screener interaction and 
knowledge representations for expert security screeners 
 Assistive Re-Run Removal 
Perceptual [Abstract] 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Perceptual [Superficial] 0.03 0.02 0.00 
Procedural [Descriptive] 0.08 0.32 0.12 
Procedural [Compiled] 0.02 0.13 0.03 
Situational [Analytic] 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Situational [Rich] 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Strategic [Reflective] 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Strategic [Structured] 0.02 0.05 0.00 
 
Data Matrix for Figure 48. Summary of co-occurrences between screener interaction and 
knowledge representations for non-expert security screeners 
 Assistive Re-Run Removal 
Perceptual [Abstract] 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Perceptual [Superficial] 0.04 0.00 0.01 
Procedural [Descriptive] 0.31 0.30 0.15 
Procedural [Compiled] 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Situational [Analytic] 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Situational [Rich] 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Strategic [Reflective] 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Strategic [Structured] 0.02 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix J: Conceptual Model Configurations 
J.1 Component Interactions during the Search Phase 
The search phase is comprised of transitions between search activity and 
examination activity (Chapter 6). The nature of interactions between model 
components for search and examination activity are presented in this Section for both 
experts and non-expert security screeners.  
The transition between search and examination for expert security screeners is 
shown in Figure 61. Strong relationships between knowledge in the consecutive model 
components are evident. The strength of these relationships is shown by the 
procedural, perceptual and strategic knowledge that are continuous between the search 
and examination model components.  
 
Figure 61. Relationships between search and examination components for expert security 
screeners 
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Continuous perceptual, procedural and strategic knowledge in the model 
components means that these knowledge types are closely integrated and used 
concurrently during transitions between search and examination activity.  This results 
in rapid retrieval of the continuous knowledge during transitions for the performance 
of the subsequent activity. Consequently, task performance features resulting from this 
knowledge, which include search templates, attention allocation, comprehension and 
selection of action, are closely integrated. This close integration, as well as the rapid 
retrieval of continuous knowledge results in minimal interference between activities 
during transition between activities. 
Similar to expert security screeners, the transition between non-experts’ search 
and examination activity is characterised by a strong continuity of knowledge in 
consecutive model components. In Figure 62, the relationships between knowledge is 
shown by continuous perceptual and procedural knowledge.  
 
Figure 62. Relationship between search and examination components for non-expert security 
screeners 
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The continuity of both perceptual and procedural knowledge means that during 
activity transitions this knowledge is concurrent and influences the performance of 
both activities. In terms of task performance, this means that search templates, 
attention allocation, comprehension as well as selection of action are all closely 
integrated, resulting in minimal interference between transitioning activities. 
Ultimately, this shared knowledge leads to rapid transitions between search and 
examination activities.  
Comparing the transitions between model components in Figure 61 and Figure 
62, it can be seen that there is little difference between experts and non-experts. For 
both experts and non-experts knowledge both within each model component as well 
as between each model component share substantial relationships. The well integrated 
knowledge for both expert and non-expert security screeners during transitions 
between the search and examination activity reflect the results presented in this 
research. In particular, only minor differences were observed between expert and non-
expert security screeners’ in the performance of search and examination activity 
(Chapter 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
